Rethinking regional development and spatial inequality: evidence from county-level China by Xu, Man
Rethinking Regional Development and
Spatial Inequality: Evidence from county-level
China
By
Man Xu
SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
April 2016

I, Man Xu confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where
information has been derived from other sources, I confirm this has been indicated in
the thesis.

1Abstract
Regional development and spatial inequality in China is an area of research that
has attracted considerable scholarly interest, mainly focusing on the implications of
development theory and development strategies in this transitional and developing
country.
In contrast to most previous studies of China’s regional development and spatial
inequalities based on provincial data, my arguments are drawn from observations on a
much finer scale. In this thesis, information at the county scale is employed to fill a
gap in the literature on Chinese regional development. In addition, as the majority of
previous research has focused on the economic indicators that have had a great
influence upon China’s regional development and spatial inequality, I explore social,
political and ideological, as well as economic, factors in China ’ s transition and
transformation. The central aims of my thesis are to understand current spatial
regional inequality in China at different scales, to explore the relationship between
development and inequality and to explain the factors that cause the inequality
underlying China’s impressive progress in macro economic development.
My thesis identifies and explains spatial inequalities in China at the county scale by
using data from more than 2000 counties, focusing on economic, social, political and
ideological factors. As well as the quantitative data collected from the official
statistical yearbook and documents, my field survey relies on data gathered through
focus groups, questionnaires and interviews in five counties in three different
provinces. Such data illuminates how local people understand and react to rapid socio-
economic development and widening disparities between different groups of people.
Through critical analyses of fieldwork data, this fieldwork intends to explain the
inequality phenomenon and explore the causes of socio-economic disparities at the
county level in China.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Born and brought up in Wuhan, the largest city in the middle part of China, I was
educated in communist ideologies such as ‘everybody is equal in the People’s
Republic of China’. I had complete faith in such mantras until finishing my
undergraduate studies. However, when I worked in Shenzhen after my graduation in
1998, I noticed that there were a lot of wealthy people around me. There was a
popular saying in Shenzhen that, ‘those with 100 thousand RMB are poor, those with
one million are just about going towards wealthy, and only those with 10 million can
be ranked as wealthy [10万是贫困户，100万才起步，千万才算富]’. A typical rich
man in Shenzhen normally has three or four properties, one or two luxury cars and
membership of a golf club, all of which could worth around 5 million RMB in 1998
and nearly 20 million in 2008.
Figure 1- 1: ‘Son for free’ (Source: Xkb.com.cn, 2007)
The difference is striking when comparing the cohort who has become rich first
with the mass majority. For example, I joined a charity group helping rural children
with severe illness such as heart disease, leukaemia or other disabilities. There is no
free medical service for rural residents, which means that children must simply wait to
die if their parents are unable to afford expensive surgery fees. In some extreme cases,
parents abandon their sick children in hospital hoping that wealthy people will adopt
their children and save their lives. Figure 1- 1 shows a woman giving away her son,
who is suffering from thalassemia. Her husband is disabled and they have spent all of
16
their savings on their son’s illness. They have sought help from various governmental
organisations but the allowances they have received are still far from enough.
Eventually, they decided to give their only son to someone able to pay his medication
costs. I was shocked by this huge inequality between rich and poor and wanted to
understand why it was happening.
At the time of beginning my research, Asian countries and regions such as
Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, India and China had experienced high economic growth
in the previous four decades (Heikkila, 2003). China’s economy in particular has been
growing at a rate faster than that of any other country, with annual GDP increasing by
approximately 10% since the economic reform in 1978 (China’s Statistical Yearbook,
2007).
In 2009 (see Table 1- 1), China’s GDP reached 12.5% of the world total, making
it the third largest economy in the world after the US and Japan (People’s Daily
Online, 2009). In terms of the total value of imports and exports, China was the third
largest country after the US and Germany. China has also become the world’s largest
recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI), totalling 148 billion US dollars. China
had accumulated 2.4 trillion US dollars in foreign exchange reserve by the end of
2009, the largest amount in the world to date (China ’ s Statistical Yearbook, 2010).
Given similar sustained growth, China is likely to emerge as the largest national
economy in the world within the next fifteen years.
Table 1- 1：Macro Data of China (Source: World Bank, 2010)
Indicators US Dollars (trillion)
Gross Domestic Production (GDP) 4.91 (2009)
Total Value of Imports and Exports 2.174 (2007)
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Net Inflows 0.148 (2008)
Foreign Exchange Reserve 2.4 (2009)
Substantial disparities in regional development are not new and are found in
almost every geographically large country (Williamson, 1965), as well as in some
17
small countries experiencing rapid development, such as Botswana in south-central
Africa. Since its independence in 1966, the economy of Botswana has been growing at
an annual average rate in excess of 10%. The county has gone from being one of the
least developed and poorest nations in the world to one classified as an ‘upper-middle
income’ economy but severe socio-economic disparities exist between rural and urban
people (Hope and Edge, 1996). Therefore, while maintaining rapid economic growth
and simultaneously getting disparities under control has become both a theoretical and
a practical challenge (Coes, 2008; Barro, 1995; Williamson, 1965), the extent and
causes of the disparity are very complex, and vary considerably from place to place.
China also suffers large inequalities in income (see Wang, 2007; Li and Zhu,
2006 and Lee, 2005), education (for example, Zhang and Kanbur, 2005 and Hannum,
2005) and health care (Akin et al., 2005; Björn and Li, 2004) as well as between
different regions and between groups of people differentiated by age, gender and
social class. Figure 1- 2 for example shows the distinct difference in classroom
facilities between urban and rural areas.
Figure 1- 2：Urban (left) and rural (right) primary school facilities (Source: Xinghuanet, 2006)
These inequalities might have severe economic, social and political consequences.
Due to limited interaction between China ’ s regions, the great differences between
geographical zones, the strong contrasts in the distribution of resources (both human
and natural), and the broad spectrum of technologies and local policies in use,
different parts of China differ widely in their level of economic activities,
organisational forms, and degree of prosperity. This has been particularly exacerbated
in recent years and these disparities have now reached extreme proportions (see Fan
and Sun, 2008; Edward, 2006; Fleisher, 2006; Hu, 2002). The problems are so great
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that the 11th. Five-Year Plan (2005-2010) is intended to reduce inequality. The richest
regions – such as the Yangtze River estuary region centred on Shanghai, the Pearl
River estuary region centred on Guangzhou and Shenzhen, and the Beijing-Tianjin
region – occupy about 1.6% of the territory of China, with less than 10% of the total
population, yet produce over 40% of the GDP (China Statistical Yearbook, 2007).
In particular, Shenzhen (see Figure 1- 3) has the highest per capita GDP in China
(89814 RMB in 2007: equivalent to about £8800) (Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook,
2008) and the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of the local people has been
significantly higher than in several developed European countries.
Figure 1- 3：Shenzhen (Source: Shenzhen Special Zone Daily, 2007)
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Figure 1- 4：Northwestern China (Source: Bbs.5460.net, 2007)
In great contrast, in the poorest areas such as Gansu province (Figure 1- 4) in
north-western China (which is similar in size to France), there are still millions of
poverty-stricken people. In 10% of rural areas (counties or prefectures) per capita
GDP is far less than 2500 RMB (equivalent to about £180) (Gansu Statistical
Yearbook, 2008; Shang, 2007). The inequality between rich and poor has been
growing continuously and rapidly for some time. The Gini coefficient has risen for the
whole of China from a low of 0.33 in 1980 to 0.465 in 2005 (National Statistics
Bureau of China, 2006). This level is much higher than the international warning level
of 0.4. Based on a UNDP (2006) report, 10% of China’s population possess 41% of
the total national wealth. It has been estimated that 60% of the nation’s wealth lay in
the hands of less than 0.5% of families in 2005. The situation is far worse than is
found in any developed capitalist country, such as the US or in Europe.
Nobel Laureate Joseph Stigilitz (2006: p44) has commented that
‘I believe that it is important for countries to focus on equity, on ensuring that the
fruits of growth are widely shared. There is a compelling moral case for equality; but
it is also necessary if there is to be sustained growth. It is important to remember the
big picture: success means sustainable, equitable, and democratic development that
focuses on increasing living standards, not just on measured GDP. Income is, of cause,
an important part of living standards, but so too is health and education. A country’s
20
most important resource is its people. At the extreme, high levels of inequality,
especially as a result of unemployment, can result in social unrest.’
Similar questions have been asked about China’s situation. For example, is such a
long period of high economic growth sustainable in China (Zhang, 2001)? How can
rapid economic growth be maintained and disparities be brought under control
(Kanbur, Qian and Zhang, 2008)? How will such inequalities affect China’s economic,
social and political stability in the future (Knight, 2008; Fleisher, 2006)? Why
disparity in China has become so exceedingly high in recent years (Wan, 2007, 2008;
Fan, 2006)? These questions are becoming matters of grave concern as well as
bringing both theoretical and practical challenges. Therefore, my thesis attempts to
answer these questions via theoretical and empirical research.
1.1 Development and Inequality
‘Development occupies the centre of an incredibly powerful semantic
constellation. There is nothing in modern mentality comparable to it as a force
guiding thought and behaviour’ (Sachs, 1992: 8).
This statement affirms that development has been a very important topic in
academic research since World War II. Fundamentally, ‘development’ refers to
economic development since this is the principal component of development, with the
primary criteria of increasing the quantity and quality of resources of all kinds
(Szirmai, 2005).
However, the identification of development with economic growth has come
under increasing criticism. Authors such as Acemoglu (2008); Ul Haq(1999); Sargent
and Wallace (1995); Terhal (1992); Fogel (1986); Seers (1979) and Koopmans(1965)
along with institutions like the International Labour Organisation (ILO), have pointed
out that developing countries did not experience much change in the living conditions
of the poor in spite of impressive growth figures in the post-World War II period.
They came to the conclusion that development involves more than economic growth
and changes in economic structures. Seers formulated three additional requirements
for the use of the term development, namely that there should be a decrease in poverty
and malnutrition, that income inequality should decline, and that the employment
21
situation should improve (Seers, 1979). Therefore, although the discussion of
development has focused mainly in the economic domain, some social scientists have
stated that development should not be viewed in terms of economics only (Szirmai,
2005; Potter, 2004; Sen, 2000). Instead, one should also pay attention to changes in
family structures, attitudes and mentalities; culture changes; demographic
developments; political changes and nation building; the transformation of rural
societies and processes of urbanisation. Other critics have gone even further and
challenged the narrow focus on the economic dimensions of development alone. This
is because a country can grow rapidly but still do badly in terms of literacy, health, life
expectancy and nutrition (Sen, 2000). The environmental costs of growth are also
insufficiently recognised (Mishan, 1967); and economic growth does not necessarily
make people happier or satisfied (Easterlin, 1972). Criticism of growth fetishism has
led to the emergence of so-called social indicators: life expectancy, literacy, levels of
education, infant mortality, availability of telephones, hospital beds, licensed doctors,
availability of calories, and so forth. The Swedish Nobel Prize winner Gunnar Myrdal
(1957) has argued that discussions of development have implicitly been based on a
series of modernisation ideals or values, while Amartya Sen (1999) has argued for an
even broader concept of development focusing on the concept of freedom. Therefore,
as Sachs (1992) and Drakakis-Smith (1993) argued, ‘development’ should not always
be used as an abbreviation of ‘economic development’ and, instead, it should
encompass social, political, culture dimensions. Many scholars, such as Unwin (1994),
have addressed the importance of such social, political and cultural dimensions in
development.
Thus, defining development is incredibly complicated because it has been debated
continuously since the establishment of development studies several decades ago
(Simon, 1997; Tim, 1994; Drakakis-Smith, 1993; Saches, 1992). Perspectives on its
definition have been changing from time to time in association with world economic
development stages and events (Potter, 2004). As a result, there has for some time
been no widely accepted definition of development. Typical examples of definitions
include:
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- The word ‘development’ (发展) in Chinese is a combination of two characters:
‘发’, meaning gradual growth in scale or quantity, and ‘展’, meaning spatial extent or
spreading (Chinese Dictionary: 290);
- The word ‘development’ means ‘the gradual growth of something so that it
becomes more advanced, stronger, etc.’ (The Oxford English Dictionary: 344);
- ‘The core of development is economic growth’ (Potter, 2004:5);
- ‘Development has connection with social, economic and technological change’
(Unwin, 1994:14);
- ‘Development involves three things: development theories, development
strategies and development ideologies’ (Hettne, 1995:10).
- ‘Development means national enhancement and increases in economic wealth
of a group of people’ (Dawkins, 2003:133).
- ‘Development can be seen; it is argued here, as a process of expanding the real
freedoms that people enjoy’ (Sen, 1999:2).
Inequalities between people, urban and rural, and areas/regions (both within
countries and between countries) are generally induced by natural differences, socio-
economic conditions and policy decisions. Owing to the existence of natural and
inherent differences, complete eradication of disparities is very difficult, if not
impossible. However, it is quite possible to eliminate or, at least, reduce artificial
impediments (e.g. social restraints and policies) that prevent people, areas or countries
developing their full potential. Balanced development tends to provide all people with
equal opportunities (often referred to as a level playing field), enabling them to
participate in development by contributing to, benefiting from and influencing the
decision making involved. Such participation can be expected to provide people with
income and assets, good health, knowledge, respect and recognition.
Compared to development, defining ‘inequality’ is relatively straightforward: it
refers to a difference or disparity, especially connected with unfair treatment (Oxford
Dictionary). When it is used in conjunction with development it refers to the
differences in economic, social, and political aspects between countries, provinces,
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states, continents or people (Yang, 2002; Yao, 2001). Similarly, the interaction of
development and inequality have long attracted extensive attention from across
research fields (Easterly, 2007; Fields, 2007; Edward, 2006; Vicente and Borge, 2000;
Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973; Kuznets,1955), including from economists,
socialists and geographers who have developed many theories, strategies and debates
on development and inequalities. Inequality is often considered to be a consequence of
the development of economic wealth among one group of countries or people at the
expense of another political or social group.
In the context of this thesis, China is also defined as a ‘developing country’.
Commonly, the definition of a developing country refers to nations with low per
capita income, widespread poverty, and low capital formation (Marangos, 2006).
However, modern geographers use the term less economically developed country
(LEDC) to portray the countries classified as developing countries more accurately, a
relative categorisation specifying that they are less economically developed than other
counterparts. More recently, Szirmai (2005:6) defined common characteristics of
developing countries as: ‘a) a relatively large share of agriculture in output and
employment; b) pronounced dualism in economic structure; c) explosive urbanisation;
d) large-scale underutilisation of labour; e) political instability, pervasive corruption;
f) environmental degradation; and g) low levels of technological capabilities’. From
this definition, it can be seen that China meets most of the criteria.
China is also recognised as a transitional economy, which is changing from a
centrally planned economy to a free market. Transition economies undergo economic
liberalisation where market forces set prices rather than a central planning
organisation. The process has been applied in China, the former Soviet Union and
Communist bloc countries.
Inspired by above definitions and debates, I argue that inequality is identified as
the differences between regions, locations, genders, social classes and ethnic groups;
and development as the elimination of a range of types of inequality. As a transitional
developing country, based either on historical evolution or statistical and empirical
data, China’s economic development has not promoted socio-economic equality and
political democracy so far. On the contrary, there is a wide inequality between coastal
and inland areas, between urban and rural, between genders, between social classes
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and between ethnic groups. In order to fully understand the connection between
development and inequality in my thesis, I investigate three dimensions of
development and inequality: economic, social and political. Development is not only
characterised as GDP growth and increasing income but also the equality of social
status, education and health care. In addition, the removal of political corruption and
attainment of political democracy are also essential.
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives
The central aims of this research are to understand the current spatial regional
inequality in China at different scales, to explore the relationship between
development and inequality, and to explain the factors that cause the inequality
underlying China’s impressive macro-economic development progress.
In order to achieve the central aims, the thesis has four objectives. First, this
thesis attempts to understand the current spatial regional inequality in China by
examining county-level data using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and
statistical analysis. To date, most research has concentrated on provincial-level data.
In contrast to provinces, the county is the most basic economic, social and political
unit in China and offers a much finer scale at which to analyse China ’ s spatial
inequalities. However, in China, there are only 31 provinces, but these contain more
than 2000 counties. The huge amount of data collection, arrangement and analysis
required in a county-level study is therefore a big challenge for a researcher, which
means that county-level research lags behind provincial-level research. Therefore, in
contrast to most previous studies which have used provincial data, this thesis fills a
gap by using information based at the county scale.
Second, previous research on China ’ s regional development and inequality has
focused mainly on economic indices, and rarely mentions the social and political
factors which have had a great influence on China’s economic development. One of
the key innovative features of this research is therefore its comparison between social
and economic difference at a range of scales and a willingness to consider how certain
political factors have influenced China’s social and regional economic strategies. This
thesis, therefore, is the first systematic attempt to investigate spatial differences not
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only in terms of economics but also in terms of social and political development
across China at the county level.
Third, this thesis explores insights into debates about uneven regional
development in China, especially the relationship between economic growth and
economic inequality, both theoretically and empirically.
Fourth, in order to explain the factors that cause development inequality, the case
study research analyses data from five counties, with special emphasis on income,
expenditure, saving, education, health care, social welfare, central government
preferential policies, local governance and people’s values and beliefs. As a result, the
research explains how people with different backgrounds– such as age, gender,
location, social status and ethnicity –respond to development and disparities. This also
involves investigating the factors behind the disparities and suggesting practical
means of alleviating such inequalities at the county level in China.
To achieve these objectives, two main methodological approaches are adopted.
The first is the use of GIS to analyse China ’ s recent economic development and
induced regional disparities. To understand the differences in economic and social
development between county and provincial levels, at least three years’ economic data
will be examined (one from the beginning of the economic reform period, one from
the middle, and one from recent years). Within each province, features and conditions
that have important influences the local economy, such as social and geographic
conditions, vary from one county (or area) to another. Unlike provincial division,
county division is smaller scale and so is at little risk of giving rise to regionally
independent forces. In order to provide a distinctive image and scientific interpretation
of the data, GIS is employed to display and analyse the data. Using GIS to analyse the
economic data of over 2000 counties and reveal the detailed spatial distribution of
China’s uneven economic development is an innovative approach, which may offer an
alternative account to that suggested in current regional development studies. Existing
regional development theories and models mentioned in the literature review chapter
are examined, tested and discussed using the new pattern identified by the use of GIS.
In addition, this research investigates the major factors that have caused disparities
between regions, and in particular between urban and rural areas, which include
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geographic, natural and human resources, as well as other social, economic and
political factors.
The second approach is to conduct research with people in five counties
concerning their experiences of development and inequality, in order to provide more
detailed investigation. Further to the nationwide county-level study, three counties
from west China (Gansu province), one county from the middle of China (Hubei
province) and one from a coastal area (Guangdong province) have been selected as
case studies. Via focus groups, questionnaires and interviews, the case studies explore
how people understand development and inequality. They also give insights into the
nature of economic, social and political differences between groups of people as a
result of age, gender, social status, location and ethnicity. Research into the reasons
underlying inequality can provide a basis for the exploration of ways to reduce the
more extreme disparities identified.
1.3 Thesis Outline:
This thesis covers the period from 1949 to the present, and the analyses focus on
economic, social, political and ideological dimensions at the county level. The thesis
consists of nine chapters:
The Introduction (Chapter 1) has covered the rationale for choosing this topic and
how my thesis intends to move existing knowledge forward. It has also introduced the
aims, objectives, thesis outline and definition of the key terms.
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical framework and examines the scholarly
debates from previous literature. Special attention is paid to China’s uneven regional
development in the context of Western and Chinese development theories; the effect
of economic inequality and economic growth, both theoretically and empirically; the
social, political and ideological dimensions of development and inequality; and
development and inequality at county level.
Chapter 3 then investigates the methodologies employed in this research. Both
quantitative and qualitative approaches are used because each has strengths and
weakness, and using them in combination maximises the quality of the analysis. In
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addition, this chapter explains how the data sets – containing over 1.4 million pieces
of data – are collected, managed, selected and analysed. GIS and statistical methods
are both used to analyse the data chronologically and spatially.
Chapter 4 discusses China ’ s regional development history and related
development features prior to the economic reform in 1978, which serves as a
background for further understanding present-day China and its ideological, political,
social and economic dimensions, as discussed in other chapters of the thesis.
Chapter 5 explores the spatial distribution of inequality in China using county-
level data, which gives a different perspective compared to more commonly use
provincial data. This chapter focuses on understanding spatial development and
inequality patterns through county-level data and gives explanations of the maps
created using GIS. It then explores the causes of regional development inequalities.
The political factor is emphasised here but is not the sole reason as other factors, such
as environmental, economic and social, also play an important role.
Chapter 6 presents detailed evidence of interprovincial development and disparity
in Guangdong, Hubei and Gansu. Understandings of development and economic
inequalities– such as in income, expenditure and savings – are explored in order to
ascertain how people react to rapid development and widening inequality, and how
these regional development disparities influence the attitudes and opinions of people
with different backgrounds, such as age, gender, location, ethnicity and social status
(e.g. occupation).
Chapter 7 examines the social inequality between different groups of people by
using fieldwork data. Further to the economic analysis, inequalities in social
development are investigated in more detail, including birth rates, social classification
and social mobility.
Chapter 8 examines the political inequality between different groups of people by
using fieldwork data. Further to the economic and social analyses, this chapter
presents detailed investigation of inequalities in political development, such as local
government preferential policies and corruption as experienced by people from
different backgrounds.
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The last chapter summarises the main conceptual and empirical contributions of
the research, its challenges and constraints as well as directions for future research
about development and disparity in China.
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Chapter 2 Chinese Uneven Regional Development
and Inequality in the Context of Development
Theory
2.1 Introduction
Development has been well established as an important topic in academia since
WWII (Iyer, Kitsonand Toh, 2005; Khanand Jomo, 2000; Martin and Sunley, 1998;
Hirschman and Rothschild, 1973). Relatedly, China’s emergence and transformation
as a transitional developing country has raised many research questions for
economists and geographers. Substantial scholarly interest has focused on regional
development and inequality in China because of its size, history, diversity and
implications for development theory and strategies (Zhang et al., 2008; Woetzel, 2004;
Fu, 2004; Zhang, 2003; Golley, 2002; Zhang and Zou, 1998; Fan, 1995 and Zhang,
1989). The interplay between recent literature on regional development theory and the
transitional economy demonstrates that these two bodies of literature are embedded in
Western regional development theory and strategy. At the same time, during the
transition progress China ’ s new perspectives and ideas on the development process
have shaped regional development theory and vice versa. The aim of this chapter is to
focuses on the key academic debates and arguments that are in particularly associated
with the aspects addressed in the following empirical chapters.
This chapter therefore brings three bodies of literatures together into a conceptual
framework for the specific context of this thesis. Firstly, current prevailing research on
Chinese development, which is mainly based on provincial economic statistical data
and their spatial variations (Zhang et al., 2008; Fan and Wei, 2006; Fu and Wu, 2006;
Golley, 2002; Zhang and Zou, 1998). The significance of scale in terms of
development and inequality has been justified by this literature. Analysis of county-
level data presents a more comprehensive picture of regional development in China,
which is why this thesis employs this scale of analysis. Secondly, the huge amount of
literature on development theory is reviewed (Dawkins, 2003; Barrow and Sale-I-
Martin, 1999; Lucas, 1988; Caldor, 1970; Williamson, 1965; Rostov, 1960; Solow,
30
1956; Schumpeter, 1947) focusing on the key debates and arguments relevant to the
following empirical chapters. Thirdly, China, like all other ex-communist countries
such as Romania, Poland and Vietnam, is in transition from a centrally planned
economic system to a free-market economy (Maragos, 2006; Ding, 2005; Muldavin,
2000). However, as Ding (2005) argued, Chinese development is actually
characterised by a hybrid of a capitalist economic system and a socialist social and
political system. This hybrid symbolisation distinguishes China from both developing
countries, such as the East Asian states, and transitional countries, such as the Eastern
European states (Marangos, 2006). Therefore, this chapter investigates understandings
of the social, political and ideological dimensions of transitional economies
particularly in the context of China (see Figure 2-1).
Figure 2- 1: Key Theoretical Debates (Source: author)
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In order to set up a coherent framework for following empirical chapters, this
chapter consists of five sections. Following the introduction, the second section
focuses on the main arguments of economic geography and the geographies of scale.
The importance of scale in helping with understandings of regional development and
inequality is addressed. The third section reviews the key development models and
economic development strategies that have inspired Chinese development, and which
have consequently induced imbalanced regional development and spatial inequality.
In particular, mature Western unbalanced regional development theories are examined,
such as the Export Base Model (Orloff, 2002; Tiebout, 1956; North, 1955); Dual
Sector Models (Kaldor, 1970; Mydral, 1957) or Neoclassical Growth Model (Barro
and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Koopmans, 1965; Cass, 1965) and Kuznets’s inverted U
model (Higgins and Williamson, 1999; Kuznets, 1965). The fourth and fifth sections
draw special attention to the social and political dimensions of development and their
relationship to economic dimensions. The last section concludes with an analytical
framework for the thesis.
2.2 Geographical Scale
Hewitt (1993:34) states that, ‘the problem of geographical scale has long been
identified as central to the task of geographical research, particularly in regional
studies. Development can be considered at a number of scales. These go from the
individual, the local community, the regional, the national and the global (among
others)’. Elsewhere, Smith (1988:149-50) points out that, ‘in our knowledge of
regional change depend on our ability to pin the processes of change to real places.
An understanding of the production of scale is central to this effort’. The definition of
development may differ by scale and, in addition, strategies of development may be
similarly scale dependent (Torres and Momsen, 2004). Smith and Dennis (1987)
suggest that the continual restructuring not only of geographical space but of spatial
scale is an integral part of the broader experience of uneven development. Inequalities
can be revealed if you look at particular spatial scales (Willis, 2005).
Marceau (1999:348) argued that, ‘every change in scale will bring about the
statement of a new problem and there is no basis for presuming that associations
existing at one scale will also exist at another’. For example, if we analyse national-
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level development data we get no sense of the differences between regions and sub-
regions within the country. Spatial inequalities play a key role in any debate of
development. Some development models and strategies may lead to increasing
inequalities between places, while other development approaches may unambiguously
attempt to decrease spatial inequalities. Haggett (1965: 263) declared that, ‘our basic
dilemma is that generations made at one level do not necessarily hold at another level
and that conclusions we derived at one scale may be invalid at another’. Le Gallo and
Ertur (2003) argue that spatial effects are most important when it comes to smaller
scales. A number of issues, such as the increasing development of trade and
technology between different spatial units on a smaller scale, lead to geographical
dependence. Those factors, if investigated on a provincial scale, maybe insignificant
or unobservable due to their local specificity. However, the county level may show
signiﬁcant spatial effects so ignoring ﬁner scale data analysis may result in misleading
or even inaccurate assessment of development outcomes.
Previous research on regional inequality has been less sensitive to scale and space.
China-based geographers and economists have made some improvements and argued
that regional development in China can be more thoroughly understood through
studies of scalar relations (Ye and Wei, 2005; Huang et al., 2003; Gu et. al., 2001).
Geographical differences within provinces are as enormous as across provinces, and
an improved understanding of regional development requires more studies in different
locales (Wei and Ye, 2009). A finer scale investigation is important because an
outstanding feature of transition and transformation are reshaping China ’ s political
economy, ‘through the process of decentralisation of state power from a single
unitary national scale to multiple local scales’ (Wei, 2002: 111). Therefore,
geographers have researched at a finer scale, including analysing intraprovincial
inequality within local development models and strategies, especially in Jiangsu,
Guangdong and, more recently, Zhejiang Province (Wei and Ye, 2009; Ye and Wei,
2005; Wei and Ye, 2004; Wei and Fan, 2000; Weng, 1998). The research results have
revealed a multifaceted picture with a diversity of factors leading to spatial inequality
in provinces, especially local institutions, geography, and FDI. Fiscal decentralisation
of central-local fiscal relations in China has also been shown to have significant
practical and uneven impacts on regional inequality (e.g., Wei, 2007; Zhao and Tong,
2000).
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Therefore, compared to the provincial level, researching at the county level helps
to provide a better understanding of development and inequality in China, including
understandings of the economic, social, political and ideological dimensions. The
county-level scale offers a new vision of the relationship between people’s everyday
lives in their communities and larger scale forces operating on them.
2.3 Development Models in the Context of Chinese Regional
Development Strategies
Economic development theories have flourished since the 1930s in Europe,
particularly following World War II when people desperately sought to rapidly rebuild
the economy, and economists began to regard economic development as a distinct
subject (Dawkins, 2003). Since then, many economic theories and strategies have
gradually evolved into development economics, Neoclassical Endogenous Growth
Theory (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992; Koopmans, 1965; Cass, 1965), Neoclassical
Exogenous Theory (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Borts and Stein, 1964), Rostow’s
Stages of Growth Theory (Rostow, 1960), Simon Kuznets’s inverted U hypothesis
(Higgins and Williamson, 1999; Kuznets, 1965), Dual Sector Models (Kaldor, 1970;
Mydral, 1957), Growth Pole Theory (Perroux, 1950), Export Base Model (Orloff,
2002; Tiebout, 1956; North, 1955); Cumulative Causation Model (Myrdaland
Sitohang, 1957), Growth Machine Theory (Quah, 1996) and New Economic
Geography (Behrens and Thisse, 2007; Krugman, 1991; 1999). In addition, the post-
war formation of the United Nations – and its attendant agencies, such as the World
Bank, the I.M.F. and the various regional commissions – saw a growth in studies
leading to the emergence of a non-academic strand of development theory (for
example, The World Bank Development Report 1992, 2003, 2005, 2007).
Among the huge amount of literature about economic development theories and
strategies, the following models are particularly discussed in this section in order to
address the spatial characteristics of unbalanced regional development: Export Base
Model (Yang, 2012; North, 1995; Lewis, 1972; Tiebout, 1956), Dual Sector Models
(Woetzel, 2004; Dixit, 1973; Kaldor, 1970) and New Economic Geography (Roberts
et al., 2012; Martin and Sunley, 2007; Paul Krugman, 1991; 1999; 2011; Fan et al.,
2000). This is because, first, the ideologies of these models are specifically favoured
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by Chinese authorities among other Western development models, and are considered
to be the most applicable to China ’ s situation because they explain the spatial
characteristics of unbalanced regional economic development (Wang and Fan, 2004;
Tsai, 2001; Deng, 1983). For example, Wang and Fan (2004) believes that economic
development does not occur in all places at the same time; developing countries in
particular lack resources meaning that it would be viable to concentrate energy on
certain places able to make rapid economic development, and then gradually bring
other places to follow.
Second, prior to 1978, China’s economy was in chaos while other countries and
regions, especially its neighbours, benefited from economic growth (Fan and Sun,
2008). China was very keen to learn from the positive experiences of these countries,
especially from their development strategies. Export-led strategies and market-
orientated economies have been found to be positively related to high economic
growth for developing countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea (Vogel,
1991). Therefore, as successful experiences, these models were also introduced in
China to lead a new era of development economics.
Compared to previous economic models, the Export Base Model emphasises the
importance of trade for economic growth. Douglass North (1955) proposed that a
region’s response to exogenous world demand basically determines regional growth in
local political, economic, and social institutions. This leads to the expansion of both
the export sector and economic base as a whole. Later on, Charles Tiebout (1956：
170) challenged: ‘North’s model ignores the importance of supply-side factors that
ultimately affect a region’s ability to support an emerging export base’. Furthermore,
Lewis (1972:25) declared that, ‘as most industries, both export and non-export, are
attracted to areas where input supplies are ample and growing, it should be expected
that regional growth would be associated with expansion of the export sectors’.
Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea and Malaysia have employed the
export-driven model successfully in practice (Heikkila, 2003). As China has similar
characteristics to its neighbouring countries, it also followed this successful export-
driven model. As the Chinese economist Yao (1999) has suggested, similar to these
Asian countries, China adopted the principal approaches of maximising exports to
developed countries, retaining long-term high growth rates and pursuing high degrees
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of economic freedom. For example, between 1979 and 1980, China established
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces; in the 1980s, it
set up coastal Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs), Coastal
Open Economic Zones (COEZs) and Open Coastal Belt (OCB); and in the 1990s
these policies were extended to all of China (Lee, 2000; Mody and Wang, 1997). It is
commonly accepted that FDI and foreign trade exert a critical influence on regional
economic diversity. Therefore, export and trade encourages China to increase its
involvement in international trading and competition, which in return have beneficial
impacts on its domestic economic development. For this reason, FDI and export have
been extensively investigated and analysed. Therefore, in Chapter Six, I investigate
how FDI and exports have affected personal income associated disparities between
people in different regions.
The Dual Sector Model was coined because many developing countries had dual
economies with both a traditional agricultural sector and a modern industrial sector
(Lewis, 1972). It assumes that surplus labour from the traditional agricultural sector is
transferred to the modern industrial sector, whose growth over time absorbs the
surplus labour, promoting industrialisation and stimulating sustained development.
The Dual Sector Model was expanded by researchers such as Kanbur and Zhang
(2005); Levin (2001); Putterman (1992) because it provides a good starting point for
explaining China ’ s economic development situation. As Kanbur and Zhang (2005)
suggested, in China, the industrial sector had highly developed technology with high
levels of investment in urban environments. The traditional agricultural sector was
characterised by low savings, low productivity, low incomes and considerable under
employment. The modern industrial sector attracted migrant workers from rural areas
(Roberts, 2001). Industrial firms, whether private or publicly owned, could offer better
wages that would guarantee a higher quality of life than remaining in the rural areas.
Indeed, in China, migrating workers moved away from the villages to the towns to
earn higher incomes, and this reflects Lewis’s suggestion that the model would be
driven by a desire to generate more savings. As a result, urban migration from poor
rural areas to relatively rich industrial urban areas gave workers the opportunities to
earn higher incomes and, crucially, save more of their funds. These funds made more
investment possible by entrepreneurs (Solinger, 1999b). Therefore, a growing
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industrial sector requiring labour provided the income for the labour. This would in
itself generate demand and also provide funds for investment. However, Dong (2003)
argued that a regular demand for labour from the industrial sector is problematic.
Technological development may reduce the need for labour. In addition, rural-urban
migration figures have exceeded the jobs that the industrial sector can provide (Guan,
2014). As a result, urban poverty can replace rural poverty. It is interesting that in
China these two arguments have both occurred (Banister and Taylor, 1989). Therefore,
the application of the Dual Sector Models to China ’ s development stage will be
examined and analysed in Chapters Six and Seven, based on the county-level data.
Gunnar Myrdal (1957) proposed that within a given region, the first economy to
industrialise is the one in which economic activity has regularly increasing returns. In
addition, the process of growth tends to feed on itself, which is called cumulative
causation. Underdeveloped regions provide low-wage labours and developed regions,
through spreading, offer benefits to underdeveloped regions. This is a result of the
diffusion of innovations into lagging regions and the growing export markets for
products from these lagging regions. However, another possibility is that it may cause
backwash effects, with capital and labour flowing from the lagging region into the
developed region. Free trade among regions strengthens this process of cumulative
causation by further increasing the economic growth of developed regions at the
expense of economic growth in underdeveloped regions (Dawkins, 2003).
Kaldor (1970) expanded Myrdal’s theory of cumulative causation by introducing
ideas from Export Base Theory and the concept of an efficiency wage. Kaldor
assumed that increasing returns to an economy give early industrialising regions the
advantage in international trade. Cumulative causation sets in when an exogenous
shock increases international demand for an industrial good. Actual monetary wages
may be the same in all regions, but efficiency wages – defined as monetary wages
divided by a measure of labour productivity – become lower in industrialised regions
due to scale economies. Since regions with lower efficiency wages can produce more
output, lead to further reductions in the efficiency wage, growth may build on itself
without boundaries (Dawkins, 2003). Dixon and Thirlwall (1975) argued that Kaldor’s
model captures the main elements of an open economy growth model, which has
relevance to regions within countries and to open developed and developing countries
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alike. At the national level, a built-in balance of payments limitation might suggest
that exports and imports must balance in order to preserve the value of a currency in
the foreign exchange market. At the regional level, it is difficult to conceive of a
balance of payments constraining growth, except to the extent that there may be a
constraint on the regional money supply. There is certainly no requirement that
exports and imports must balance to preserve the value of a currency in the foreign
exchange market.
New Economic Geography, as developed by Paul Krugman (1991), offers static
assumptions about the forces that lead to the emergence of industry clusters. A
combination of centrifugal and centripetal forces causes regional clusters of economic
activity. On one hand, firms with strong scale economies wish to serve national
markets from a single location. Therefore, firms will choose locations with a large
local demand in order to reduce the cost of delivering goods to market. As a result,
firms are most likely to choose a location to which industries have already located,
because firms wish to be close to their workers. The implication of this theory is that
there is a form of circular causation. Once a significantly sized manufacturing belt has
been recognised, it will have a tendency to stay in existence. The significance of this
model is to integrate external scale economies and increasing returns into traditional
models of interregional trade. It has to be noted that this mainly relies on the general
equilibrium model of monopolistic competition developed by Fujita and Mori (2005).
Fan et al., (2000) presented an N-region, N-industry, three-factor evolutionary
economic geography model with monopolistic competition. This model can create
urban systems with different sizes and industry compositions. It shows that the
economic-geographic equilibrium reached by the economy depends not only on initial
conditions, but also on the speed of adjustment (Fan et al., 2000).
Furthermore, among existing development theories and strategies, Simon
Kuznets’s ‘inverted U-curve hypothesis’ is the most influential statement on the
dynamics of development and inequality (Kuznets, 1955). This debate has not been
settled in academia since the introduction of the hypothesis in 1955 (for example,
Candelaria, 2009; Bahmani-Oskooee, 2008; Lahiri and Dillon, 2007; Khasru and Jalil,
2004; Thornton, 2001; Higgins and Williamson, 1999). Kuznets Curve is one of the
most famous hypotheses, introduced by one of the earliest workers in development
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economics, Simon Kuznets (the Nobel Laureate in Economics). It is an empirical
model, as shown in the graph below: the horizontal axis measures the increase in
economic development (presumed to correlate with time), and the vertical axis
measures income inequality. The curve is an inverted U-curve, which means that
economic inequality increases over time while a country is developing, and after a
critical average income is attained, it begins to decrease (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2- 2: Kuznets Curve
In other words, Kuznets’s hypothesis that income inequality increases in the early
stages of economic growth and then decreases is not a law or even a central tendency.
However, ‘about 10% of the country cases are consistent with Kuznets’ inverted-U,
another 10% support an ordinary U, and the remaining 80% exhibit no statistically
significant tendency at all’ (Fields, 2007:579). Therefore, the question of how the
Kuznets inverted U model fits with China ’ s development is both interesting and
theoretically critical: will the U-shape happen, i.e. will inequality start to decrease? In
Chapter Five, Kuznets’s inverted U model is tested based on county-level data.
2.4 Social Dimensions in Perspectives of the Transitional Economy
in China
China, like all other ex-socialist countries such as Romania, Poland and Vietnam,
is in transition from a rigid, centrally planned economic system to a free-market
economy (Gainsborough, 2003; Pickles and Smith, 1998). Taking a political economy
approach, Marangos (2005:662) identified and developed ‘five alternative models of
transition: Shock Therapy, the Neoclassical Gradualist Model, the Post-Keynesian
model of transition, the Pluralistic Market Socialist, and the Non-Pluralistic Market
Socialist Model of transition (the Chinese model)’. Based on the case of China,
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Muldavin (2000) argued that China’s mixed economy is not necessarily a transition to
capitalism, but more an emergent form of modernisation and development.
The social dimension of development was first addressed by classical sociologists
such as Marx and Weber, as it is the fundamental pillar of social theories. Research on
social dimensions primarily includes studying society’s development trends and
human social interactions, seeking to understand how to manage the dynamics on
which societies operate. Marx and Weber, although ideologically opposite to each
other, have made well-known contributions to research on social dimensions. Marxists
such as Callinicos (1983) believe that the critical social problem is the contradiction
between high and low social groups or tiers. Those in high social groups normally
own major means of production, whereas low social groups often have nothing but
their labour. In contrast to Marxism, Max Weber (1994) argued that the development
of capitalism is part of a wider long-run social trend of rationalisation and
bureaucratisation in Western societies. Yet, it is not only capitalism that makes a
profit, socialism also does. The difference is that in the capitalist system government
bureaucracies and capitalist firms can maximise profit by efficiently making use of
impersonal bureaucratic forms (Coleman, 1990). Along with the rise of modern
capitalist society, Jacobs and Asokan (1999) and Brock and Durlauf (2001) pointed
out that social development is a multifaceted and complex process with a communal
social pattern based on family, kinship, class and local community.
Emerging from classical social evolutionism theories, modernisation theory
highlights the positive role played by the developed world in modernising and
facilitating sustainable development in underdeveloped nations. So (1990:23) outlines
that
‘western countries are the most developed, and rest of the world (mostly former
colonies) are on the earlier stages of development, and will eventually reach the same
level as the western world; development stages go from the traditional societies to
developed ones; third world countries have fallen behind with their social progress
and need to be directed on their way to becoming more advanced’.
The dichotomy between traditional and modern societies involves changes in a
number of cultural and institutional dimensions. For example, modern societies are
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characterised by increased upward and downward social mobility in comparison with
transitional static hierarchical societies; and by political democratisation in
comparison to authoritarian rule. Modernisation therefore implies increased roles for
unions, parties, political pressure groups and other associations of civil society
(Charlton and Andras, 2003). Modernisation theory stresses that many societies are
simply trying following the most successful societies and cultures so it has been
criticised for emphasising a one-sided focus on the Western world and its culture.
Contrasted with modernisation theory, dependence theories considered the
development of industrialised countries and the underdevelopment of developing
countries as two parts of one historical process. Developing countries are dependent
countries and underdevelopment is not backwardness but intentional downward
development (Paul, 1997).
Therefore, Ding (2005) argued that Chinese development is actually characterised
as a hybrid of a capitalist economic system and a socialist social and political system.
This hybrid symbol distinguishes China from both developing countries such as the
East Asian states and transitional countries such as the Eastern European states
(Marangos, 2006). As a result, section 2.3 focuses on the arguments of the regional
development and inequality literature and explores Western capitalist development
models and strategies related to China. This and the following section particularly
concentrate on literature related to China ’ s transitional social and political
perspectives, which have significant impact on regional development and inequality.
Household Registration and HuKou
The ‘HuKou’ system (Zhu, 2003) is considered here because unlike any other
developed or developing country, all Chinese residents have a household registration
(or HuKou), by which their movement, education, employment, welfare and even
some activities are manipulated by the state (Cheng, 1994). Under the HuKou system,
every household is designated as rural or urban. Before 1978, citizens had to live and
work in the place where they were permanently registered, normally their place of
birth (Liu, 2005). Since the introduction of the open-door policy, urban workers are
free to apply for and to leave jobs; but they are only entitled to pensions where they
are registered. Rural workers, who often become migrant workers, are forbidden from
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competing with urban workers for higher paying jobs, and, if they do not have jobs,
are even subject to arrest by the state's public security bureau (Wang, 2004).
Basically, the HuKou system shapes the welfare of the rural population in two
ways. First, the rural population are not entitled to access quality education, in urban
areas, resulting in lower educational attainment by rural residents relative to their
urban counterparts (Li, 2009; Lu, 2008). Second, the HuKou system denies the rural
population access to urban employment that rewards education more than rural
employment (Tsang, 1994); this, in turn, discourages the rural population from
investing in education and therefore leads to a further reduction in educational
attainment.
In an investigation of the impact of the HuKou system on social and economic
outcomes at the individual level, Li (2001) found that those who had obtained an
urban HuKou late in their lives fared significantly less well than other urban residents.
Such people tend to have fewer years of education, are less likely to hold state sector
jobs, or to have employer-provided healthcare benefits, and are more likely to be self-
employed or unemployed. Therefore, it is very important for a rural individual to
obtain urban resident status as early as possible. In order to estimate the potential
economic benefit associated with urban HuKou, Liu (2015) conducted pair-wise
comparisons between urban and rural residents of Beijing. In Beijing there are neither
geographical nor informational barriers between the rural and urban populations, so
Liu (2015) argued that the rural–urban income differential can be attributed mainly to
the HuKou system because it denies rural residents the rights to urban life, education,
and employment. On the other hand, urban residents have benefited substantially from
the HuKou system, not from a monetary point of view, but with respect to other
benefits, such as a better quality of life through access to social and cultural activities
in urban areas.
In summary, the HuKou system has played an important role in affecting social
and economic outcomes at the individual level. It is a fundamental cause of rural–
urban inequality, as well as related education, health care, social welfare and
employment inequalities. More details are presented in Chapter Seven.
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Population and the One-Child Policy
Malthus and Malthusians believe that population growth threatens human welfare
and that there are physical limits to the increase in population, such as the availability
of land, energy and raw materials and the carrying capacity of the global environment
(Bergaglio, M., 2001; Hilali, 1997; Dudley and Yaukey, 1992; Ehrlich and Ehrlich,
1990; Malthus, 1798). However, optimists argue that scarcity provides a challenge to
human creativity. Feng et al., (2012) believes that although over-population could
cause a scarcity of resources, scarcity in turn promotes human creativity, which will
be capable of solving all encountered problems. From this perspective, people always
find new technological solutions to the problems of scarcity. For instance, if the prices
of raw materials such as oil go up, it becomes economically feasible to develop
alternative sources of energy. Limits to growth are not fixed, but are shifting all the
time. Well-known representative of this optimistic perspective is Ester Boserup
(Boserup, 1983). In China, these two opinions about the consequences of population
growth have been debated. Ma(1957) suggested that a fast growing population without
the support of a fast growing economy could cause disaster for China, a theory
supported by Chinese leader Deng (Deng, 1983). On the contrary, Mao’s theory
supported human optimists. He asserted that, ‘people have the real power, greater than
God, more people, more power’ (Mao, 1963). Ultimately, China was the only country
in the world to strictly control its population growth rate with a ‘one-child policy’,
implemented in 1979. Optimists and pessimists differ not only in their analysis of
causal mechanisms, but also in their empirical estimates and projections.
The debates on the effect of China ’ s one-child policy are extensive. Chinese
authorities claimed that the birth control policy has effectively prevented 250 to 300
million births. The total fertility rate (meaning the number of children born per woman)
decreased from 2.9 in 1979 to 1.7 in 2004, with a rate of 1.3 in urban areas and just
under 2.0 in rural areas (Kane and Choi, 1999). However, some researchers have
pointed out that although the one-child approach significantly limited the
overpopulation problem, with its associated social and environmental difficulties, it
created other social problems, such as a gender-based birth rate disparity (Ding and
Hesketh, 2006), an imbalanced sex ratio (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997), an ageing
population, named the ‘One-Two-Four’ (one child, two parents and four grandparents)
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problem (Qu, 2014; Friedman et al.,1996; Du, 1992), and discrimination against the
Han Chinese and city communities (as other ethnic groups and rural residents were
able to have two children). Therefore, stemming from these arguments, Chapter Seven
examines how the social consequences of the one-child policy shaped China’s further
social development and inequality according to fieldwork survey data.
Education
Knowledge is a significant factor in regional development (Gewirtz et al., 1995).
An increasing store of knowledge leads to a rising productivity of regional inputs such
as labour, human capital and physical capital, as well as to higher per capita incomes
(Zhang and Zou, 2007). In the long term, the growth of total factor productivity is
mainly determined by the accumulation of knowledge, which is often considered to be
the best available indicator for regional development and competitiveness (Robeyns,
2006; Farrell, 1994). As the spatial pattern of an economy plays a crucial role in
regional development, the distribution of knowledge is just as important as the
creation of knowledge (Bretschger，1999). Knowledge diffusion can be described as
a special type of communication concerned with the spreading of messages that
constitute new ideas (Sutton, 2009).
In line with neoclassical economic theory, greater labour productivity would
result in higher incomes for the categories of employees concerned. It is not only
individuals who would benefit from investment in education, but society as a whole
would also benefit from an increasing supply of better educated workers and citizens.
The human capital theory suggests that with people becoming more and more
educated so they became more productive and better able to handle existing and new
production techniques (Chi, 2008; Yan, 2007; Robeyns, 2006; Wang and Yao, 2003;
Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1961). The indirect effects of education also include more
rapid technological change, reduced fertility and higher infant health. Such positive
external effects are a justification for public subsidies to education. Though highly
influential, human capital theory has also been severely criticised by screening theory
(Stiglitz, 1975) which argues that education in itself does not contribute to a person’s
productivity. Screening theory suggests that much of education in developing
countries is irrelevant as the knowledge and skills acquired in educational institutions
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are not applied in one’s later career. The specific skills required in a profession are
instead learned on the job rather than at school. Expanding the educational system
merely results in diploma inflation and a scramble for the highest diplomas, which is
reflected in contemporary China (Zheng, 2008). Therefore, in my opinion, both
human capital theory and screening theory prove that primary education, secondary
education and skilled worker qualifications are as important as higher education for
the labour market. People with higher diplomas displacing people with lower
educational qualifications will not improve productivity. Like human capital theory,
screening theory is also open to criticism (Blaug, 1985). For example, if screening
theory is valid and education does not contribute to productivity, it is hard to explain
why self-employed people with a higher education usually have higher earnings than
self-employed people with less education (Gregorio and Lee, 2002).
As an ancient civilisation, education was considered the top priority for China.
Therefore, it is not surprising that between 1949 and 1952, the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) organised literacy campaigns in villages, factories and poor sections of
cities, and the number of students doubled (from 24 to 51 million primary school
pupils and from one to two and half million secondary school students) (Hannum,
1999). Now, the government provides nine years of free universal elementary
education throughout the country. This policy is consistent with research outcomes
(China Daily, 2007). For example, Hannum (2003) finds that developing countries
should give priority to primary education because increasing the level of schooling
would lead to higher labour productivity and a personal income levels. In addition, the
rates of return for primary education were consistently much higher than those for
secondary and higher education. However, after 1978, China ’ s investment in
education is not as significant as investment in physical capital, although another
interesting research finding is that in developing countries the rate of return on
investment in education was higher than the rate of return on investment in physical
capital (Li, 2003; Psacharopoulos, 1984).
Social Class Stratification
Before considering how to analyse class stratification, it is important to recognise
that the term ‘stratification’ has its limitation and can be ambiguous (Saunders, 2006).
In the case of a stratification metaphor, the arrangement of different social groups
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within a society is not really like the arrangement of rock in the earth’s crust because
geological strata do not interact with one another, whereas there is some degree of
interaction between social groups in even the most rigid and hierarchical of societies.
Similarly, different geological layers cannot change places relative to one another
whereas in human societies, one group may rise in power and status over time while
another group may fall. Class has been a key issue in sociological analysis. Marx and
Engels (1943) suggested that all societies that had ever existed had been ‘class
societies’ of one kind or another. There was in their view one ‘overriding principle
governing the organisation of human affairs in all societies up to and including the
advent of capitalism and that was that one section of population owned and controlled
the basic material resources at the society’s disposal while another section owned
nothing’. According to Marx, one group of people (the ‘bourgeoisie’ or ‘capitalist
class’) owns the factories, land and banks while another (the ‘proletariat’) has no
choice but to work for the capitalists in return for a subsistence wage which never
reflects the real value of what is produced in the course of labour. Marx did not deny
that sometimes workers could become capitalists and the vice versa. From a Marxist
perspective, the class relationships between social groups are characterised by
contradictions and conflicts (Jessop, 1982). The ruling class is in charge of state
apparatus, and ultimately has completely control over law, religion, culture and
economic development. The Marxist perspective is a source of inspiration for the
empirical study of the social constraints within which government must operate and
the influence of classes, interest groups and pressure groups on government actions
and policies (Lukács, 1971).
However, although Chinese ideology and social society have been deeply affected
by Marxism, understanding social structures and the subjective identification of social
classes is complicated. Is China still a ‘class society’? How have economic shifts and
social changes shaped the way we understand class? Has social mobility done away
with class as a key issue in contemporary societies? Thus, among the different groups
being identified by Chinese sociologists, a deeper understanding of the social relations
developing within these groups is central. Of course, this topic has drawn the interest
of many Western scholars as well. Croll (2011) has focused on increasing inequalities
faced by women; Anagnost (2008) has focused on urban inequality; and Davin (2005)
has, separate from gender, studied inequality emerging within China due to large-scale
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rural-urban migration. All have contributed evidence to understanding the
fundamental structural changes happening in Chinese society after, as Tang and
Parrish (2000:3) says, a ‘socialist contract’ society was turned into a ‘marketing
contract’ society. Research on changes in post-communist East European societies
also shed light on the social consequences of China ’ s reforms. Kornai’s (2006:16)
work concerned the way people’s daily interactions changed due to the prevalence of
what he calls ‘vertical dependency’, where rather than dependence on the self, one
relied on the state and its representatives to meet one’s material needs. Notions of the
self and individual were replaced by collectivised identities. This leads us to
understanding social difference in all its complexity. Bourdieu (1987) has extended
the idea of social differentiation to the facets of social, economic, cultural and
symbolic capital. His intention was not to add to the corpus on class theory but to
assess a set of practices that structure social differentiation and the ways in which
social differentiation is expressed. China today presents an excellent example of the
complexity of social differentiation that occurs when a society undergoes economic
and structural change.
In contemporary China, social class stratification is not yet apparent as it is still in
its transition stage (c.f. Bian, 2002). During Mao’s era, the classification of social
classes was rather simple, with society divided into peasants, workers, intellectuals,
cadres, soldiers and black five elements [黑五类份子]: landlords [地主]; rich farmers
(peasants) [富农]; anti-revolutionists [反革命]; bad-influencers [坏分子]; rightists [右
派 ] (Anagnost, 2008). At present, social classes are much more complicated than
before. Bian (2002) has redefined the class structure as: peasants living on agricultural
products they produce; peasant labourers floating in urban areas; working class;
cadres (both administrative and managerial); rural cadres; private entrepreneurs;
managers; household business owners, individual manufacturers, traders;
professionals; and intellectuals. Sociologist Li (2005:5) suggests a detailed model of
Chinese social stratification: ‘in China today, there is a peasant class, a working class
(urban state worker and urban collective worker, urban non-state worker, and
peasant worker), a capitalist class (about 15 million), and a class of cadre (about 40
million) and quasi-cadre (about 27 million)’. However, there is a problem with above
models/classifications, as they all ignore the fact that China’s economic development,
particularly in the last decade, has significantly diversified the occupation-based social
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classification, and such classifications no long reflect the reality of social status. As
Barbrook (2006:16) commented: ‘in every society the most basic class distinction is
between the powerful and the powerless’. Following this line, a classification model
providing a much clearer and simpler picture reflecting China ’ s current social class
stratification is explained in Chapter Seven.
2.5 Political Dimensions in China from the Perspective of the
Transitional Economy
Modernisation theorists posit a dichotomy between traditional and modern
societies. The economic core of modernisation is industrialisation, which requires a
measure of congruence between economic developments and their social and political
environment. Ding (2005) argued that Chinese development is actually characterised
as a hybrid of a capitalist economic system and socialist social and political system.
Therefore, this hybrid symbolisation make China distinguish itself from either
developing countries such as the East Asia’s states or transitional countries such as the
Eastern European states (Marangos, 2006).
Political Ideology
The CCP still has almost absolute control over politics. The post-1978 reforms on
the mainland have led to some relaxation of control over many areas of society.
However, the Chinese government still continually seeks to eradicate threats to the
social, political and economic stability of the country. China’s economic reforms had
a dramatically improvement; however, political reform is far from being mentioned.
From the political point of view, China is more like a traditional society rather than a
modern society.
Modern society emphasises political democratisation compared to authoritarian
rule and implies increased roles for unions, parties, political pressure groups and other
associations of civil society.
Marxism has been particularly emphasised here as China ’ s overall social and
economic development was governed by Marxist ideologies: principles of common
ownership with the state as trustee, together with generalised fairness (Fan, 1997). As
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one of the most important and influential development theories, Marx’s economics
focused on capitalism and commodity surplus value (King and Howard, 1985). This
originated from classical economic theories such as Adam Smith’s (1776) ‘an
invisible hand’, John Stuart Mill’s ‘utilitarianism and liberty’ (cited from Hollander,
1985), Thomas Malthus’s (1798) ‘population growth theory’ and David Ricardo’s
‘free trade and comparative advantages’ (cited from Ruffin, 2003), which were
characterised by ample economic development ideologies. Marx’s main argument was
focused on capitalism and commodities. He argued that ‘capitalists do not pay
workers the full value of the commodities they produce. The gap between the values
of a worker produces and his wages are a form of unpaid labour, known as surplus
value’ (Marx, 1887).
Adhering to Marxism, Chinese planners believed that capitalists exploit the
surplus value of the wage from workers, making them wage slaves, and the real labour
values are always hidden (Callinicos, 1983). Therefore, China demolished capitalism
in order to achieve the socialist ideology of radical equality. However, Marx’s theory
itself has many inconsistencies, which have been rigorously debated since the 1970s.
For example, Dmitriev (1974) has argued that Marx's theory of labour value cannot
handle the relation between value and price, and that Marx's theory is internally
contradictory on this basis. Kliman (2006) also points out that Marx’s theory cannot
possibly be right since his theory was internally inconsistent. However, in China,
Marx had long been worshiped almost as a god and Marx’s theory provided the
guideline for establishing the CCP and the new government in 1949. For example, on
15th September 1956 at the 8th General Meeting of the CCP, Mao declared that ‘the
ideology of Marxism and Leninism is always the principle of our party’ (Mao,
1956:116); and in February 1959 in an interview made by the director of Chile’s
newspaper ‘The Last Minute’, Mao said that ‘Marx-Lenin Economics is to use
Marxism-Leninism’s point of view to investigate economic phenomena’ (Mao,
1959:34).
Therefore, unsurprisingly, any policy developed in 1978 that reversed radical
equality policies was questioned and debated in the context of whether China would
become a socialist or a capitalist country (Yu and Chen, 1985; Gu et al., 2001). For
example, uneven regional development policies were to concentrate the limited capital
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and resources at that time to enable only a small group of people and some chosen
regions to become rich first. Therefore, these strategies were against Marxist ‘fairness’
ideology. In order to justify the new strategies in line with the CCP’s principle of
Marxism, the CCP authorities and researchers had to find theoretical support from the
Marxist model that could rationalise such transformation. For example, researchers
such as Fan (1997:622) in their well-cited paper argued that ‘China was a semi-
colonial and semi-feudal country when it adopted socialism; and because it has not
yet reached the socialist stage as defined by Marx and Lenin, the transition to
socialism would entail a very long process’. Therefore, it is viable for China to fully
adopt classical Marxism, as Deng (1993) pointed out that ‘classical Marxism was
designed for mature socialist societies but not for nations at a primary stage of
socialism and with a low level of economic development. Therefore, it is fair to
combine Marxism and the special practices of China to form a specialised Chinese
Socialist System’. Engaged in these debates, one of my field research objectives is to
explore whether ordinary Chinese people prefer radical equality or uneven
development policy.
In addition, the relationship between politics and economics is co-dependent.
Marx (1959) defined development in the economic sphere of society as the
‘substructure’ and development in culture, religion, politics and law as the
‘superstructure’. He suggests the substructure (the development in the economic
sphere) determined the superstructure of society (the development in the social,
political and ideological sphere). On the contrary, according to Weber’s thesis (1994),
the Protestant ethic favours economic development. Weber pointed out that the
combination of diligent and disciplined work in one’s professional ‘calling’ and
religiously motivated sobriety in consumption promoted high levels of savings and the
accumulation of capital. Thus the Protestant work ethic is the determining factor in the
rise of capitalism and process of economic growth in the West.
In my view, neither Marx nor Weber’s theories can explain the relationships
between economic, social, political and ideological development in the context of
China. Whether in ancient or modern China, economic growth does not necessarily
suggest social, political and ideological development, and vice versa. The economic
sphere cycles up and down, and the social, political and ideological spheres cycle in
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their own pattern, although these cycles sometimes connect with each other. However,
it seems that economic growth remains one of the necessary conditions for long-term
development and that economic development can be explained by economic,
historical, institutional, cultural, demographic, political, social and ecological factors
(Lee, 2000). For example, development involves a wide range of changes in a variety
of social indicators such as health, education, technology or life expectancy, which are
directly or indirectly linked to economic changes (Knight, 2008). Therefore, the fact
that there are modernisation ideals or development goals do not mean that all societies
ought to develop in the same manner or that they ought to converge at some common
standard (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977).
Corruption and Local Governance
Weber (1994) considered state formation to be one of the important perquisites
for economic development. Political centralisation, uniformity of regulation at the
national level and the development of a well-functioning government bureaucracy
increase predictability, which is a prerequisite for rational calculations of costs and
benefits in a market economy. Legal protection of individual ownership rights by
central rules, sanctioned by the central apparatus of violence, contributes to
entrepreneurship and investment in capital goods and technical innovation. In the long
term these lead to an increase in collective welfare (Hebel, 2003).
A key political condition for economic development is political stability. Political
instability, social unrest and abuse of civil rights hamper long-run capital
accumulation (Fosu, 1992), whether in the form of political turmoil, ethnic tensions or
unpredictable changes in regimes and governments, which cause economic stagnation.
Kuznets (1966) identified a minimum degree of political stability for assuring a stable
relationship between entrepreneurs’ efforts and rewards. Another important political
condition for economic development is good governance (Ndulu and O’Connell,
1999). Good governance has a wide range of connotations, including the effectiveness
of governance bureaucracies, prudent macro-economic policies, transparency and
predictability in public decision making, the existence of checks and balances to
control the abuse of political power, the insulation of the bureaucracy from undue
influences from pressure groups, the rule of law and the impartial and independent
functioning of the judicial system.
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One of the important dimensions of good governance is a low degree of
corruption. Corruption takes many forms, including bribery, nepotism, fraud,
patronage and extortion. Rock and Bonnett (2004) summarise an increasing volume of
recent empirical research showing that corruption has negative influences on
economic growth (e.g. Booth, 1999; Wei, 1997a; 1997b). The negative effects of
corruption on growth include the fact that corruption acts as a tax on investment, and
substantially reduces the rate of investment and therefore of growth. It also reduces
the rates of return of capital. An unexpected effect of corruption is that it is likely to
increase the rate of investment in public infrastructure while decreasing its quality and
productivity (Rock and Bonnett, 2004). The often noted paradox that developing
countries prefer investments in new infrastructural projects, rather than maintaining
existing infrastructure, becomes more understandable (Roberts et al., 2010). Thus,
corruption contributes to the decay of existing infrastructure.
The negative influence of corruption on the rate of growth does not mean that
corrupt societies cannot experience rapid growth. For example, China and Indonesia
are two countries that have combined pervasive corruption with rapid economic
growth (Pei, 2001). However, Indonesia’s experience during the Asian crisis of 1997
illustrates that corruption can reach levels at which a regime becomes totally incapable
of responding adequately to economic challenges (Timmer, 2004). Reducing the
extent of corruption is a difficult task as corruption is deeply embedded in the nature
of political systems.
The Chinese official stance appears to be a synthesis of the major political
leaders’ beliefs, with Deng Xiaoping playing a key role as arbiter between the
reformers and conservatives, and influences the parameters within which the official
discussion of corruption and reforms occurs. Although there are disagreements about
the causes of corruption, the leadership and official publications all agree that, unless
corruption can be brought under control, it poses a serious threat to the reforms, if not
to the regime (Ostergarrd and Petersen, 1991: 89-91). For example, as the Official
Government Position on Corruption, in 1982 the Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress defined corruption as:
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‘smuggling, illicit currency exchange, seeking exorbitant profits, stealing public
property, speculation and profiteering, stealing and selling valuable cultural relics,
and demanding or receiving bribes.’ (NPC on Publishing Crimes, 8 March 1982:155.)
In 1985, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate
defined corruption as:
‘Activities by state personnel who use their positions to acquire public property
by misappropriation, embezzlement, theft, fraud or other illegal methods’. (Answers
to Several Questions by the Supreme People’s Court: 156)
However, while political stability and good governance are a prerequisite for
economic development, economic development is not necessarily a prerequisite for
political stability and good governance. It is true that when there is economic growth,
capital accumulation and an increase in productivity can allow an effective
government administration to be financed and the government to play a mediating role
in conflicts between social groups and classes (Zhuang et al., 2010). However, under
certain circumstances economic growth may also trigger bad governance and give rise
to political instability (World Bank, 1992). This is because, in accordance with
Kuznets’s well-known U-curve hypothesis, income inequality tends to increase during
the early industrialisation (Kuznets, 1955). Economic growth leads to increasing
inequality between groups who benefit from the increase in productivity and those
groups who do not. This growth and industrialisation can give rise to political tensions
and conflicts until a certain redistribution of access to the new production factors takes
place and inequality is decreased. World Bank (1992) emphasises that such
redistribution does not occur automatically. Political elites can try to mitigate social
tensions by co-opting the economically rising groups and improving their access to
political power and social status. At the same time, a regime can increase its
legitimacy among the poorer masses not profiting much from economic growth by a
process of political democratisation.
2.6 Analysis Framework
Since the mid-1990s, geographers such as Fan and Sun (2008); Ho and Li (2008);
Kanbur and Zhang (2005); Jones et al., (2003) have made significant contributions by
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using updated, newly released data to reveal a more complete picture of regional
inequality in China. Their work challenged the conventional ideology of regional
convergence under Mao and regional divergence during the reform period after 1978.
As summarised by Li and Wei (2010b) and Fan et al., (2003), they argued for the
dynamic and multi-scalar nature of regional inequality, and the significance of central
and local governments and regions in uneven development. In addition, scholars have
attempted to uncover reasons for regional inequality, including notions of transitional
institutions; multiscalar and multi-mechanism, externally driven development; and
place-based development, etc. (e.g., Wei and Fan, 2000; Wei, 1999; Yang, 1990). The
effects of fiscal decentralisation, foreign investment, state investment, labour mobility,
technology, and privatisation on regional development have also been analysed (e.g.,
Hu, 2007; Fu and Wu, 2006; Ma, 2006; Zhang, 2005; Lu and Wang, 2002; Bian, 2002;
Wei, 2000; Ying, 1999; Zhang and Zou, 1998; Fan, 1997; 1995). Along with
economists and scholars in China (e.g., Lu, 2003；Bao et al., 2002; Luo et al., 2002;
Raiser, 1998), geographers have exposed the strengthening of the coastal-interior
divide, the decline of interprovincial inequality in the 1980s due to problems in SOE
(state-owned enterprise) dominated regions favoured by Mao’s military
industrialisation policy, and the emergence of a group of coastal provinces driven by
foreign investment and non-state enterprises. Wei’s (2002:118) ‘multiscale and multi-
mechanism framework conceptualises the process of China’s economic reforms as a
triple process of decentralisation, marketisation, and globalisation, and argues that
multiscalar regional inequalities (interregional, interprovincial, intraprovincial) are
driven by a multiplicity of agents (including the global investor, the state, and the
local agent) unleashed by the triple process, which have interactively and jointly
produced the uneven landscapes of regional development in China’. The work of
China-based geographers has enhanced understanding of these processes and the
bottom-up forces at work. They argue that treating the region as the geographical
sphere (i.e., expanding the scale of analysis to encompass the entire planet) is most
suited to framing interactions of complex social processes in an era of globalisation
(Cartier et al., 2005), and that regional inequality is shaped by the complex interplay
of globalisation, institutions, and region-specific factors (Wei, 2002). Cartier et al.,
(2005) has criticised Skinner’s macro-region model for its theoretical base in location
theory, treating the region as a ‘container’ and ignoring causal processes and
54
transboundary activities. Such a critique is situated in the broadening of economic
geography from neoclassical location theory to institutional, relational and cultural
perspectives. Unlike conventional work on regional inequality focusing on the macro
scale, the efforts of Chinese geographers to scale down research and connect to
regional development theories have improved understanding of how causal forces
shape the trajectories of regions and the evolution of regional inequality. The
institutional turn in economic geography has placed institutions, particularly the role
of development states in China, at the centre of the regional development literature
(Zhang et al., 2008; Wei, 2007; Wei and Fang, 2006; Zhu, 2003; Dawkins, 2003;
Démurger et al., 2002a; Martinand Sunley, 1996; Yang, 1990). The notion of
conditional convergence is limited because it removes some structural, local variables
that significantly influence regional inequality (Petrakos et al., 2005). Despite such
progress, research on regional inequality in China can be further deepened and
broadened.
First, the scalar nature of regional inequality and bottom-up forces can be studied
further. Most economists working on China deal with regional inequality at the
provincial level, with limited studies on intraprovincial inequality, while much of the
work of geographers on local development is rarely connected with the study of
regional inequality. A scalar perspective presents a typology of regional inequality
(Wei et al., 2011), and has the potential to link inequalities from the macro scale to the
micro scale, even everyday life experiences. The ways in which multiple mechanisms
operate at each scale are extremely complicated and require substantial attention. At
even finer scales, one can analyse intracounty and intraurban inequalities, which have
drawn some attention from economists, geographers and political scientists working
on China (e.g., Wei, 2002).
Second, regional inequality can be manifest in many different forms, such as
rural-urban, interurban, and rural inequalities, as well as inequalities in specific sectors,
such as the technology divide and social inequality, which remain less studied (Li and
Sen, 2003). With globalisation and liberalisation, inequalities in those dimensions,
especially social and political inequality, have been intensified and merit more
attention from geographers.
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Third, with the scaling down of the discipline of geography and the distance from
public policy, few geographers are engaging in the debate on regional development
policy in China, including the recent Great Western Development Strategies, although
China-based geographers have been heavily involved in numerous policy efforts. As
far as many are concerned (e.g., Dawkins, 2003; Démurger, 2002a), geographers
cannot afford to abandon ‘totalisation’ and distance themselves from large policy and
political issues of national and even global significance.
Therefore, based on the conceptual framework of this chapter, this thesis argues
that ‘development’ has economic, social, political and ideological dimensions in the
context of Chinese development, according to both statistical and survey data at the
county scale. By engaging with debates on development models, theories and
strategies, this thesis fills in two gaps in the literature: it uses county-level rather than
provincial data; and economic, social, political and ideological dimensions are used to
examine Chinese development and inequality.
Chapter Three describes the methodologies employed in this research. Both
quantitative and qualitative approaches have been used because each has strengths and
weakness, and using them in combination can maximise the quality of the analysis. In
addition, this chapter explains how the data sets, containing over 1.4 million pieces of
data, have been collected, managed, selected and analysed. Both GIS and statistical
methods are used to analyse the data chronologically and spatially.
The historical and statistical part of the thesis includes two chapters. Chapter Four
addresses the historical evolution of China’s regional development history and related
development features prior 1978, which serves as a background for understanding
contemporary China, including its ideological, political, social and economic
dimensions. Chapter Five explores the spatial distribution of inequality using county-
level data, which offer a different perspective compared to provincial data, and
explains the understandings of disparity shown by the maps. In addition, in order to
understand China’s regional development disparity from county data, the Export Base
Model, Dual Sector Model, and Kuznets inverted U model are tested. This explains
why development and inequality exhibit different patterns at the provincial and county
scales. Then, by exploring the relationship between economic growth and economic
inequality using county-level data, this chapter considers the causes of the inequalities.
56
Political factors should not be considered to be the sole reason as other factors –
geographical, economic, social, and ideological – also play an important role.
The empirical part of thesis focuses on how different groups of people –
segmented by age, gender, location, ethnicity and social status – understand and react
to rapid development and widening inequality. Chapter Six emphasises the
relationship between development, inequality and economic indices, such as income,
expenditure, savings and consumption. Chapters Seven and Eight examine social and
political inequality between different groups of people by using fieldwork data.
Further to the economic analysis, these chapters investigate the relationship between
development, inequality and indices of social and political development, such as
education, health care, social stratification, political policies, local governance and
corruption.
Chapter Nine summarises the conceptual and empirical contributions of the thesis;
the policy implications of the main findings; the research challenges and constraints of
the thesis and possible future research directions on development and inequality in
China.
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Chapter 3 Research Design
3.1 Introduction
In order to achieve the research aims and objectives, a good and practical research
design must reflect research questions which draw out a conceptual framework and
knowledge of the advantages and disadvantages of different techniques (McQueen and
Knussen, 2002). Rubin and Babbie (2008) have argued that researchers should be
explicit about the research process, including participant selection and analytical
procedures. In accordance with the above, this chapter aims to explain the
methodology that was used to achieve the research aims in accordance with the
theoretical framework. This research design illustrates how economic, social, political
and ideological dimensions affect China ’ s development and the current spatial
regional inequality underlying China ’ s impressive macro-economic development
(especially since 1978) at different scales.
In order fully to understand and explore these dimensions of China’s development
and disparities, both quantitative and qualitative approaches have been used in this
thesis. Quantitative methods generally involve counting and measuring and are able to
grasp changes in indices, especially regarding economics, social development and
demography; while qualitative methods focus on descriptive information, exploring
social actors’ meanings and interpretations, and recognising how policies are changed
as they are implemented at various levels (Sullivan and Gilbert, 2004). Jones et al.,
(1997) points out that single methodology approaches (qualitative only or quantitative
only) have strengths and weakness. Using a combination of methodologies (both
qualitative and quantitative) can bring their relevant strengths to the fore. This is one
of the crucial aspects in justifying a mixed methodology research design, as focusing
on any one of the methods alone may lead to important parts of the research context
being missed (McQueen and Knussen, 2002). Therefore, both quantitative and
qualitative studies are applied in this research, and extensive data and information is
gathered in order to investigate the critical fact that regional disparities do exist in
China’s nationwide economic development, and to determine and analyse the causes
of such disparities.
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This chapter begins by providing a justification for statistical data collection
methods and the reliability of statistical data. Section 3 examines how a field survey
of local residences’ data through focus groups, questionnaires and interviews in five
counties of three provinces was designed and put into practice. Section 4 explains how
the quantitative and qualitative analytical methods were used to analyse the statistical
and survey databases. The last section clarifies the implications of the research
methods and how these methods overcome key challenges of the research.
3.1.1 Statistical Data Collection and Processing
Data used by this research has been obtained from two sources: official statistical
data and field survey data. This section focuses on the justification of statistical data
collection methods and reliability of data. Statistical data analysis has been widely
used in different domains of economics, business, science and social science because
it is normally regarded as the abstraction of information and knowledge. Although the
reliability of China ’ s statistical data had once been questioned by some researchers
(e.g. Xue, 2004；Holz, 2002), analysis of statistical data have been extensively used
to understand China ’ s development and inequality, using a process entailing
inspection, modelling, suggesting conclusions and supporting decision making
(Bramall, 2008; Zhang, 2006; Fu, 2004; Démurger, 2002). Therefore, this section
includes two parts: data collection and data reliability. This first part focuses on
economic and social statistical data that have been collected, compiled and released
publicly by Chinese governments and statistical bureaus at national and provincial
administrative levels. Therefore, this data forms the mainstay of the raw materials on
which this research has been built, as it provides a primary picture of the economic,
social and development status of China over the years. It has also been extensively
employed by researchers, analysts and governmental officials for a range of purposes,
both domestically and internationally (Bramall, 2008; Zhang, 2006; Fu, 2004;
Démurger, 2002). The second part of the section examines the reliability of the data
because the accuracy of the data plays a key role in terms of quantitative methods. It
is therefore essential to evaluate the data accuracy and quality as far as possible in this
section.
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3.1.2 Data Source and Data Selection
Chinese development and inequality have been widely researched, but mostly at a
provincial level (for example, Ho and Li, 2008; Knight, 2008; Kanbur et al., 2008;
Huang et al., 2003; Jian et al., 1996). Compared to the provincial level, researching at
the county level provides a better understanding of development, and in particular
inequality in China’s economic, social, political and ideological development (section
2.4 gives detailed rational arguments for choosing county-level data). Only two papers
(Tsui, 2005 andYin, 2003) have conducted their studies at county level. However,
both studied only fiscal disparities and statistical data that were collected before 2003.
Using provincial data has its limitations. For example, one of the most developed
provinces, Guangdong, has some of the richest cities (e.g. Shenzhen and Guangzhou)
and also some of the poorest areas (e.g. Shaoguan) in China. Such development
inequalities are not identified in research focusing on comparisons at a provincial level.
In contrast, this thesis is based on a smaller scale than most previous debates of China’
s development and inequalities. Besides economic aspects, it also explores social,
political and ideological factors such as the economic infrastructure, personal income,
social class stratification and biased policies that have caused such inequalities.
One of the main difficulties in conducting the study at a finer level is the amount
of data that needs to be processed. The county-level data set is over 67 times the size
of the provincial data set in terms of any single index. For example, in 2000, there
were only 31 province-level administrative units, which included 4 municipalities
(Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), 22 provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin,
Liaoning, Hebei, Shaanxi, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Fujian,
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shanxi,
Gansu, Qinghai), and 5 autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region,
Ningxia Hui Nationality Autonomous Region, Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous Region,
Tibetan Autonomous Region, and Guangxi Zhuang Nationality Autonomous Region).
In addition, there were two special districts (Hong Kong and Macao), and Taiwan,
which Beijing considers a province but is not actually under the administration of the
People’s Republic of China (NBS, 1990). In comparison, there were over 2000
counties (including county-level cities) across China (the number of counties in each
province-level unit varies significantly from 3 to 140, see Table 3- 1).
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Table 3- 1: Administration Unit Number (Source: derived from National Bureau of Statistics)
Province-level Unit Province Name Number of Counties
Municipalities Beijing 5
Shanghai 3
Tianjin 4
Chongqing 26
Provinces Heilongjiang 66
Jilin 41
Liaoning 44
Hebei 126
Shaanxi 109
Shandong 91
Jiangsu 58
Zhejiang 62
Anhui 61
Jiangxi 81
Fujian 59
Henan 110
Hubei 66
Hunan 88
Guangdong, 77
Hainan 18
Sichuan 140
Guizhou 78
Yunnan 120
Shanxi 87
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Gansu 76
Qinghai 39
Autonomous
regions
Inner Mongolia Autonomous
Region
84
Ningxia Hui Nationality
Autonomous Region
20
Xinjiang Uigur Autonomous
Region
87
Tibetan Autonomous Region 72
Guangxi Zhuang Nationality
Autonomous Region
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Data used by this study are taken from the Statistical Yearbooks published by the
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) and the Provincial Bureau of Statistics.
The original statistics provide records of 20 indices per county per year from 1992 to
2006 (see Table 3- 2). As mentioned above, one challenge of this thesis is the
collection and processing of the database –around 1.4 million pieces of data were used
by this study. The creation of this database has been a very time-consuming task as
most of the data provided by NBS are not in digital format. It took the author nearly
five months (eight hours a day for 20 days a month) to type these data sets manually
into an Excel file. All the data have to be manually typed up and put into a digital
format so that they can be further processed by analysis tools such as GIS.
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Table 3- 2: County-Level Data Indices (Source: derived from National Bureau of Statistics, 1992-
2006)
Unit: RMB GDP (100 million RMB )
Value-added of Primary Industry (100 million RMB )
Value-added of Secondary Industry (100 million RMB )
Industrial Value-added (100 million RMB )
Annual Per Capita Net Income of Rural Households (RMB )
Local Government Revenue (100 million RMB )
Local Government Expenditure (100 million RMB )
Outstanding Loan of Financial Institutes at Year-end (100 million
RMB )
Outstanding Amount of Savings Deposits of Urban Households
(100 million RMB )
Unit:Persons and
Household
Population at the Year-end (10000 persons)
Of which: Rural Population (10000 persons)
Student Enrolment in Regular Secondary Schools (10000
persons)
Student Enrolment in Primary Schools (10000 persons)
Number of Households at Year-end (household)
Percentage GDP Index (%)
Unit: Ton Total Output of Crop Cultivation
Total Output of Meat
Unit Number of Beds in Hospitals and Sanitation Agencies (10000
units)
Number of Social Welfare Nursing Centres (unit)
Number of Beds in Social Welfare Nursing Centres (unit)
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Another challenge of this thesis is the dimension covered by the statistical data
sets. From the above table, 14 out of 20 indices belong to the economic dimension; 6
are social data; and there are no data published on political or ideological dimensions.
This is partly because political and ideological data are very sensitive in China so the
publication of these data is strictly controlled by central government. Therefore, in
order to remedy this limitation of statistical data, conducting a field survey is essential
because it is able to collect detailed first-hand county-level data about the ideological
and political dimensions.
3.1.3 Statistical Data Accuracy
The reliability of China ’ s statistical data had once been questioned by some
researchers (Holz, 2004a; Xue, 2004). Indeed, over-reporting of output data through
China’s traditional regular reporting (statistical) system has been a problematic issue
for many years in China (Wong, 2001; Rawski, 2001). This is because the
exaggeration of outputs was once particularly prevalent in the lower tier of statistical
bureaus (below county level) when reporting to a higher bureau (county statistical
bureau and then provincial, eventually reaching to the state level). In addition, the
output data was to some extent based on estimation, and most importantly, the data
had long been seen as a judgement on local officials’ achievement. As a result, the
quality of these data is likely to be poor, often no more than guestimates, and easily
subject to manipulation. Therefore, the reliability of these data is in turn likely to be
low prior to 1996. In many cases, overstating is so apparent that some higher level
statistical bureaus had to fight against data falsification by ‘squeezing the water
content’ away from the data they received from an immediate lower-level statistical
bureau (Rawski and Xiao, 2001).
In order to remove data falsification in 1996, along with the success of the
economic system’s transformation from central planning to market economy, the
Chinese government decided to revise Statistic Law, through which innovative
changes were made to the old data collection and regular reporting system. Starting
from 1996, the Chinese statistical data collection system consisted of three methods: i)
a regular reporting system; ii) censuses; and iii) sample surveys. Censuses and sample
surveys have been added to the existing regular reporting system to significantly
reduce the role of the traditional reporting system (Chow, 2006).
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Above the regular reporting system, which involves the lower tier of statistical
bureaus making regular statistical reports to the higher tier of bureaus and the results
eventually reaching the state level (Holz, 2004a), censuses double-check the
comprehensiveness and accuracy of China’s statistical data, adding an influential extra
function to the regular reporting system. Holz (2004b) give the example of the tertiary
sector census of 1993, which led to a large number of revisions to the value-added
data. As a result, GDP had to be revised for the years 1978 to 1993. Holz (2006:54)
stated, ‘China ’ s National Bureau of Statistics announced a benchmark revision of
national income and product accounts statistics based on the findings of the 2004
economic census. The benchmark revision covers the years 1993-2004 and comprises
revised nominal values of economy-wide and of sectorial value added, as well as
revised real growth rates’.
Sample surveys are established because the traditional reporting system does not
reliably cover some activities. Therefore, in 1984 the National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS) established urban and rural survey teams as administrative facilities directly
under its control. In 1994, the NBS enterprise survey teams were equipped with
networked computing systems so that data could be easily shared among them. By
2004, the NBS had established 857 rural survey teams in China’s over 2000 counties
and 226 urban survey teams in its 663 municipal or county-level cities (Holz, 2004a).
The main advantages of directly employing survey teams are that the NBS can ensure
the quality of collected data and obtain selective data quickly, which it cannot easily
get from lower tiers of statistical departments. In addition, high-quality data on some
productive units that are not reported directly to statistical authorities can also be
gathered by the survey teams. Most importantly, sample surveys reduce the
possibilities of data falsification at the local level.
Furthermore, party and administrative disciplinary policies are enforced through
the NBS. In 1997, the NBS cooperated with the CCPCC Disciplinary Commission
and the CCPCC Organizational Department in drafting a document attacking data
falsification. The offices of the CCPCC and State Council formally issued the
document in February 1998 warning ‘local officials not, because of a discrepancy
between reality and the targets they are responsible to achieve, to falsify statistics or
command the falsification of statistics’(CCPCC/SC, February 16, 1998).
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Given such innovative changes to the data collection systems and the introduction
of a series of disciplinary measures against data falsification, it is believed that since
1996 China ’ s overall statistical data has been reasonably accurate, more or less
reflecting a true picture of its realities (Wong, 2001; Rawski, 2001). Thus, in order to
avoid any inconsistencies for data analyses which would mislead the analytical results,
this research only employs the post-1996 statistical data. Furthermore, in order to
provide enough information to produce representative research results, the statistical
data specifically cover a ten-year time span used for sample studies from 1997 to 2006
because it is in these ten years that China ’ s economic development accelerated and
inequalities dramatically enlarged accordingly.
Specifically, this study has used the following variables (see Table 3- 3) for
detailed comparison and analysis. These variables were either taken directly from or
derived from the raw statistics collected in the database constructed for this research.
The justification for choosing these variables is explained in section 5.2.
Table 3- 3: County-Level Data Indices (Used in Thesis (Source: calculated and derived from
National Bureau of Statistics, 1997-2006)
Per capita GDP calculated from GDP and population
Per Capita Net Income of Urban/Rural Residents calculated from Net Income and
population
Per Capita Residents’ Savings Deposits calculated from Savings and population
Per Capita Local Government Revenue calculated from Local Government
Revenue and population
Per Capita Local Government Expenditure calculated from Local Government
Expenditure and population
Per Capita Outstanding Loan of Financial Institutes calculated from Loans and
population
Student Numbers per 10000
Hospital Beds per 10000
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3.2 Field Research Practice
The second part of the research consists of data that has been collected directly in
field surveys carried out in five counties of three provinces in China. This first-hand
information vividly reveals the actual disparities that exist between different areas and
different groups of people, which would have otherwise been hidden within
government statistics (Hamel et al., 1993).
Besides data coming from official Statistical Yearbooks, conducting a field
survey is also necessary because through focus groups, questionnaires and interviews,
fieldwork helps to collect detailed first-hand county-level data of the ideological,
political, social and economic dimensions of development. Unwin (1994) suggests
that all groups of people have four main types of activities: economic, social, political
and ideological. Unwin (1994) also argues that none of the four dimensions operate
independently from one another during development. For example, development
engages a large range of changes in a diversity of social indicators such as population,
life expectancy, education and social classes, which are directly or indirectly linked to
economic transformation. This conceptual framework was discussed in detail in
section 2.3.
Therefore, following the analytical framework of this thesis, the field
investigation aims to understand these economic, social, political and ideological
dimensions. It reveals the reality of how people understand and react to rapid
economic development and widening disparities between urban and rural areas, and
between rich and poor people; and how development and disparities affect their well-
being and relationships with family members, relatives, friends, neighbours,
communities, and other ethnic groups. Through critical analyses of fieldwork results,
the field survey explains the inequality represented by county-level statistics, uncovers
reasons behind the disparities between different ethnic groups and communities, and
seeks practical ways of alleviating such inequalities at the county level inching.
Jones et al. (1997) points out that a central aspect in justifying a mixed
methodology research design is that every single methodological approach has its
strengths and weaknesses, and the combination of different methodologies can draw
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on their relevant strengths and avoid their weaknesses. Focusing on any one of the
methods may lead to important parts of a story being missed.
This thesis uses different research methods to make a full investigation of China’s
development and disparities. Alongside quantitative analyses using statistical data,
different qualitative methods are also used to better understand different aspects of the
research topic. In particular, questionnaires are used to help better understand
economic, social, political and ideological disparities; focus groups and interviews are
adopted to identify the reasons behind such developmental disparities and strategies
that could alleviate these disparities from economic, social, political and ideological
perspectives.
Both interviews and focus groups are best used for problems requiring deep
insight and understanding, especially when dealing with explanatory concepts
(Robinson, 1998). Focus groups provide information that cannot be obtained in
interviews. Gibbs (1997:2) points out that ‘focus groups elicit a multiplicity of views
and emotional processes within a group context compared to individual interviews,
which aim to obtain individual attitudes, beliefs and feelings.’ Goode and Hatt (1981)
suggest that in the early stages of research, focus groups are helpful to guide the later
construction of questionnaires and interview questions. Questionnaires provide a rapid
and inexpensive way of discovering the characteristics and beliefs of the population at
large, while interviews capture rich insight into people’s feelings, attitudes, aspirations,
experiences and opinions (Robinson, 1998).
Therefore, in the fieldwork carried out from June to September 2008 for this
research, focus groups were conducted first, which provided guidance for the
construction of interview questions (c.f. Morgan, 1988) and the refinement of the
questionnaires. Then, questionnaires were used, providing a rapid and inexpensive
way of discovering the characteristics and beliefs of the research population at large
(Robinson, 1998). Finally, interviews were used to provide a rich insight into
individual people’s experiences, opinions, aspirations, attitudes and feelings
(McQueen and Knussen, 2002), which cannot be achieved solely through focus
groups and questionnaires. More details of each method are discussed separately in
later sections.
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“A researcher is positioned by her/his gender, age, “race”/ethnicity, and so on, as
well as by her/his biography, all of which may inhibit or enable certain research
method insights in the field” (Kim, 1994:85). As a Chinese woman studying abroad
and coming back to China to carry out field work, my research position is affected by
my gender, age, race and my cross cultural background (Wiederhold, 2014). For
example, being a young woman, it is easy for me to convince participants I am
“unthreatening or ‘harmless’ (Turner, 2012). So most of my participants are
cooperated well and provide me the detailed information. Being a Chinese to conduct
the field work in China, for one side, I can understand some phenomena more easily
and better than foreigners. I am able to find the gatekeepers easily. But I also face
challenges such as presumptions of their answers using my own knowledge in the
field. Certainly, my biographies of studying in UK give me access to a particular view
of the events and enable me have certain insights in the field. For example, being self-
critical methods encourage me to explore the different dimensions rather than focus on
one side of fieldwork as they arise.
Although ensuring flexibility in the research design was important, it was equally
important to plan ahead. The whole fieldwork survey carried out for this research
included 15 focus groups, 505 questionnaires and 100 interviews. The numbers of
each method are shown by county in Table 3- 4.
Table 3- 4: Field Survey Methods by County (Source: author)
Focus Groups Questionnaires Interviews
Boluo in Guangdong Province 3 105 20
Wuchang in Hubei Province 3 102 20
Jinchang in Gansu Province 3 100 20
Gulang in Gansu Province 3 98 20
Liangzhou in Gansu Province 3 100 20
Total 15 505 100
In addition to the survey, other information, such as population (e.g. China
population and employment statistical yearbook, 2007–2011), environment
(topographic and climatic) (e.g. White papers of Chinese Government, 2006), human
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and natural resources (e.g. White Papers of the Chinese Government, 2007)and
statements of governmental policies (e.g. Report on the Work of Gansu Government
Report, 2007) can be obtained from publications (including normal print and online
publications), government documents (including reports, news circulations, new
policies and regulations, planning and filed records), enterprise and industry reports
and media documentaries. Published data of this kind were used as background
information for this thesis.
3.2.1 Research Locations
Places play an important role in shaping the research setting (Sullivan and Gilbert,
2004). The choice of locations puts constraints on the conclusions that can be drawn
(McQueen and Knussen, 2002). The location of a focus group, questionnaire or
interview also impacts on participants and their responses (Rubin and Babbie, 2008).
Therefore, among over 2000 counties in China (see Figure 3- 1); a few representative
locations with different development levels were selected for this research. The survey
setting was also carefully designed so that the underlying causes of China ’ s
development and disparities can be identified and investigated.
Most current literature shows that the per capita GDP of coastal areas is much
higher than most western areas in China, and that the middle area is in between the
two (for example, Hao and Wei, 2010；Liu and Li, 2006). Therefore, choosing one
county in Guangdong Province, one in Hubei Province and one in Gansu Province
enable comparison between a coastal, middle and western area of China.
According to the China County Level Economy Yearbooks 2002-2006, all
counties of China have been ranked from A (the most competitive) to J (least
competitive) based on the County Economic Competitiveness, which considers eight
indices as shown in Table 3- 5. Counties change their classifications year by year
according to their competitiveness.
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Table 3- 5: County Economic Competitiveness (Source: derived from China County Level
Economy Yearbooks, 2002-2006)
Competitive
ness
Ranking
Indices Fieldwork
Survey
Counties
Well-
Developed
Counties
A (the most
competitive
counties)
 Per Capita GDP
 Per Capita GDP Growth
Rate
 Annual Per Capita Urban
Disposable Income
 Annual Per Capita Net
Income of Rural
Residents
 Per Capita Year-End
Urban and Rural Savings
 Per Capita Fiscal Budget
Revenue
 Per Capita Fiscal Budget
Expenditure
B
Boluo
Wuchang
C Jinchang
Medium
Developed
Counties
D
E
F
G Liangzhou
Under-
Developed
Counties
H
I Gulang
J (the least
competitive
counties)
Therefore, along with the China County Level Economy Yearbook 2006 (the
most up-to-date data at the time of the field survey), Boluo, Wuchang and Jinchang
are all well-developed counties which rank in groups B, B and C respectively.
Investigating areas with similar developmental backgrounds enables an understanding
of development and reveals the causes of disparities between different areas. In
addition, within Gansu province, Jinchang, Liangzhou and Gulang counties are next
to each other, so their social and political environment should be very similar, yet
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these three counties exhibit large economic development inequalities. The fieldwork
allowed research into the reasons behind this inequality. According to the China
County Level Economy Yearbook 2006, Jinchang is a well-developed county ranked
in group C; Liangzhou represents a medium developed county ranked in group G and
Gulang falls into the category of an under-developed county and is ranked in group I.
Finally, local connections play an important role in the fieldwork. There are many
counties to choose from but the reality is that the surveyor should have some local
connections as these are crucial for field surveys, especially in China. Yang (1994)
demonstrates the difficulties of carrying out fieldwork if there is no local network. I
asked 10 interview participants if they would have accepted my interview invitation if
they had not known me, and they all said no. For example,
‘If you were not my sister-in-law’s friend, why would I bother to talk to you?
There are too many cheaters in China and I do not trust any 陌生人 ’ (Li-45-M-U-
Policeman-Wuchang (surname-age-gender-urban/rural-profession-location)).
Therefore, having a local network in these five counties was a key factor in
enabling me to carry out the fieldwork. Without it, it would have been almost
impossible to run a focus group or organise an interview.
For all the above reasons, Boluo in Guangdong Province, Wuchang in Hubei
Province and Jinchang, Gulang and Liangzhou in Gansu were chosen as representative
case studies for this research (see Figure 3- 1).
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Figure 3- 1: Locations of Fieldwork (Source: author)
3.2.2 Focus Groups
‘Focus groups are group discussions organised to explore people’s views and
experiences on a specific set of issues’ (Kitzinger, 1994: 104). A particular advantage
of focus groups, and therefore the main reason why they were included as part of the
multi-method approach, is that they can reveal issues and opinions that would not
have emerged without the group interaction (Kitzinger, 1994; Morgan, 1988).
Furthermore, focus groups help to explore how meaning and experiences are
negotiated and contested between participants (Limb and Dwyer, 2001). Another
important benefit of focus groups is the extent to which researchers as well as
participants learn through the process (Bedford and Burgess, 2001).
Although the term focus group has been used to include a range of techniques, the
general field of social science research has come to generally conceptualise this
technique as follows: using a semi-structured group session, moderated by a group
leader, held in an informal setting, with the purpose of collecting information on a
designated topic (Limb and Dwyer, 2001). Data regarding observations and opinions
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are enhanced through group interaction because individual participation can be
improved in a group setting (Bedford and Burgess, 2001). Thus, the most important
characteristic is the nature of the group itself as expressed though the interaction of the
members and the flow of the discussion. The focus groups conducted during my
fieldwork meant that participants not only expressed their own attitudes and
experiences but also responded to the views of others, helping to promote discussion
and generate new ideas.
The guidelines for conducting focus groups suggest that the members included in
a focus group ought to be chosen on the basis of their common experience related to
the research topic. Generally, members are homogeneous in terms of prestige or status,
such as occupation, age, education, family background and social class (Grudens-
Schuck et al., 2004; May, 1997). This homogeneity is important because people are
more likely to share information with others who are seen as similar. In addition, if the
group is too heterogeneous, the lower status members may defer to higher status
members and not fully contribute. Therefore, following these guidelines, this research
involved three focus groups in each county with around ten participates invited in
each group.
Given the fact that people in each group have a similar background and share
common experience and interests in local development, the variation in their
occupations may better stimulate their discussion and encourage them to debate
(Kitzinger, 1994). Therefore, in each focus group, people are invited from within the
same class and from a similar background but with different occupations. However,
due to differing views on the definition and measurement of classes, there is no
straightforward way to classify people in terms of income and classes (see section
2.3.3). However, according to Bian (2002), China’s social classes can be grouped into
three categories: the cadres, the new middle class and the vulnerable group. The
cadres form a very special class which, since 1949, has had power without being
properly monitored. Thus, this class has supremacy over other groups, high levels of
welfare and the highest social status, meaning that it possesses both power and wealth.
Those who earn their wealth using their knowledge or talent are classed as new middle
class, as they have wealth, but no power. Those who have neither power nor money
are classified into the vulnerable group, falling in the lowest social class stratification
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(Li, 2005). Therefore, following the above claim, in each county three focus groups
were conducted (see Table 3- 6).
Table 3- 6: Focus Groups (Source: author)
Groups Social Class
Group 1: Cadres government officials
rural cadres
retired government officials
policemen
Group 2: New middle
class
private entrepreneurs
managers
household business owners and individual
manufacturers and traders
professionals
intellectuals
Group 3: Vulnerable
group
peasants living on producing agricultural products;
peasant labourers floating in urban areas
workers of private companies and state-owned
enterprises
unemployed persons
Having established the main groups of people being invited, the next challenge is
to choose individuals. The most frequently used non-probability method is quota
sampling (Kothari, 1994). The selection of participants for my focus groups was
further helped by snowball sampling (Grudens-Schuck et al., 2004). Once one or two
people had agreed to participate, they helped to identify peers of a different gender to
participate. Although the total number of participants in a focus group was planned to
be precisely ten, some flexibility towards the size was employed in the field so that the
participants varied from six to twelve. This flexibility in participant selection involved
trade-offs balances and compromises depending on the circumstances.
The focus group session structure comes from the guideline questions developed
by the researcher. The amount of structure varies with the preferences and
professional experiences of the researcher. As a researcher and moderator, I monitored
group interaction and adapted plans accordingly. For example, a group that seems
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stuck on one aspect may be guided to the next. Each of the focus groups conducted
took one and a half hours and consisted of the following four primary stages (see also
Appendix 1):
Introduction – The moderator presents an overview of the goals of the
discussion and introduces the participants to each other (taking approximately 10
minutes).
Discussion Building Stage – Easily answered questions are asked to encourage
participants to begin talking and sharing. For example, the question of how their
personal life has changed since 1978 may be asked first (lasting approximately 10
minutes).
In-depth Discussion – Focus on the main questions in the topic guide,
encouraging conversation to reveal participants’ feelings and thoughts. All questions
may be asked (approximately 60 minutes).
Closure – Summary of the impressions and conclusion about the information
gathered, which gives an opportunity for participants to clarify, confirm or even
elaborate (taking approximately 10 minutes).
An important component of the focus groups was the introduction and discussion
building questions. The introduction assured participants that the focus group was
only for the purposes of research, promoting a relaxed atmosphere. Then, the question
of how their personal life has changed since 1978 was a good icebreaker with which
to start the discussion. In the in-depth discussion stage, nine main issues were
discussed:
1. Understandings of ‘development’;
2. The difference between the periods 1949-1978 and 1978-present in China;
3. Imperative challenges for the government;
4. GDP inequality in different parts of China;
5. GDP inequality in different parts of the province;
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6. Reasons for disparity;
7. Understandings of disparity;
8. Changes in disparity in China in the last 30 years;
9. China’s future and prospects for ordinary people’s lives.
Each main issue enabled exploration of understandings of development in more
depth. For example, when participants discussed the difference between the periods
1949-1978 and 1978-present in China, income, living conditions, community and
political and ideological factors were discussed.
Four key issues arose during my fieldwork research:
First, Morgan (1988) emphasise that group size is a concern in conducting
fieldwork. In the case of this research, a session involving around ten people proved to
be very efficient during fieldwork. This is to say that: 1) everybody feels comfortable
as part of a small group; 2) each member has an opportunity to talk; and 3) it is easy to
manage the group dynamically and pass information between each member.
Second, my research experience shows that participants were reluctant about
conversation being recorded digitally in China, although this has become almost
universal in other places. Taking notes by hand in a focus group was deemed much
more acceptable. This is probably because people fear that their recorded voice might
be used against them in the future in an unforeseeable circumstance – for example, the
Cultural Revolution recurring. Therefore, during the survey, I made notes myself and
also employed an assistant to take notes for me using the pre-designed forms (see
Appendices 1 and 2), thus enabling me, as the moderator, to concentrate on
stimulating discussion, asking key questions and making everything run smoothly and
efficiently. Soon after the focus groups, I worked with my note-taker to review notes,
filling in gaps and ensuring that accurate and complete information had been gathered.
Third, the location and the arrangement were chosen very thoughtfully based on
local tradition and custom. My previous experience also shows that the condition and
environment of the place where the focus group is being carried out is equally very
important. Local people did not like to feel as if they were in a formal meeting;
77
otherwise, they would not express their true views and have a real discussion. This is
because many of them have had too many political meetings, particularly during the
Cultural Revolution period, in which the expression of any incorrect political view
could bring disaster for them. An informal gathering in a quiet place with certain
privacy and less interruption from unexpected intruders will encourage a very relaxed
atmosphere, making the participants feel as if they are talking with a group of friends.
Fourth, sitting around a table with drinks, teas and snacks provided was always
appreciated by people as a form of hospitality, which in most cases helps to make
participants talk freely and openly. Those who do not make much contribution to the
discussion would be seen by locals as an unfriendly person and not deserving of the
entertainment. Silverman (2005) considered school premises as a good location but in
my experiences in China school premises were far from an ideal research setting,
because there was a danger that participants perceived my research as an extension of
classroom rules, such as only speaking when asked a question and only giving correct
answers.
Despite the advantages of focus groups in terms of group interaction, at the same
time the group dynamics also had disadvantages. One of the biggest challenges of the
focus groups was that participants sometimes remained silent about some views or
readily agreed with more dominant views as a result of group pressure (Yin, 2003).
For example, I ran five focus groups with cadres in the five counties. I found that in
two out of the five groups, cadres at a lower tier either remained silent or totally
agreed with other cadres, especially those at higher tier. Furthermore, focus groups
were less suitable for exploring sensitive topics or talking about personal experiences
and feelings (Denscombe, 2007). For example, during one of the focus groups in
Jinchang, the participants were very unresponsive to questions regarding issues such
as corruption and local governance.
3.2.3 Questionnaires
After focus groups, questionnaires were conducted in order to collect information
from a larger proportion of the population. Compared to focus groups and interviews,
Flowerdew and Martin (2005) suggests that the great advantage of questionnaires is
that they enable the targeting of a large number of people (who may be from variety of
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backgrounds) in a short period of time with relatively little effort. Respondents also
remain completely anonymous so that their answers to the questions can be more
genuine than other methods, particularly in the case of more elderly Chinese people
who have bitter past experiences of political movements, such as the Cultural
Revolution. In addition, questionnaires can cover a wider range of questions than
focus groups and the answers might or might not support the findings from the focus
groups (Marshall and Rossman, 1995).
The questionnaire was designed in English (Appendix 2) and then translated into
Chinese. My experience shows that concise questions printed in a neatly and closely
designed layout can effectively encourage people to take part in answering the
questionnaire. In the questionnaire both closed-ended questions and open-ended
questions were used. The use of closed answers produces quantitative data and
permits easy comparison between answers given by different people; on the other
hand, open-ended questions identify relevant topics and determine the full range of
possible answers (Marshall and Rossman, 1995).
The choices made in selecting participants, such as who to talk with, where, when,
about what, and why, put constraints on the conclusions which can be drawn.
Therefore, a strategy was adopted to ensure that my sample would be representative of
my target population. Through conscious choices of the places where my research was
undertaken and those who were approached to participate, an attempt was made to
include as many participants as possible.
Approaches for participant selection fall into two broad categories: probability
and non-probability sampling (Kothari, 1994). In probability sampling each member
of a population has the same chance of being selected, whereas non-probability
sampling selects participants based on the judgement of the researcher in an effort to
achieve particular objectives.
The approach used to select the questionnaire participants was probability
sampling. Questionnaires were conducted in five counties: Boluo (with a population
of 760,000), Wuchang (850,000), Liangzhou (980,000), Jinchang (460,000) and
Gulang (370,000) (Guangdong, Hubei and Gansu Bureau 2006). In each county,
around 100 questionnaires were completed, giving 95% confidence with a calculated
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margin of error of 9.78%. Based on probability and sample size distribution theories,
the sample sizes for the all five counties were the same, as the populations of the five
counties are all greater than 20,000 (http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html). A
stratified sampling method (dividing the respondents into two strata: urban and rural
residents) was employed as it has fewer sampling errors than a random sampling
method (Cochran, 2007). About half of the questionnaires were circulated randomly in
urban areas and half in rural areas. In urban areas, the questionnaires were delivered to
every 10th person in the high street of the city during weekends because in China most
people from various social and economic groups go out shopping or participate in
other leisure activities during the weekend. In rural areas, the questionnaires were
distributed in a couple of radial directions away from the city, travelling from the city
towards the furthest distance possible. In China, people who live in rural areas are all
peasants, so the responses to the questionnaires received from rural areas were
confidently considered as from peasants with a range of economic status. Therefore,
these sampling and delivery methods covered a variety of groups of people, including
peasants working on farms, those working local industries, self-employed business
owners and government organisations.
However, as with any approach to selecting participants, mine also had its
weaknesses. For example, I aimed to deliver questionnaires to urban residents in the
high street of the city during the weekend. However, rural residents sometimes go to
the city during the weekend to go shopping on the high street. Thus, I realised that
some questionnaires were completed by rural rather than urban residents, so the
finished questionnaire had to be abandoned.
As Goode and Hatte (1981:171) point out: ‘the questionnaire is effective only
when the respondent is able or willing to express his reactions clearly’; thus, the
design of the questionnaire for this research aimed to be short and concise. People are
often impatient about answering long questions. If the number of questions is over 25
(i.e. more than three A4 pages) people may be put off participating. Therefore, the
questionnaire survey was confined to 21 questions excepting personal information. As
the written Chinese language is in characters, not letters, the seven-page English
version of the questionnaire easily condensed onto two pages in Chinese.
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Sudman and Bradburn (1983) suggest that the design of the questionnaire should
consider three elements: questions should closely reflect the research aim; question
type and wording should be appropriate; and the question sequence and overall layout
design should also be appropriate. Following the above guidelines, and my research
aim and analytical framework (see section 1.1 and section 2.5), my questionnaire
included six sections as shown below:
Section 1 covers basic understanding of the terms ‘development’ and ‘disparity’
and an understanding of ‘development and challenges in China’. At the beginning of
the questionnaire, this section aims to ask the less sensitive and confidential questions
which can be answered easily and comfortably, giving respondents some confidence
at the start and encouraging participants to complete the whole questionnaire.
Section 2 covers the economic dimension. Economic growth, as the core of
development in many definitions, is also a key element of the research. Therefore,
questions about economic information immediately follow the general understanding
section. The questions in this section mainly target aspects regarding personal income,
savings, consumption and investment. Although many researchers have shed light on
income inequality and consumption disparity using statistical data (Yao et al., 2005;
Wong and Lu, 2002), interesting debates arise from the use of questionnaires. For
example, in China many people, particularly government and industrial officials,
teachers and medical staff, receive extra income in addition to their normal salaries.
This extra income is labelled as ‘grey income’ by ordinary people (Lv, 2004). For
example, ‘grey income’ teachers ask for payment from students for giving extra
tutoring; lecturers receive consultation fees from commercial companies; medical
doctors accept red pockets (money wrapped in red paper) from patients, illegal
refunds from medicine producers or salesmen; and government officials take bribes,
which include cash, commodities, free meals or other forms of entertainments. In
addition to ‘grey income’, another benefit enjoyed by certain occupations is ‘non-
currency income’, which refers to insurance for medication, education and
unemployment. Clearly, all this extra income is closely connected with particular
occupations, as it is said by ordinary people that ‘power generates money and money
exchanges for power’ (Zhang-52-M-U-Worker-Liangzhou). Using another example,
Mao once claimed that imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic-comprador capitalism
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are the three big mountains pressing on the head of the Chinese people. This was
something my participants made fun of, saying that the new three big mountains now
sitting on the heads of Chinese people are housing, education tuition fees and
healthcare costs.
Section 3 focuses on social dimensions. This section includes questions about
family and social community, education, social class stratification and social welfare.
Along with rapid economic development, a social evolution is quietly emerging in
Chinese society. Economic inequality has been widely recognised but increasing
social inequality has not yet received similar contemplation. There are several reasons
that social inequality ought to be highly considered. First, family linkages among
Chinese people are very strong and people do care about their relatives’ positions in a
society. They may undertake selfish and sometimes even unlawful actions to help
their relatives, such as opening ‘back doors’ for them using their power (Pei, 2001).
Zhang (2005) asserts that higher social inequality is frequently connected to lower
happiness. Second, large social inequality often leads to social instability and even
more crime, which in turn has a negative impact on investment in the social
environment and economic growth. Third, the increasing gap in social development
may decrease the trickle-down effect of economic growth on poverty reduction
(Brown and Park, 2000). For example, it is hard for an uneducated person to share in
rapid economic development. On the whole, social inequality is equally as important
as income inequality. Traditionally, relationships between family members or between
neighbours are very close in China. With social and economic development, close
relationships have been declining (Thornton and Fricke, 1989). The purpose of asking
questions about this is to discern how social and economic change influences family
relationships. This is also one of the central issues in the social sciences. During
Mao’s era, the classification of social classes was rather simple, with society divided
into peasants, workers, intellectuals, cadres, soldiers and black five elements [黑五类
份子]: landlords [地主]; rich farmers (peasants) [富农]; anti-revolutionists [反革命];
bad-influencers [坏分子]; rightists [右派] (Anagnost 2008). Nowadays, social class is
still in transition (Bian, 2002) so it is very interesting to see how social classes have
been redefined in China.
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Section 4 focuses on political dimensions. Three key political elements were
examined: governance, corruption and political stability. First, a key political
condition for economic development is good governance (Tarschys, 2001) and one of
the important dimensions of good governance is a low degree of corruption. Second,
Yang and Zhao (2004) summarise an increasing volume of recent empirical research
showing that corruption has negative influences on economic growth (e.g. Wei, 1997;
2000). Ahlin and Pang (2008) also point out that corruption has a negative influence
on the rate of growth, but does not necessarily mean that corrupted societies cannot
experience rapid growth. Here with this question I asked people’s opinion about the
local political environment to see how happy they were with their ‘parent officials’
(government officials always call themselves parent officials of ordinary people). Of
course, the answers from the questionnaire only show one side of story. I later
reviewed local governments’ practical performance using various documents and then
combined the information to make a fair judgement of local governance and the
political environment. Third, Fan (2001) stressed that a minimum degree of political
stability is required for entrepreneurial individuals to be assured of a stable relation
between their efforts and their rewards. Dewoskin and Stones (2006) concludes that
political instability, whether in the form of political turmoil, ethnic tensions or
unpredictable changes in regimes and governments, causes economic stagnation. Fosu
(1992) suggest that political stability is a prerequisite for economic development, and
economic development is one of the prerequisites for political stability. Currently,
many Western journalists and scholars, through various media, have suggested a few
factors that may threaten China ’ s political stability: the independence of Xinjiang,
Xizhang (Tibet) and Taiwan, corruption and disparities. I included these factors in my
questionnaire to see what Chinese people actually think about these threats.
Section 5 sheds light on the ideological dimensions. Beliefs, values and culture
are discussed in this section. For example, although cultural elements can be gradually
changed under socio-economic development, such as the emergence of global markets
or the impact of mass media, once a cultural pattern has emerged and hardened, it will
have a certain persistence of its own and will play an independent role in channelling
and regulating behaviour for long periods of time. Tang (1991) concludes that cultural
patterns influence subsequent behaviour. Tang (1991) also found that Confucianism,
as the root of culture, has helped to promote economic growth in East Asia. In China,
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traditional culture such as Confucianism was more or less destroyed during the
Cultural Revolution under the instruction of the central government. It has been
revived since the end of the Cultural Revolution and the revival of Confucianism and
rapid economic growth started at the same time in China. Question 18 tries to
ascertain the linkage between cultural understanding, economic development and
disparity.
Background information on personal characteristics, such as gender, education,
age and marriage, were solicited to aid the analysis of the results. In order to obtain a
diversity of responses, it was deemed necessary to involve people with a range of
different backgrounds. Compared with the other sections, the last section of the
questionnaire asks for personal information related to more sensitive and confidential
questions: place of residence, marital status, gender, age, ethnic group, education and
profession. Thus, I put this section last on the questionnaire, in case some respondents
chose not to proceed in answering the questions. Nevertheless, the objective of the last
section was to allow an examination of the attitudes and opinions of people from
different backgrounds, the possible relationship between background and economic
status, and if personal status has any influence over attitudes towards development.
3.2.4 Interviews
‘Interviews are a form of human interaction in which knowledge evolves through
dialogue, with the aim of acquiring qualitative descriptions of participants’ lives’,
according to Kvale (2008:9). Furthermore, an advantage of interviews is that they
present a wide range of information quickly, allowing a researcher to clarify issues
and quickly follow up on unanticipated themes. Compared to a questionnaire, which
fails to provide any explanation or analysis beyond the descriptive level, an interview
can effectively compensate for these shortcomings (Rubin and Babbie, 2008).
There are different ways to structure an interview, ranging from very structured to
completely unstructured, and the choice of interview technique largely depends on the
research aims and objectives (McQueen and Knussen, 2002). I chose to use semi-
structured interviews, both to create a degree of comparability between the different
research locations, but at the same time to give participants a chance to explore issues
they felt were important and in that way influence the direction of the discussion (May,
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1997). As Kvale (2008) points out, in contrast to survey data, the discussion in semi-
structured interviews helps to develop a thorough understanding of elements such as
community values. This method is well suited to smaller target groups, with whom
more open-ended, interactive discussions can be held.
The interviews were structured around a list of predetermined questions and
themes to be covered, but at the same time there was flexibility to change the
questions or the sequence of the questions to follow up on participants’ answers
(Kvale, 2008; Kothari, 2004).
Jones et al.,(1997) notes that the main argument against the use of the qualitative
research methods is the relatively low sample numbers often encountered, which may
lead to claims of findings being unrepresentative of the population. In order to bring a
rational selection process to this method, at least two participants from each group
were interviewed so as to obtain an unbiased view of their interests and concerns. The
need to balance the gender of participants was also considered. Varying by income
and social classes, a total of 20 people in each county were interviewed. The selection
criteria included the following stipulations:
1. Interview two wealthy people and their enterprises to trace their respective
ways of achieving success.
2. Interview some of the middle-class individuals, possibly two teachers and two
doctors.
3. Visit and interview the poorest group of people to reveal the realities of their
living conditions and the reasons for their position in society. Interview two
peasants, two peasant labourers and two workers.
4. In order to explore the level of corruption of government officials and how this
affects overall local economic development, interview two rural cadres, two
urban cadres and two policemen, who are normally aware of the underside of
society.
5. Interview two household business owners and individual manufacturers and
merchants.
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Each interview began with a structured introduction after which participants were
asked for consent and permission to voice record the conversation. Unfortunately,
similar to the focus groups, most of participants objected to this because they were
concerned that the recordings might be used against them in an unforeseeable
circumstance. Therefore, I instead took literal notes of the conversations on the printed
interview guides. Then, participants were asked for the following personal details:
place of residence, marital status, gender, age, ethnic group, education and profession.
Although it is more common to ask participants for personal details at the end of an
interview, I found that asking them at the beginning often helped to put the answers
they gave in their particular context. Furthermore, I used semi-structured questions
which were drafted from the questionnaire and these were the same for all participants.
However, participants were encouraged to use their own words, as this can best
convey a sense of reality and familiarity. Furthermore, in accordance with the research
objectives, the interview questions were particularly focused on participants’ own
experiences and stories (see Appendix 3).
Three main factors arose when conducting interviews, which influenced the
responses and should therefore be discussed in some detail here:
First, in choosing the interview location, a private setting was preferable to a
public one (Kvale, 2008.). The research locations were intended to provide an
informal and relaxed atmosphere in which participants would feel comfortable
expressing themselves freely, particularly with respect to more challenging questions
(Denscombe, 2007). The fieldwork showed that when interviewing wealthier people,
such as cadres, teachers, doctors and policeman, the best place to do so was their
office, as they were more talkative in a formal and quiet place. However, for peasants,
peasant-workers, workers, and household business owners, it was better to conduct the
interview outside as they were accustomed to working in an open place where they
often utilise their skills to carry out their tasks, and in the same way, they felt more
comfortable and talkative in such a location. Another benefit to the interview location
being set in participants’ own ‘territory’ was that it created a more informal
atmosphere and also gave me an opportunity to learn about their environment,
allowing me to discover more about the research sphere of interest (Flowerdew, R.,
and Martin, D., 2005).
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Second, finding an appropriate gatekeeper was crucial in my field survey because
the gate keeper affected my participants’ willingness to be interviewed and also their
willingness to talk. If I was introduced by a close friend, my participants felt free to
talk. Otherwise, they tended not have much inclination to talk about their own story or
experience. Therefore, finding an appropriate gatekeeper became one of the main
tasks in my field survey.
Third, voice recording usually allows an interview to flow freely without
interruption but the note-taking method can be inaccurate and takes time, meaning that
respondents may behave seriously and speak slowly. Therefore, I prepared a digital
recorder to record the process if participants allowed me to do so and took notes if
they did not. However, most participants were very sensitive to recording and as a
result, only 10% interviews were recorded digitally.
3.3 Analytical Methods
While there is a wide range of academic literature on how to collect qualitative
data, much less is written about quantitative data analysis (Neuman, 2005) (for
exceptions see Silverman, 2005; Bryman and Burgess, 2002; Marshall and Rossman,
1995). Similarly, scholars are usually explicit about how they collected their research
data, but often remain silent about how they actually analysed it (Bryman and Burgess,
2002). In accordance with such recommendations, this section seeks to avoid this
pitfall by making explicit the steps that were taken in the data analysis (Neuman, 2005;
Darlington and Scott, 2003; Clifford and Valentine, 2003).
3.3.1 Quantitative Analysis: GIS and Statistical Analysis Methods
GIS has been widely employed in both physical and human geography
(Fotheringham and Rogerson, 2013; Goodchild, 2000). In my research, this method
has been used particularly because it can analyse and display county-level data. In
particular, it enables the variations in inequalities or disparities across China to be
visibly and distinctively demonstrated by different levels of shading. This also means
spatial correlations can be undertaken relatively simply, and comparisons with other
data sources can be made. ArcInfo 9.1 software, which was produced by ESRI in 2005,
was employed for all of the further analysis. This is the professional version of the
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ArcGIS package, which has the full analytical, statistical, mathematical and modelling
functionalities.
Yu and Wei (2003; 2008) have previously used GIS to study features of China’s
economy at a provincial level, but this approach has not yet been extended to the
county level. The provincial borders are unduly broad administrative divisions and do
not match geographical divisions, and the statistical data they employed were
frequently based on averaged information for each province. Therefore, their studies
failed to identify the real distribution patterns of economic development across China.
The core GIS analyses of this research concentrated on the county level, with over
2000 counties in total, as county division is determined more scientifically, being
based on its population distributions and geographical characteristics that facilitate
easy management and administration. Given that there has so far been no systematic
research on differences in economic development undertaken at a county level, this
research revealed the detailed spatial distribution pattern of the uneven economic
development of China, which may offer an alternative account to that suggested in
current regional development studies. Existing regional development theories and
models mentioned in Chapter 2 were also examined and discussed using the new
results. A new regional development model, based on the county-level study, was then
proposed.
Moreover, previous analyses have mainly concentrated on pure economic
statistical data and lack the full incorporation of social and other vital factors that have
significant impacts on economic development (Postiglione, 2006; Lin, 2003; Hu, 2002;
McMichael, 1996). This research overcame the existing problem in regional economic
development studies by incorporating social, environmental and physical geographical
data into the analyses and producing a series of GIS maps at the county level, so that
critical comparisons with other researchers’ results could be made. Informed
interpretations were then formulated to explain the diversity of regional economic
growth based on multi-factor orientated GIS models. The great advantage of using
GIS is that the large database, together with its spatial information, can be displayed,
analysed and modelled in various mapped or graphic forms, which provide effective
visual outcomes so that comparisons and conclusions can be drawn in a straight
forward manner (Maguire et al., 2005). This research involved large quantities of
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statistical data at the county level as well as other regional geographical information,
and most importantly all these data are highly spatial, so GIS is an ideal analytical
method for this research.
After statistical data obtained from NBS had been input into Microsoft Excel
format manually, they could be conveniently transformed into an ArcInfo GIS
database, and then linked to the corresponding digitised spatial map of China in
ArcGIS format (obtained from the China Centre, University of Michigan), based on
the 2000 county-level administration map. Then each index of data can be displayed
visually in map format using different classification methods, which is very
appropriate for displaying the spread of variable values. Rather than making simple
displays, my research incorporated appropriate information into the analyses. When
displayed, the data of each index themed, simply showing the variations in actual
values among all counties.
In 1996, the Chinese government embarked on a drive to end data falsification by
revising the Statistic Law, as a result of which innovative changes were made to the
data collection system. New statistical data systems, namely census and sample survey,
have been added to the long and existing regular reporting system, which has
significantly reduced the role of the traditional reporting system and emphasised the
importance of censuses and sample surveys: ‘Statistical investigation should collect
and compile statistical material through regular censuses as the basis, routine sample
surveys as mainstay, and unavoidable statistical reporting, key investigations, and
comprehensive analysis as supplement’ (NPC, May 15, 1996, quoted from Holz,
2004). In addition, in 1997 the NBS cooperated with the CCPCC Disciplinary
Commission and the CCPCC Organizational Department to draft legislation cracking
down on data falsification. The offices of the CCPCC and State Council formally
issued the document in February 1998 (CCPCC/SC, February 16, 1998), warning
local officials not to falsify statistics or order the falsification of statistics because of a
difference between reality and their targets, as they were otherwise at risk of party and
administrative disciplinary measures. Given such innovative changes to the data
collection system and the introduction of a series of disciplinary measures against data
falsification, it is believed that China ’ s overall statistical data since 1996 are
reasonably accurate, more or less reflecting a true picture of its realities (Wong, 2001).
89
Thus, in order to avoid any inconsistencies in data analysis or misleading analytical
results, this research mainly employs statistical data from between 1996 and 2005,
derived from China’s Statistical Yearbooks. The reasons for choosing the 2000 county
administrative map are that, firstly, it is the most up-to-date administrative map by
2008. Secondly, 22 counties were promoted to cities between 1996 and 2000 due to
rapid social and economic improvements but their administration boundaries remained
unchanged, so this has no influence on the county-level GIS analysis. Furthermore,
given that these are a relatively small number of counties in comparison with the total,
they do not have much influence on the overall analysis. However, it has to be noted
that Chongqing, together with its surrounding 27 counties, was granted autonomous
city status in 1997.
3.3.2 Qualitative Analysis: Data Coding and Analysis
Qualitative data analysis is a dynamic process that is an ongoing and continuous
part of the entire research (Darlington and Scott, 2003; Bryman and Burgess, 2002).
Although there are different understandings about what data analysis entails, it is
usually about systematically identifying patterns, relationships and concepts in the
generally imprecise, diffuse and context-based qualitative data, and then interpreting
and organising them into theoretical explanations (Neuman, 2005; Darlington and
Scott, 2003).
Bryman and Burgess (2002) usefully distinguished between analysis in the field
and analysis after data collection. According to them, during analysis in the field
researchers engage in preliminary analytic strategies, whereas analysis after the
fieldworks about identifying and interpreting patterns through a coding system. Also
in my research, analysis began as soon as the first data was collected in the field. In
the initial stages of the field research the analysis above all served to revise the
different research methods and rephrase some of the questions asked. In later stages it
served to focus and elaborate on emerging themes by asking participants for further
explanation about them. After returning from the field, a more systematic analysis of
the data began. The bulk of the data consisted of written notes on 15 focus groups, 500
questionnaires and written notes on 100 interviews (see examples in Appendices 1, 2
and 3).
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To analyse the questionnaire data in a systematic manner, a database was
designed in Microsoft Excel, which followed the questions of the questionnaire format,
with a separate column for each variable and each individual question, while at the
same time leaving room for additional questions. Typing all the data into this database
was a major time investment, but it offered me the opportunity to become immersed in
the data in the transition between field research and further analysis, and a chance to
get a feel for the data as a whole. As Bryman and Burgess (2002) and Darlington and
Scott(2003) claim, a common technique used for qualitative analysis is coding, which
is the process of categorising and sorting data by creating conceptual categories and
assigning them to selected data. Therefore, close-ended answers were coded as
follows:
1. Single variable: use numerical values 1, 2, 3… to represent A, B,
C…respectively and make input as one variable.
2. Multiple variables: use numerical value 1, 2, 3… to represent A, B, C…
respectively and make input as multiple variables.
3. Ranking: define multiple variables according to ranking using numerical
values.
Furthermore, throughout the input process preliminary themes and patterns were
identified and extracted from the data. Once the database was in place, it allowed for
the data to be sorted according to fixed variables such as gender, age, location and
occupation, as well as for descriptive statistics to be derived and selected areas or
questions to be searched for specific words or expressions. Open-ended descriptive
data from focus groups, interviews and questionnaires were also digitised, but just
typed into plain text. After all the data had been digitised, the preliminary themes and
patterns were organised in accordance with the research objectives into initial
conceptual categories and subcategories, such as income, expenditure, savings and
investment, social community, social class, social welfare, governance, corruption and
values. Subsequently, these were then iteratively refined through continuing data
analysis and are reflected in the structure of the empirical chapters of this thesis.
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3.4 Conclusion
Kimmel (1988: 30–41) and Hay (2006:112–128) have explained the importance
of ethical principles in research. Many professional bodies, state agencies and
universities define relevant ethical principles as ‘honesty, objectivity, carefulness,
openness, respect for intellectual property, confidentiality, responsible publications,
responsible mentoring, respect for colleagues, social responsibility, non-
discrimination and human subject protection’ (Resnik, 2011:2-6). As a Chinese
woman studying in the UK, when I returned to China to undertake sensitive research,
being honest, objective, careful, open and avoiding misconduct are key ethical
considerations for researchers trained in UK universities (as noted in Royal
Holloway’s research ethics guidelines). Research misconduct may result from
environmental and individual causes. ‘The deviations from research norms may also
occur because the researcher simply did not know or have never thought seriously
about the ethical norms in research’ (Resnik, 2011: 8–9). For example, in China, using
and presenting participants’ photos and answers from research is not traditionally
regarded as an issue. Since studying in the UK, I have realized the importance of
privacy. Therefore, during the fieldwork I asked the participants for their permission
to use and present their photos and answers for research purposes, in order to avoid
research misconduct.
In order to fully understand and explore the economic, social, political and
ideological dimensions of China’s development and disparities, both theoretically and
practically, this chapter has justified how the research aims and objectives evolved
into a specific design, especially focused on three parts. The first part explored how a
large, county-scale database was collected and processed. The second part explained
the design and implementation of a field survey of local residences’ data through
focus groups, questionnaires and interviews in five counties of three provinces. The
third part examined how statistical data and field survey data were analysed, which
stressed both quantitative and qualitative analytical methods. This chapter also
clarified the rationale, strategy and processes behind the research design and justified
the choices that were made. The chapter has also demonstrated the implications of the
research methods, such as the use of GIS software to visually and clearly demonstrate
and analyse spatial variation in inequalities across China. Furthermore, the chapter
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addressed some challenges of my research, such as collecting and processing such a
large data set and making an interview appointment with a wealthy person. In addition,
the chapter discuss the reliability of the database. Before moving to the outcomes of
this data analysis as presented in the four main analytical chapters, the next chapter
examines how China ’ s history between 1949 and 1978 has influenced contemporary
China’s ideological, social, political and economic spheres.
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Chapter 4 Spatial Distribution of Development:
Geographical, Historical and Political Context
4.1 Introduction
The impact of the years 1949 to 1978 is still felt in China today. It follows that, in
order to more deeply understand and analyse the post-1978 development of China, it
is essential that the pre-1978 situation and its impact on China’s ideological, social,
political and economic spheres is examined. Therefore, this chapter specifically
addresses the spatial distribution of regional development in the period between 1949
and 1978, providing a historical background to the disparities in China.
China has experienced a long history of both development and disruption caused
by wars; the country and the people were extremely impoverished in periods such as
the Han and Tang dynasties. This chapter only examines the period between 1949 and
1978 because the communist country was founded with the launch of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, led by Mao Zedong, Chairman of the CCP (Perry,
1999). Both the communist country and Mao Zedong have dramatically influenced
Chinese values, attitudes and behaviour under the specific political, social, economic
and ideological circumstances governed by the communist party. In 1978, Deng Xiaopin
launched the open-door policy to reform the economic system even though China was
governed by the communist party (Perry, 1999). Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to
explore political, economic, social and ideological development prior to 1978,
especially China’s regional development and its spatial distribution, which provides a
background for the following chapters.
There were two extraordinary historical events in China between 1949 and 1978:
the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962) (Chen, 2010) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976) (Barnouin and Yu, 1993). Around these two events, China ’ s modern history
between 1949 and 1978 can be subdivided into four shorter periods chronologically:
 1949 - 1957: Construction of the PRC and the transition to socialism.
 1958 – 1965: The Great Leap Forward and the readjustment and recovery.
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 1966 – 1976: Ten years of the Cultural Revolution and the ‘third front’
construction.
 1976 – 1978: The post-Mao era and pre-open-door policy.
China’s economic, social, political and ideological features were quite different in
each of these periods. Therefore, these features are examined in this chapter and
provide a more detailed understanding of the regional geography of China and the
national shifts that characterised each period.
4.2 Construction of the PRC and the Start of the Regional Balanced
Development Strategy (1949-1957)
In 1949, huge national disparity existed, although its features were different from
those of the present (a description of current disparity is provided in Chapter 5). In
general, China was very weak and poor economically. It was seriously lacking in
capital; inflation reached its apex in the spring and summer of 1949 (Brugger, 1981);
unemployment was widespread in the cities; the instruments of production were in
poor shape in both cities and the countryside; and agricultural reserves were extremely
low. A large amount of China’s infrastructure was devastated by years of war; public
and private buildings were shattered or damaged; and roads, railways and bridges
were in ruins. As a result, it was very difficult to get to many remote rural areas
(Brugger and Reglar, 1994).
Spatially, different regions experienced unequal and unbalanced economic
development. The core economies of several coastal centres were dominated by the
industries previously set up by Western countries. The northeast, previously seized by
the Japanese, was oriented toward a colonial-style economic expansion. Compared to
the coastal provinces, however, the majority of the interior areas were still focused on
traditional agriculture. As a result, coastal provinces were relatively rich and well
developed, whereas the inland provinces remained very poor.
Accordingly, from a social viewpoint, there were not only widespread
malnutrition and public health problems but also misery and poverty among millions
of people (Fan, 1988). Ideologically, the traditional cultural adherents of
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Confucianism were very much alive in most regions, especially in rural areas and
small and middle-sized cities; Confucianism was an active influence on general
ideology and behaviour in the social life of the majority of Chinese people (Tang,
2001). However, large, modern cities, like Shanghai, had been influenced by the West
since the nineteenth century. People were concerned with personal careers,
technological progress, monetary values, individual freedom and a culture generally
disinterested in Confucianism. At the same time, there were groups of people who
belonged to the revolutionary movement and believed in total socialism and
communism (Nee, 1991).
These inequalities were partly caused by the direct result of long-term civil and
foreign wars (Yang, 1998) and partly by the legacy of a century of foreign domination
by countries such as Britain, France, Russia and Japan. Therefore, the CCP faced
enormous problems and challenges arising from economic, social and ideological
factors (Perry, 1999).
Between 1949 and 1957, the CCP attempted to transfer China, on a national scale,
directly from a semi-feudal and semi-colonial condition to a socialist/communist
system. The assumption was that ‘everybody is equal’ because this desire was not
only urged by the communist ideology but also by the people’s anticipation that the
new government could create a new era after the long years of war (Brugger, 1981).
Therefore, in order to reward people’s support during the civil war against the Chinese
National Party (Guomintang), the CCP moved quickly to institute changes and to
eliminate inequality between people and regions. Consequently, a balanced regional
development strategy was launched and aimed at providing a boost to later economic
reform because the CCP and its leaders had very little experience of handling such
huge tasks.
Spatially, in order to reduce the inequality between regions, China started to
develop interior provinces during the period of the 1st. Five-Year Plan (1952-1957).
Among 156 projects aided by the USSR, Chinese central government placed the vast
majority in interior provinces (Figure 4- 1) (Strauss, 2007). As well as these projects,
nearly 5000 kilometres of new railway tracks were laid down and 14000 kilometres of
roads were built, which created a much larger circulation of agricultural and industrial
products (Barnett, 2001).
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Figure 4- 1: 1st. Five-Year Plan Project Distribution (Source: author)
However, the success of the balanced regional development approach during this
period has been widely debated. Its supporters suggested that it was the right strategy
because China ’ s economy made spectacular progress between 1952 and 1957. For
example, Chan (1992) proposed that under this system international relations were
dominated by the confrontation of capitalism and socialism; Mao brought China into
the socialist camp and pursued China’s overall development in the Soviet model. In
industry, the CCP used the Soviet model together with their own experience to gain a
firm foothold in the factories by deploying army leaders. The railway systems, roads
and river channels were gradually repaired, largely due to help from the army. By the
mid-1950s, the government had assumed total control of all enterprises. Lieberthal
(1995) suggested that, overall, these projects invested in central and western China
greatly promoted economic development in the western region, filled the gap between
interior provinces and coastal provinces and laid a preliminary foundation for
industrialisation in China.
In opposition to the above supporters, some researchers, such as Shabad (1972),
regarded the 1stFive-Year Plan as having caused huge imbalance between the large
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production units and the small and middle-sized industrial units; between heavy and
light industry; and between cities and rural areas in conflict with its initial aim of
achieving equality. Shabad (1972) argued that the 1stFive-Year Plan favoured heavy
industry, particularly the means of production, in the great tradition of Stalin. Spatially,
the main effort was directed toward regions in the interior, whereas in 1952 three
quarters of the industrial potential was still concentrated on the coasts for historical
reasons. This argument is problematic. First, China had just started to launch projects
in 1952 and, therefore, it is not surprising that most of the industrial potential was still
concentrated on the coasts in 1952. Second, the initial aim of the 1st. Five-Year Plan
was to achieve economic development equality between coastal and interior provinces.
Therefore, it was the early stage of industrialisation that caused the inequality between
urban and rural areas. Third, the imbalance between heavy and light industry did not
arise because of the 1stFive-Year Plan but because of the overall development model.
Both economically and politically, the Soviet Union was a key model for Chinese
development by 1953, in that it favoured heavy industry at the expense of light
industry (Lardy, 1987). Therefore, the 1stFive-Year Plan made impressive progress in
spite of some huge imbalances.
At county level, the CCP introduced the following three reforms and
improvements (Lardy, 1987). First, the new government adopted the Agrarian Reform
Law in 1950. Rather than simply distributing land to landless peasants, the CCP
encouraged peasant courts (led by party representatives). As a result, two to three
million landlords and their family members were executed (Stavis, 1976:384). This
was similar to Stalin’s policy of eliminating the Kulaks as a class, although estimating
the Kulak death toll is complicated (Conquest, 1991). As a result of this in China, the
landlords who represented the rural elite have effectively disappeared from the
villages. In the early 1950s, the average land held by each family was as high as 2.3
acres in the north and 0.5 acre in the south, owing to different population densities in
the north and south (Strauss, 2007). Ding (2003) suggested that the Agrarian reforms
had greatly contributed to an increase in agricultural production in the short run. The
popularity of the CCP was accordingly high among the rural population in the early
years of CCP rule. However, Teiwes and Sun (1993) challenged the view that the
achievement in agricultural production occurred not only because of land reform but
also because of the positive impact of ending the civil war. In fact, it is difficult to be
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sure of the reason for the improvement because of a negative correlation between land
reform and economic development, as in the case of Taiwan (Cheung, 1969).
Second, in order to meet long-standing needs for basic health care in rural China,
the CCP built clinics in each county and trained health workers in order to decrease
the impact of some of the most common diseases such as schistosomiasis. Young
people called ‘barefoot doctors’ were trained to be familiar with and report diseases
and to give talks at the village level on the importance of sanitation and hygiene
(Lampton, 1979). The cost was modest; however, it was the first time that China was
able to afford and provide health care at a rudimentary level. These efforts had a
significant outcomes and life expectancy had risen from 36 years of age prior to 1949
to 57 years by 1957. Furthermore, life expectancy reached 63 years in 1975
(Bergaglio, 2001).
Third, the emphasis was on popular education and scientific and technical studies.
Literacy campaigns were organised in factories in poor sections of the cities and
villages. Between 1949 and 1952, the number of students doubled from 24 to 51
million primary school pupils and from 1 to 2.5 million secondary school students
(Hannum and Xie, 1994). Plans were instituted to provide free universal elementary
education throughout the country, although by the 1970s this goal had still not been
met. Ideologically, the study of Marxism became compulsory at all levels in schools
and universities.
The visionary goal of these three reforms was to ensure that all would be equal
and all needs would be met. Although reforms were presented through mass
campaigns and led by local cadres, they were welcomed by the vast majority of people
(Hiniker， 1977) because they normally accorded everyone equality of status with
respect to land (a basic physical productive condition) as well as health and education
(basic social factors for human capital). Thus, these reforms have deeply influenced
China’s overall structure since then, right up to the present. As a result, for example,
the county data show that registered student numbers and have a relatively even the
number of hospital beds spatial distribution pattern across China compared to other
economic indices for 2006 (see Figure 5-10 and Figure 5-11).
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In comparison with the later ‘disorder’, the 1st.Five-Year Plan resulted in
impressive progress in spite of the huge imbalances it caused. However, these
inequalities contributed greatly to the sudden turning point in 1958. As the leader and
founder of the PRC, Mao could not face criticism when he called upon the CCP cadres
to offer their comments and criticisms to his policies in 1956 (Domenach, 1995).
Instead, the sharpest critics were detained and many individuals found themselves
accused of being ‘rightist’ and thus opposed to the party. In order to end the criticisms,
Mao moved forward with plans for the rapid shift of all of China to the commune
system; he announced that China would now begin a ‘great leap forward’ in order to
catch up with European powers like Britain in just 15 years (Karnow, 1984). As
MacFarquhar (1993) suggested, politics dominated and altered China’s economic and
social development, as the balanced regional development strategy was replaced by
the Great Leap Forward. As a consequence, the Great Leap Forward launched by Mao
and his supporters in 1958 became the first great cataclysm to hit the PRC.
From encouraging criticism to being accused of ‘rightist’ views, Chinese people
over 60 years of age still vividly recalled their tough experiences during the interviews
that I undertook in order to write this thesis. They and their children faced severe
discrimination, including when it came to studying, employment and even marriage.
‘I was accused of beingrightist because I criticised our party. I was expelled to a
rural area in Shangxi. I could not suffer the discrimination and mental abuse so I
attempted suicide once. Later, I spent most of my spare time self-learning English and
French. Thanks to Deng Xiaopin’s policy in recruiting university students in 1978, I
had the chance to pass examinations to enter university as a graduate student at the
age of 37. Since then, my life has totally changed. I still believed in communism; our
party is a great party and always corrected its mistakes.’(Chen-69-M-U-Professor-
Wuchang).
Ideologically, therefore, some people learnt their lesson and never criticise the
government and party. Partly because of this, I found that during interviews people
over 60 years of age were very cautious in making comments about the government
and its policies.
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4.3 The Great Leap Forward and Readjustment (1958-1965)
Nationally, in order to reduce the inequalities between heavy and light industries,
between industry and agriculture and between urban and rural, the beginning of the
Great Leap Forward aimed to break with the heavy-industry priorities of the Soviet
model and shift attention to agriculture (Brown, 2010). Initially the aim was to
develop agriculture because its progress would ensure increased profits, help to
promote industrial culture, stimulate independent subsistence in rural areas and lessen
inequality between urban and rural. It was necessary, said Mao and his supporters, to
engage all the people’s energies in combating backwardness and attacking its roots in
the countryside. While there was no problem with the aim, achieving it proved to be
problematic because the Great Leap Forward was such fundamentalist and untried
political choice?
A new commune system was created by the Great Leap Forward centred on the
countryside and a few urban areas. By the autumn of 1958, about 23,500 communes,
each averaging 5,000 households or 22,000 people, had been designed as a result of
planning at the county scale (MacFarquhar and Fairbank, 1991). For example, a
typical commune consisted of a small-scale local industry, a self-supporting
agricultural community, marketing, administration, a medical system, schooling and
local security. The commune also had communal kitchens (see Figure 4- 2), mess halls
and nurseries. The new centralised economy demanded certain quotas from each
commune. The state would collect a percentage from each commune while the
remainder would sustain the commune members. However, ignorance of the
rudiments of agriculture on the part of the cadres resulted in advice on planting
techniques that led many communes into agricultural disaster. Instead, the cadres
reported impossibly high quotas to please their superiors and demonstrate their
enthusiasm for the new system (Chang and Wen, 1997).
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Figure 4- 2: Communal kitchens in 1958 (Source: Xinhua net, 1959)
Misjudging the local cadres and their reporting of impossibly high quotas, Mao
and his supporters for the most part believed that more could be achieved in the 2nd
Five-Year Plan (1958-62) than in the 1st.Five-Year Plan (Meisner, 1977). Therefore,
the 2nd Five-Year Plan set out to continue industrial construction, expand the shares of
collective ownership, reinforce scientific research and development, strengthen
national defence and improve people’s living standards and cultural consciousness
(Wang and Yao, 2003).
Nevertheless, the Great Leap Forward ended with an economic and agricultural
catastrophe. During the ‘Three Bitter Years’, the ‘national grain output plunged by
15% in 1959 and by another 16% in 1960 and 1961’ (Bernstein, 2006:428), which was
a devastating blow to rural China. However, the unnatural mortality figures were
contested by researchers and because no official figures were published, the use of
various calculation methods and different data resources led to different values. For
example, Riskin (1998) estimated the lowest figure (16.5 million) and Yang (1998)
the highest (30 million). Between these, Bernstein (2006) suggested 18.48 million and
Ashton et al. (1984) claimed 29.4 million.
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For Chinese people who are now more than 50 years old, the experience in those
three years was a nightmare. During one interview I undertook, Mr. Wang told me:
‘The three Bitter Years were a nightmare. Lots of people died because of
starvation. Sometimes, we had to eat tree bark and even a kind of soil in order to
survive. My mother died in 1961 because she could not digest these things. She was
very piteous. I hated myself for being so helpless’ (Wang-54-M-R-Peasant-Jinchang).
The reasons for the catastrophe were partly natural disasters and partly the actions
of party and government (Riskin, 1998). For example, Yang (2005) suggested that the
correlation between participation rate in the communal kitchens and the death rate was
robust. Spatially, Table 4- 1shows that the death rate in the interior region was higher
than in the coastal region because of high participation rates in the communal kitchens
in the interior. This conclusion is consistent with Riskin (1998) and Yang (2005).
Table 4- 1: Death rate between 1956 and 1963 at the provincial level (Source: Population N., 1989)
Province Participation
rate in
communal
kitchens (%)
Death rate (%)
1959 1960 1961 Average
1959-1961
Beijing 9.7 9.1 10.8 9.87
Tianjin 9.9 10.3 9.9 10.03
Hebei 74.4 12.3 15.8 13.6 13.9
Shanxi 70.6 12.8 14.2 12.2 13.07
Inner Mongolia 16.7 11 9.4 8.8 9.73
Liaoning 23 11.8 11.5 17.5 13.6
Jilin 29.4 13.4 10.1 12 11.83
Helongjiang 26.5 12.8 10.6 11.1 11.5
Shanghai 6.9 6.8 7.7 7.13
Jiangsu 56 14.6 18.4 13.4 15.47
Zhejiang 81.6 10.8 11.9 9.8 10.83
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Anhui 90.5 16.7 68.6 8.1 31.13
Fujian 67.2 7.9 15.3 11.9 11.7
Jiangxi 61 13 16.1 11.5 13.53
Shandong 35.5 18.2 23.6 18.4 20.07
Henan 97.8 14.1 39.6 10.2 21.3
Hubei 68.2 14.5 21.2 9.1 14.93
Hunan 97.6 13 29.4 17.5 19.97
Guangdong 77.6 11.1 15.2 10.8 12.37
Guangxi 91 17.5 29.5 19.5 22.17
Sichuan 96.7 47 54 29.4 43.47
Guizhou 92.6 16.2 45.4 17.7 26.43
Yunnan 96.5 18 26.3 11.8 18.7
Shannxi 60.8 12.7 12.3 8.8 11.27
Gansu 47.7 17.4 41.3 11.5 23.4
Qinghai 29.9 16.6 40.7 11.7 23
Ningxia 52.9 15.8 13.9 10.7 13.47
Xinjiang 18.8 15.7 11.7 15.4
National 14.6 25.4 14.2 18.07
Realising that it would be difficult to maintain the pace of economic development
as envisaged, the State Planning Commission of the central government had to bring
forward the policy of readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement
(Dirlik and Meisner, 1989). During this time there was still a political and ideological
struggle between the Left [左 ] and the Right [右 ]. Each camp made a different
assessment of the Great Leap Forward and had a different idea of what path should be
taken afterwards. The rightists, such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, felt that,
above all, the Great Leap Forward was an economic movement that had failed
drastically. However, the Left saw the Great Leap Forward as a new mode of
development which had the potential to demolish the three big inequalities at that time
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between mental and manual, between worker and peasant and between urban and rural,
even though this was a long-term objective. In 1961, the political majority began to
swing to the Right; Liu and other top leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng
Zhen and Bo Yibo dealt with the disastrous aftermath of the Great Leap Forward and
initiated a series of corrective measures (MacFarquhar, 1993). In terms of
industrialisation, reasonable and well-organised planning was implemented and much
emphasised; ideological fever and mass movements were no longer the controlling
ideas. Slowly, China began to recover. Another notable important change after 1961
was the party's greater attention in strengthening defence and internal security, which
deeply influenced regional development (Naughton, 1988) (see the more detailed
analysis in section 4.4).
The Great Leap Forward had many economic consequences including a shortage
of food and raw materials for industry; overproduction of poor-quality goods;
worsening of industrial plants through mismanagement; and the collapse and
demoralisation both people and government at all levels. However, the most important
lesson from the Great Leap Forward for party officials and scholars is that economic
law is much more important for economic development than political commands
which might impede economic growth.
4.4 The Ten-Year Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)
Even today on the wall of an old house in Guangdong (one of the richest
provinces: see Figure 4- 3) there is still the remnant of a propaganda slogan that was
put up during the Cultural Revolution. The slogan reads ‘Highly Hold the Great
Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Bravely March Forward’. As one of the most
extraordinary events in this century, the Cultural Revolution, which lasted for ten
years, is best understood as a tragedy not only for individuals and society but also for
the nation as a whole. A vivid description of it can be found in the book Wild Swans:
Three Daughters of China, authored by Jung Chang.
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Figure 4- 3: Cultural Revolution Slogan (Source: author)
MacFarquhar (1993) pointed out that the origin of the Cultural Revolution was
Mao’s restless quest for revolutionary purity which led him to over emphasise and
misjudge the political and social problems confronting China in the mid-1960s. His
unique status in the CCP gave him enough power to unleash powerful social forces.
He was confident that the initial challenges and problems would soon die out.
However, on the contrary, the Cultural Revolution dragged the whole nation into
violence and chaos. The economy was severely damaged, careers were disrupted,
spirits were broken and lives were lost.
From a different point of view, Wang and Wong (1998) considered that the
Cultural Revolution was used as an instrument to re-establish order and begin the
reconstruction of political institutions. At that time, the CCP faced a big challenge due
to the high levels of urban protest and widespread dissatisfaction with a variety of
social, economic and organisational policies. If effective reforms cannot be
undertaken, a political crisis may produce violence and disorder, or even rebellion and
revolution, because of the pressure of economic transformation, political mobilisation
and social change. These circumstances forced China into deep disorder until military
forces became involved.
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The violent phase of the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 to 1969, deeply marked
Chinese society (Barnouin and Yu, 1993). As to the estimated half a million deaths,
even today no one can be sure of the precise figure because no official statistical data
have been published concerning deaths as a result of torture, beatings and enforced
suicide. In addition, thousands more were brutalised as a result of the frenetic
activities of the Red Guard faction who caused untold physical and psychological
damage. For example, in February 1968 the editorial section of the Blood on Bayonet
magazine of the Capital Red Guards designed a typical poster (Figure 4- 4), which
reads ‘we will crash the "dogs’ heads" of those who dare to oppose Chairman Mao!’
The survey for this research found that participants in the age group 50-60 had
been more deeply affected than other age groups of people because the latter were Red
Guards during the Great Cultural Revolution. Inspired by Mao’s call to action, they
began their onslaught on traditional Chinese culture. The following quotation from
one of my interviews is consistent with research conclusions such as those of Karnow
(1984).
‘I deeply regret what I did during the Cultural Revolution. I smashed, destroyed,
burned and attacked ‘old culture, old ideas, old customs and old habits’ with great
enthusiasm. I imposed humiliating verbal abuse and public beatings on my teachers. I
physically and psychologically attacked other people who are now believed to be
innocent. I lost 10 years’ education. I got nothing.’(Wang-58-M-U-Retired Driver-
Liangzhou).
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Figure 4- 4: Cultural Revolution Poster (Source: www.sinohits.net)
Overall, Maoist policies exacted an enormous human cost. Misguided policy
decisions of the Great Leap Forward claimed millions of lives. Mao himself chose the
policies which led to human disaster and he cannot be absolved of responsibility for
the outcomes (Womack, 1986). What is unique about the Cultural Revolution is that
this political crisis was deliberately induced by the leader of the regime itself.
The country also suffered economic disorder. Production fell as workers spent
their time involved in political struggle because most of these struggles took place in
urban areas. Agricultural production also fell in many areas and income stagnated.
One of the few positive developments was that the urban turmoil brought
opportunities for small town and village enterprises that produced necessities like
chemical fertiliser and smaller consumer goods, which city factories, absorbed by
political activity, failed to supply (Klatt, 1970).
The 3rd. Five-Year Plan also called for the prioritisation of national defence in the
light of a possible major war either with Russia or with India, actively preparing for
conflict and speeding up construction in three key areas: national defence, science and
technology, and industrial and transportation infrastructure. Between 1966 and 1975,
52.7% of national investment in the 3rd. Five-Year Plan and 41.1% of national
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investment in the 4th Five-Year Plan was put into the ‘Third Front’. The total
investment amount reached 117.341 billion RMB (Ju, 2014).
Spatially, the objective of the Third Front construction was to create an entire
industrial system within this naturally remote and strategically secure region. With
both security and economic development in mind, the programme was created to
provide a strategic reserve when and if China was drawn into a war (Naughton, 1988).
China carried out a massive programme of investment in the remote regions of south-
western and western China. Figure 4- 5 shows the scope of the Third Front. China’s
potential enemies included the USA, USSR and India. China bordered the USSR in
the north and India in the southwest; and the USA conducted a war with Vietnam
between 1964 and 1971. Therefore, most Third Front projects were undertaken far
from China’s borders and were widely dispersed, often in hidden mountain areas. The
area included all of the provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Gansu, Qinghai and
Ningxia; a portion of Shannxi; and western, mountainous portions of Henan, Hubei
and Hunan, comprising about one third of the country in total.
The Scope of the Third Front
Figure 4- 5: The Scope of the Third Front (Source: author)
Basically, the Third Front greatly increased the cost of industrialisation. The
projects of the Third Front were built not only in provinces more distant from existing
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industrial centres but also, even within those provinces, individual Third Front
factories were located in remote locations on purpose, which further added to costs.
According to Growth Pole Theory (Perroux’s, 1955), projects launched in remote
locations cannot benefit from the availability of a range of supporting services in the
urban area. As a result, projects based outside of major urban areas take longer,
require greater expenditure and make any complex project difficult to carry. Thus,
most of the projects were considered to be economically inefficient (Naughton, 1988).
However, Ju (2014) argued that some projects resulted in achievements that
would eventually benefit China’s long-term development strategy. For example, a new
railway network linking previously inaccessible parts of China; exploitation of
previously unknown or neglected ferrous and non-ferrous mineral resources; and the
construction of some reasonably efficient manufacturing enterprises.
4.5 Post-Mao and Pre-Open-Door Policy (1976-1978).
Since the establishment of the PRC in 1949, China’s overall social and economic
development has been governed by Mao’s ideologies or a Maoist development model.
The core content of Mao’s development ideas was based mainly on Soviet experience
and planning. Mao adopted the same two key sets of guiding principles that underlay
the Soviet development strategy: principal roles for politics above economics; and
radical equality and mass mobilisation to sustain permanent revolution (Fan, 2003). In
addition, Mao added another principle to China ’ s economic policy making: the
principle of regional economic self-sufficiency. This declares that a region should be
self-sufficient not only in food production but also in industrial goods. The reason for
adopting self-sufficiency was because China was internationally isolated from both
Western countries and Soviet Russia. As a result, this third principle undoubtedly had
the greatest impact on China’s regional economic outcomes.
Mao’s development ideology, especially the self-reliance principle, had several
virtues. As Karnow (1984) concluded, the self-reliance principle overlapped with the
egalitarian principle to lead to reduced provincial inequality. As a consequence, Eisner
(1977) suggested Mao had identified one of the key social contradictions to be
eliminated in the new China. Yang (1990) suggested another virtue, which is that the
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biggest beneficiaries of the self-reliance principle were the poorest provinces (because
they were overwhelmingly agricultural). This policy was favourably supported by
many senior party leaders because during the civil war, the Kuomintang (National
Party) had driven the CCP out of urban areas and into the poorest and most remote
mountainous or border regions, where the CCP had established their bases and set up
good relationships with local communities. Therefore, the majority of the party
leaders were keen to rebuild these provinces in order to show their appreciation to the
local people and compensate them for the sacrifices they had made.
In economic terms, despite considerable agricultural growth living standards in
rural areas in the late 1970s were said to be much the same as in the 1950s and the
amount of cash paid to commune members had declined. NBS (2000) showed that the
per capita availability of raw grain in 1977 was 226 kilograms, only slightly higher
than the 1957 figure of 214 kilograms. However, cadres were often unwilling to seek
relief grain when their units were entitled to it because of bureaucratic obstacles or
because such action would suggest they had failed in the self-reliance rubric.
Statistical data also reveal major problems in industry. It became apparent that
many commune-level industries, of which China’s leaders were very proud, were just
as wasteful as the county-level industries of the late 1960s. Local industries in general
had performed inefficiently and decentralisation had allowed enterprises to be
established by local authorities without any reference to macro-economic rationality.
There was much wasteful duplication and the proliferation of small plants exacerbated
an already serious problem of over-accumulation. In the industrial sphere as a whole,
a prolonged wage freeze caused the average wage to fall in real terms by 17%
between 1957 and 1977 (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005).
There was also a crisis of productivity. Productivity per capita had tripled since
1952 but per RMB productivity had declined. Moreover, phasing out the policy of
rusticating youth revealed significant urban unemployment. The accumulation rate
was also felt to be exceptionally high (due to a concentration on heavy industry),
which depressed consumption and caused dissatisfaction. Energy production (with
excessive consumption) and the development of transport also lagged behind the
economic growth rate. Investment was neglected in anything defined as ‘non-
productive’, and also in trade and services. The over-centralised system, which took as
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its basis the view that the economy as a whole was a ‘natural economy’ analogous to a
single workshop, also gave considerable power to the arbitrary whims of top leaders
and ignored the complexities of ‘circulation’. With such a view, production was
divorced from demand (Riskin, 1987).
Although China suffered major economic setbacks, social chaos and political
dictatorship, it is worth mentioning some national achievements in economic and
social development. For example, China’s infrastructure expanded with the addition of
new railways and improved roads; electricity became available in all but the most
remote villages; and life expectancy had reached 65 years by the time of Mao’s death
(Brugger, 1981). Under the PRC’s new laws, women held equal status to men and, as
a result of the commune movement, worked outside the home. Although efforts to
expand education stumbled repeatedly due to political campaigns, the number of
literate men and women increased as schools and colleges grew in number throughout
the period (Gao, 2004). All these achievements provided a base for developments in
economic and social equality. Therefore, during Mao’s era China experienced more
equality than present, although it was equally poor.
After Mao’s death in 1976, Maoist redistributive policies and ‘Third Front’
development policy were criticised for not having emphasised factors of production,
for ignoring scale, for ineffective investment and for causing a slowdown in national
economic growth, especially compared to its neighbours such as Japan, Taiwan,
Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea (Fujita et al., 2004; Booth, 1999). Mao’s
successor, Deng Xiaoping, took power in 1978 and reversed China ’ s development
strategies from Maoist redistributive policies to those of uneven development. In
essence, the new policy was designed to concentrate the limited capital and resources
available at that time and to enable a small group of people and some chosen regions
to become rich first.
4.6 Conclusion
China ’ s historical evolution can be used to explain the spatial distribution of
regional development after 1978. Both Mao’s ideal of ‘everybody is equal’ and
Deng’s ideal of ‘letting some people get rich first’ have, in different ways,
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dramatically shaped Chinese economic, social, political and ideological conditions
(Bhalla et al., 2003a; 2003b).
This chapter provides a background to present-day spatial disparities in China. In
1949, different regions experienced unequal and unbalanced economic development.
The coastal provinces dominated the economy and the majority of interior areas were
still based on traditional agriculture. As a result, coastal provinces were relatively rich
and well developed, whereas inner provinces remained very poor. Between 1952 and
1957, the 1stFive-Year Plan (1952-1957) sought to develop the interior provinces in
order to eliminate inequality between people and regions. As a result, the central
government placed the vast majority of construction projects in interior provinces.
Between1958 and 1962 the national economy was in chaos and there was no obvious
spatial development pattern.
Between 1966 and 1976, 52.7% of national investment in the 3rd Five-Year Plan
(1966-1970) and 41.1% of national investment in the 4th Five-Year Plan (1971-1975)
was put into the Third Front, which was located in the remote regions of south-
western and western China. Between 1976 and 1978, the balanced development
strategy was widely questioned and the central government focused on developing
coastal provinces.
The conclusions drawn in this chapter focus on the main points of spatial
development patterns as well as development experience and lessons in the economic,
social, political and ideological dimensions of China, which underpin understandings
and explanations of the disparities addressed in the following chapters.
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Chapter 5 China ’ s Regional Development and
Inequality: Spatial Distribution at County Scale
5.1 Introduction
Scale is an essential concept in geography, similar to terms such as space, place,
environment and network (Wei and Ye, 2009; Wei, 2002; Marceau, 1999; Howitt,
1993; Smith and Dennis, 1987). Current literature on China’s regional development
and inequality mainly focuses on the provincial level (Ye and Wei, 2005; Wei and Ye,
2004; Xu and Tan, 2002; Huang and Leung, 2002; Willams, 2002; Gu et al., 2001;
Wei, 2000; Wei and Fan, 2000; Weng, 1998). Research at the county level remains
limited and so far research on regional development and disparities is confined to a
couple of papers, such as those by Kim (2004), Wang (2002) and Lyons (1997),
which focus on only one province, each at the county scale. The way various
mechanisms operate at each scale is extremely complex and requires considerable
attention (e.g., Wei, 2002). A county scalar perspective has the potential to link
inequalities from the macro scale to the micro scale and even everyday life
experiences (Wei et al., 2011). In addition, more attention needs to be paid to
comparisons between social and economic inequality. Therefore, research on these
areas can be further deepened and broadened. In order to fill these gaps in the
literature, this chapter contains the following three innovative concerns. First, unlike
most previous studies which have all been based on provincial data, such as those by
Fan and Sun (2008), Ho and Li (2008), Knight (2008), Wan and Zhang (2006), this
chapter investigates the county scale, giving detailed and accurate analytical accounts.
Secondly, the chapter demonstrates that regional inequality can manifest in social,
political and ideological dimensions. Much of the previous research, conducted
mainly by economists, has focused on economic indices and other dimensions remain
less studied (e.g., see Kanbur et al., 2008; Wan, 2008; Zhang, 2006; Hertel and Zhai,
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2006). This chapter extends the indices to the social dimension, making comparisons
between social and economic ‘difference’ at a range of scales, and analysing how
certain political, geopolitical, social and economic factors influence China’s regional
social and economic strategies. Thirdly, this chapter employs advanced GIS
techniques to analyse the economic, social and political data for over 2000 counties,
so as to disclose the detailed spatial distribution patterns of uneven economic
development of China, which may present an alternative explanation to those
proposed in current regional development studies.
In sum, this chapter analyses and explores social, economic and political factors
in the context of contemporary development and disparity debates based on a database
of all counties in China from 1992 to 2006. In addition, it analyses reasons for the
development of these inequalities alongside China’s impressive progress in terms of
development at the macro level. Section 2 of this chapter starts by comparing
development patterns between the provincial level and the county level, before
presenting spatial distribution patterns of regional development and inequality at the
county scale. Section 3 analyses how factors such as political policy, geographic
diversity and social economy lead to regional development and inequality. Section 4
concludes with summary of how and why all counties in China have experienced a
very high speed of economic growth together with widening inequality between 1999
and 2006.
5.2 Development and Disparity Patterns at County Scale
5.2.1 Provincial Scale vs. County Scale
Development can be judged against diverse scales from the individual, the family,
the local community, the regional, the national and the global (among others), and the
approaches to development may also be dependent on scale (Torres and Momsen,
2004). Chinese geographers have demonstrated how spatial regional development
heavily influences regional inequality (e.g., Yu and Wei, 2008; Ye and Wei, 2005;
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Fujita et al., 2004; Shen et al., 2000; Tong, 1999; Zhao, 1997). However, although a
few researchers have previously used GIS to study features of China ’ s economy at
provincial and metropolitan levels (Yu and Wei, 2003, 2006); this technique has not
been extended to the county level. Le Gallo and Ertur (2003) state that spatial effect
becomes one of the most important aspects. Numerous features, such as trade,
analysed at a smaller scale reveal geographically dependent spatial units.
Investigation at a provincial scale may not be significant or provide clear analysis due
to the neglect of more local characteristics. However, analysis at the county level in
China may direct us to understandings of signiﬁcant spatial effects. Ignoring county-
scale data analysis might result in misleading or even incorrect analytical results. In
addition, the recent developments in GIS and spatial analysis have offered a great
perspective for the study of regional development and provide an in depth
understanding of China ’ s development (Fotheringham and Rogerson, 2013;
Goodchild, 2000). Therefore, in order to develop further understanding of regional
development and inequality, I have used GIS to analyse and display the county-level
data in map format. This enables the spatial variation of development and inequality
levels across China to be visibly and distinctively demonstrated in maps.
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Figure 5- 1: 2006 per capita GDP at provincial level (RMB) (Source: author)
Figure 5- 1 shows the 2006 provincial-level GDP map and Figure 5.2 shows the
2006 county-level per capita GDP map. Both present data spatially categorised
according to the QUANTILE classification methods by creating five classes equally
according counties numbers. After comparing Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2, spatial
distribution patterns are observable. The county-level map provides much more
detailed information than the provincial-level map, the breadth of which means that
less detailed variation is presented. Wang (1995) observe that economic development
does not occur in all places at the same time. Normally, economic development
happens in certain places very rapidly before gradually moving to other regions.
Figure 5.1, the provincial-level map, demonstrates a straightforward pattern similar to
previous researchers’ results (Tsui， 2007; Cheng et al.， 2002). Beijing, Tianjin,
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong province are the richest areas; and the
coastal area including Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong and Fujian plus Inner Mongolia and
Heilongjiang is the second richest region. Towards the west, the regions become
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poorer, such as Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guangxi, Anhui and Tibet, per capita GDP
far lower than the national average (Yu, 2006; Ye and Wei, 2005).
Figure 5- 2: 2006 per capita GDP at county level (RMB) (Source: author)
Understanding regional development in China using varied scales is crucial.
Given the large scale of China, development patterns and models are extraordinarily
varied from north to south and from east to west at the county scale. The 2006 county-
level per capita GDP map shows a much more complicated impression of China ’ s
economic productivity (Figure 5- 2). It should be noted, however, that all county-level
data on Tibet, most of the county-level data on Inner Mongolia and some of the
county-level data on Xinjiang and Qinhai are absent because government control the
economic data release in these areas before 2006.
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Five key observations about development patterns can be made by analysing the
county-level per capita GDP across the whole of China.
First, there is a development belt along the coastal areas exhibiting GDP per
capita far above average, which partly coincides with the provincial-level research
result. Running from the north to the south, the Beijing-Tianjin region (Greater
Beijing area), Yangtze River estuary region and Pearl River estuary region are the
richest areas (Zhang and Xu, 2011). During the last
few decades, the majority of research has tended to focus on the southern coastal
provinces rather than the northern area such as the Beijing-Tianjin region (2014; Yu
and Wei, 2008; Yu, 2006). However, as the capital, Beijing has been the most
important political centre of China since the thirteenth century. The pattern for
development in Beijing, Tianjin and the adjoining of area Hebei province shows signs
of ‘backwash’ effects occurring, where capital and labour flows from a lagging region
into a more developed region. Since economic reform began in 1978, economic
growth in Beijing has been very steady and mainly depends on SOEs and tourism,
unlike southern regions such as Guangdong province. With regional development and
globalisation, Beijing and Tianjin have become urban cores which have attracted FDI
more rapidly than the proximate area of Hebei. Eighty percent of FDI has occurred in
Beijing and Tianjin as Beijing is the national capital and Tianjin is a coastal city
which has a much better business environment than the adjacent area of Hebei (Yu
and Wei, 2008). As a result, more and more capital and labour has flowed from other
counties of Hebei into Beijing and Tianjin, leaving Hebei lagging behind
economically. Dawkins (2003) argues that free trade strengthens the process in which
capital and labour flows from a lagging region into a developed region. The Beijing-
Tianjin-Hebei development model proves there are no obvious effects resulting from
the developed Great Beijing spreading into the ‘lagging’ region of Hebei.
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Figure 5- 3: High development areas 2002(RMB) (Source: author)
Second, two other high development belts can be seen that are not revealed by the
provincial-level research (Figure 5-3). These are the belts along the Jing-Guang
Railway lying in the middle of China from Beijing to Guangzhou and along the
Yangtze River from Sichuan to Shanghai. In the process of reform in 1978, the
Wenzhou Model and the Sunan Model in the Yangtze River Estuary became widely
known as one of three major regional development models (another is the Pearl River
Estuary Model). Given different circumstances and various mechanisms of
development, the Wenzhou Model was the leading model for the development of
private enterprises in China (Ye and Leipnik, 2013); the Sunan Model centred on
development for Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) and the Pearl River
Estuary Model focused on FDI (Wei and Ye, 2004; Lin, 1997). Ye and Wei (2005:
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357) claim that the ‘Wenzhou Model is centred on small-scale, manufacturing-
oriented, and often family-owned, private enterprises, distribution networks linking
producers and consumers all over the country and extending to the global market’.
The explosive growth of private enterprise in Wenzhou during the reform contributed
significantly to regional development in Zhejiang and has produced a number of
rapidly growing counties (Wei et al., 2007; Liu, 1992).
Figure 5- 4: Wenzhou Model and Sunan Model (RMB) (Source: author)
Cixi (Figure 5- 4), the richest county in China from 2004 to 2006, had a per capita
GDP as high as 240,382 RMB (approximately £24,000) in 2004, 305,211 RMB
(approximately £30,000) in 2005 and 375,158 RMB (approximately £37,000) in 2006
(Figure 5- 5) (CSB, 2004, 2005 and 2006). Its economy dramatically grew during the
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period of reform and it shows the ways in which the Sunan Model was successful. At
the beginning of the reform in 1978, the Chinese government encouraged non-state
enterprises to be established, especially TVEs, which are market-oriented public
enterprises under the control of local governments based in townships and villages.
TVEs enjoy more favourable government policies such as low tax rates. Enterprises
sponsored by townships and villages, and enterprises jointly owned with peasants,
have been booming (Huang and Meng, 1997). Cixi produces a variety of goods
manufactured in TVEs, such as clothes, shoes, computers and other light industrial
goods. The strong support from the local government and the establishment of
economic linkages with Shanghai facilitated Cixi in becoming one of the richest
counties in China. There are evident spreading effects from Cixi to the surrounding
counties, lending supporting evidence to Myrdal’s (1957) development theory. In the
early stage of economic reform TVEs in Cixi were mainly controlled by local
governments, however between 1999 and 2007 90% of local government-owned
firms were privatised (Tong, 1999). Since privatisation, many new firms have been
created, which have been shown themselves to be more capable than those they
replaced. In addition, a large number of new managers have controlled firms
efficiently. Therefore, privatised TVEs have achieved great success and have
provided extraordinary contributions to the local economy.
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Figure 5- 5: Per county GDP in Cixi from 1997 to 2006 (RMB) (Source: author)
Third, in the rich coastal area, there are still many poor counties which are in the
arid to semi-arid mountainous areas, such as north Guangdong, western Fujian and
southern Zhejiang provinces (Figure 5-2), which are not revealed by maps of
provincial GDP.
A number of researchers and institutions have confirmed that China ’ s poverty
problem mostly occurs in the poor mountainous regions (Shen and Zou, 2008;
Chambers et al., 2008; Ravallion and Chen, 2007; Liu, 2006; Fan et al., 2004; World
Bank, 2000b). For example, 34% of the people with income between 1000 RMB and
5000 RMB live in a mountainous area and 9% in a flat area with convenient
transportation and poor land conditions. In addition, it is worth pointing out that,
within a province such as Gansu, the majority of poor residents are from minority
groups, living in mountainous and border areas. Compared to the rural population, the
absolute rural poor are 2.7 times more likely to be from ethnic minorities (Björn and
Ding, 2009; Heath, 2005; Gustafsson and Li, 2002).
Fourth, most poor counties are located in the western part of China, and
especially in rural areas. In 2001, 63% of the population in western China was
classified as low income (Golley, 2007; Lai, 2002). The poor areas were
overwhelmed with environmental difficulties and infrastructure insufficiencies,
particularly a shortage of roads, water storage facilities and health care clinics, which
combined with low education, low agricultural productivity, undeveloped agricultural
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markets and under-developed non-agricultural industries (Zhang and Xu, 2011; World
Bank, 2003).
Figure 5- 6: Rural–urban income inequality in China, 1978-2002 (RMB) (Source: author)
Figure 5- 6 shows that between 1978 and 2002 the disparity between urban and
rural soared. In 1978, the per capita income in rural regions was nearly half the per
capita income in urban regions. However, in 2002, the per capita income in urban
regions was over four times that in rural regions. The reason for this swiftly rising
disparity between urban and rural regions is urban-biased governmental policy (Lu
and Chen, 2006), as a result of which rural populations have been severely restricted
from migrating to urban areas. Additionally, urban residents were provided with
subsidies for living costs at the expense of their rural counterparts, which has been
noted by researchers such as Yao et al., (2005), Wan and Zhou (2005). However, the
low income pattern has changed since the early 1990s. Prior to the 1990s, the
majority of urban residents owned the ‘Three irons (meaning guaranteed): iron rice
bowl (salary), iron chair (position), and iron bed (housing)’ (Ding and Warner,
2001:316). Urban poverty became a severe challenge because of the collapsing state
ownership of firms and the breakdown of the welfare systems formerly provided by
SOEs (Sachs et al., 2002). In 1998, about 40% of national government employees
were retrenched (Shah et al., 2006). Meng et al. (2005) suggests that 17.5 million
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SOE workers were left unemployed. However, rising urban poverty in recent years
does not change the overall picture: China ’ s rural areas – long lagging behind the
urban areas in terms of social and economic development – still provide a home to the
majority of its poor population. The Gini coefficient for urban and rural residents
jumped from 0.389 in 1995 to 0.417 in 2000, above the international danger level of
0.4 (Cheng, 2007).
Fifth, in the western poor areas, there are nevertheless still some rich counties,
such as in Yunnan, Gansu, Sicuan and Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia). Reasons for this
include the plentiful oil fields found in areas such as Yumen of Gansu and Kelamayi
of Xinjiang (see Figure 5- 4), which have become engines for the local economy.
Yunnan province provides another example: Yunnan contains destinations attractive
to tourists, such as Dali, and the production of tobacco brands, such as Yuxi, is
fruitful. In addition, Xingjiang, as a province principally inhabited by ethnic
minorities, has been the recipient of Chinese investment in an attempt to keep the area
politically stable. Put simply, in counties in western provinces, regional development
is economically orientated with agriculture, which is more dependent on natural
resources like sunshine, water and climate. However, in counties of eastern provinces,
regional development is orientated towards industry, which is more dependent on
investment and labour (Kanbur and Zhang, 2005).
5.2.2 Spatial Distribution of Economic and Social Development
Defining development as economic development is always a problematic issue.
As Sachs (1992) and Sen (1999) argue, ‘development’ should not always be used as
an abbreviation of ‘economic development’ and should instead include social,
political and cultural dimensions (Unwin, 1994). In extensive discussions about
‘development’, lots of scholars have addressed the importance of the social, political
and cultural dimensions. In order to overcome such a problem and focus on both
economic and social dimensions, nine indices are used in this research to analyse and
visualise development and inequality in a more detailed manner.
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The socio-economic spatial dimensions of China have been insufficiently
analysed at the county scale, in large part because of the absence of reliable data
(although for provincial-level analysis see Zhang and Kanbur, 2001; 2005; Khan and
Riskin, 1998). Here, per capita GDP, per capita net income of rural residents and per
capita resident savings are chosen for measuring economic development and living
standards. The indices of student enrolment [中小学在校学生数 ] (means primary
school and secondary school student enrolment number referring to the 9 years of
compulsory education plus 3 years of high school student enrolment number) and
hospital beds are selected to reflect education and health among social dimensions.
The main reasons for selecting these indices can be summarised as follows.
First, the per capita GDP is one of the most widely used indices for economic
measurement (Ho and Tsui, 2004; Wang and Yao, 2003; Zhang and Yao, 2001). The
GDP of a country is defined as the market value of all final goods and services
produced within a country in a given period of time (Eatwell, 1998). Researchers
frequently use GDP to measure a country’s macro development status (Lu and Lo,
2006). In my research, data demonstrating the per capita GDP at provincial and
county level in 2006 are chosen to reveal the difference between provincial and
county-level models. Net income is a popular index to evaluate individuals’ earning.
Hering and Poncet (2010a) define income as the sum of all the wages, salaries, profits,
interest payments, rents and other forms of earnings received in a given period of time.
Figure 5- 7 shows that rural income has a similar distribution pattern to GDP.
Furthermore, financial saving is one of the most important measures of people’s
disposable income. It is a cultural tradition in China that people prefer to save as
much money as possible in preparation for any unforeseeable circumstances. Figure
5- 8 proves that per capita saving is evenly spatially distributed in most areas.
Therefore, savings can also be used as an index of personal income level (Ramsey,
1928). In order to understand the process of developmental change in more detail,
Figure 5- 7 and Figure 5- 8 show the spatial distribution patterns of income and saving
by using county-level data.
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Figure 5- 7: 2006 Per capita rural income (RMB) (Source: author)
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Figure 5- 8: 2006 per capita savings (RMB) (Source: author)
Second, as one of key factors in the increase of productivity, the attainment of
education is often used to measure the level of human capital and plays an important
role in economic growth, especially in endogenous growth models (Barro, 1995 and
Lucas, 1988). By using data across 29 provinces over the period between 1978 and
1998 in China, Cai et al., (2002) illustrate a positive and significant relationship
between initial human capital (measured by average years of school in 1982) and the
growth of GDP per capita. They confirm that initial human capital has a positive
effect on growth so regional disparities in the attainment of education generate
inequality in economic growth. Given the importance of education as a measure of
human resources and social development, I use student enrolment data to explore
education as an aspect of China’s social development (Qian and Smyth, 2008a).
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Figure 5- 9: 2006 student number per 10000 people (Source: author)
Figure 5- 9 shows that student enrolment number per 10000 people[每万人中小
学在校学生数 ] (means primary school and secondary school students enrolment
number per 10000 people referring to the 9 years of compulsory education plus 3 high
school years students enrolment number per 10000 people) are higher in central parts
of China where education is traditionally highly valued. On the contrary, northwest,
west and some of coastal provinces show a moderate or low number of enrolments for
students. In the western part of China, poverty affects education facilities which in
turn affect student enrolment numbers. A nine-year compulsory period of education
has been instituted since 1986 in urban areas and 2007 in rural areas, and pupils
studying in primary and secondary schools need only pay a small amount of money to
cover the costs of books (Hannum, 2005). However, in poor western localities, fewer
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qualified teachers are available and, as people tend to live in more dispersed and
remote areas, it can become very difficult to establish education facilities (Fan et al.,
2004 and Yao, 2000). In most coastal provinces, people are generally wealthy and the
rate of student enrolment should in theory be high. However, the reality in these areas
is that traditionally people emphasise ‘commerce’ rather than ‘education’ (Hannum
and Wang, 2006). Therefore, the student enrolment numbers are on average the same
and in some cases even lower than in some western provinces. Clearly local culture
and ideology play an important role in social development.
Figure 5- 10: 2006 hospital beds per 10,000 people (Source: author)
Third, human capital can also be measured by population growth (labour) and
health care. Health care can be judged by the number of hospital beds per 10,000
people (Björn and Li, 2004).The dominant impression from provincial-based analyses
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is that eastern China, and its urban centre in particular, have a much higher provision
of health services than western rural areas. However, when focused at the county level,
a rather different picture emerges. The overwhelming impression from Figure 5- 10 is
that northern and north-western China actually has much a higher provision of
hospital beds per 10,000 people than many areas of central and eastern China.
Certainly in southwest China there are very low levels of hospital provision. It is in
much of central China that some of the lowest levels of hospital provision are to be
found. In explaining the relatively high densities to be found in parts of northern and
north-western China, it is worth noting that the Chinese government has been seeking
to provide better healthcare and education in border regions, in particular where there
are a high number of minority groups. It aims to reduce potential social tensions and
tendencies towards separatism. In addition, in the 1960s and 1970s health care
facilities were traditionally established in the urban centres, based on indicators such
as the provision of doctors and hospitals. In rural areas, the population generally had
to rely on preventative medicine and the training of rural health workers. As Zhang
and Kanbur (2005:191) note, ‘by the late 1970s, “bare-foot doctors” and clinics were
set up in almost all the villages’. These polices allowed the government to offer an
equality of health care facilities for all people. As a result, China ’ s life expectancy
rates were much higher than most developing countries. Inequality of health care is
also understood to be one of the causes of regional disparity (Akin et al., 2005; Golley,
2002), as well as gender inequality in health care (Gao and Yao, 2006).
However, other health care resources such as health care expenditure and local
clinic services have undergone dramatic changes since the reform. Thus while per
capita health expenditure rose from 10.9 RMB in 1980 to 101.7 RMB in 2001, the
government share of this fell from 28% to 16%, the share of social expenditure fell
from 56% to 23%, and the share derived from personal expenditure rose from 16% to
61% (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005). The rising regional and urban-rural differences have
been disguised by average indicators. This means social indicators such as increasing
infant mortality have not been observed in poorer rural areas (Li and Wei, 2010a). In
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addition, local government has responsibility for financial support for health care.
Therefore, regional inequality widened disparities in health resources. The distortion
of fees for health care service leads either to the neglect of preventive care or the
prescription of inappropriate drugs and services (WHO, 1999).
Fourth, the number of beds in nursing centres reveals details concerning social
welfare (Wong, 1994). Since the mid-1980s, social welfare policy has been in
transition. In order to keep pace with the economic changes, China has been
struggling to reform its social welfare and pension systems. Medical insurance
schemes have been brought in to replace practices under the centrally-planned system.
Transition processes are generating significant difficulties for the provision of social
welfare support, particularly in rural areas (c.f. Zhang and Kanbur, 2005; Hebel,
2003). Hebel (2003), for example, estimate that the coverage of social welfare system
is only 2% in countryside and expenditures on farmers who account for 70% of total
population only accounts for 11% of total expenditure. China has a high level of
decentralisation in financing and organising rural social security. Rural areas with
high demand for provision – due to higher poverty or population levels – are forced to
reduce coverage or the benefit level provided because they tend to have fewer public
resources and public finances.
Finally, I have chosen three years of GDP data (1999, 2002 and 2006) because I
want to provide the most up-to-date information possible and also focus on changes
over time. The very latest statistical data available at the time of the research was of
2006, and oldest reliable data was of 1999. Therefore, the data from these two years –
plus the data from 2002, in the middle of the ten year span – were chosen for detailed
analysis. According to Figure 5- 11, Figure 5- 12 and Figure 5- 13, one may conclude
that spatial distribution patterns in 1999 and 2002 are similar but 2006 shows more
severe inequalities. These distribution patterns partly prove that economic
development increased between 2001 and 2006 (see Fan, 2008; Fleisher, 2006; Yu
and Wei, 2003; Huang et al., 2003).
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Figure 5- 11: 1999 per capita GDP (RMB) (Source: author)
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Figure 5- 12: 2002 per capita GDP (RMB) (Source: author)
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Figure 5- 13: 2006 per capita GDP (RMB) (Source: author)
5.2.3 Understanding Regional Development and Disparity: Using
Multivariate Analysis to Test the Kuznets Model
As Sachs (1992) and Drakakis-Smith (1993) have argued, ‘development’
should not always be used as an abbreviation of ‘economic development’ and, instead,
it should also encompass social, political and cultural dimensions (Unwin, 1994).
Consequently, many scholars have addressed the importance of the social, political
and cultural dimensions of ‘development’. Therefore, this chapter uses multivariate
analysis to overcome such a problem of definition. Namely, nine indices of three
dimensions are used here to measure development, rather than simply using the
economic dimension. Inspired by the Human Development Indices (UNDP, 2000),
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this chapter intends to combine nine variables which includes three dimensions into
one development index called Quality Development Index (QDI).
Economic development and population living standards:
1． Per Capita GDP
2． Per Capita Net Income of Urban/Rural Residents
3． Per Capita Residents’ Savings Deposits
4． Per Capita Local Government Revenue
5． Per Capita Local Government Expenditure
6． Per Capita Outstanding Loan of Financial Institutes
Social-education:
7． Student Numbers per 10000
Social-health:
8． Hospital Beds per 10000
Political-welfare
9． Number of Social Welfare Nursing Centre Beds per 10000
In general, to transform an item of raw data, say x, into a unit-free index
between 0 and 1 (which allows different indices to be added together), the following
formula is used:
)min()max(
)min(
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it xx
xx
X 
 (1)
Where：
itX is the index of item itx at time t
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itx is the raw data of county i at time t
)min( tx is the lowest value of the variable itx
)max( tx is the highest values the variable itx
Therefore, according to above method, all nine indices can be calculated either
based on their monetary unit or numerical unit, depending on the type of data. Based
on such statistics, I am able to calculate QDI, which is the arithmetic average of the
nine indices, and develop a picture of the economic, social and political dimensions of
a study area.
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The main reasons for selecting these nine indices to calculate QDI are as follows:
The first six indices measure regional economic development and living standards.
GDP measures income and output (McCains, 2007); net income of households and
individuals, ‘is the sum of all the wages, salaries, profits, interest payments, rents and
other forms of earnings received in a given period of time’ (Case and Fair, 2007).
Financial savings is one of the most important measures of people’s disposable money.
It is a cultural tradition in China that people prefer to save as much money as possible
in preparation for any unforeseeable circumstances, regardless of their income.
Therefore, savings can also be used as an index of personal income levels. Local
government revenue and local government expenditure measure the financial
condition of local government and public service facilities; outstanding loan of
financial institutes is able to measure local economic activity; and the level of student
enrolment per 10,000 persons is an important index of basic education. Given the
importance of education as a measure of human resources and social development, I
use this to explore the social educational dimension of China ’ s development. The
number of hospital beds per 10,000 persons can be used as a measure of social health;
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and finally the number of social welfare nursing centre beds per 10000 explores
aspects of political welfare as it pertains to China’s regional development and political
welfare.
Identifying a measurement of inequality is also difficult because in my thesis
inequality means not only income or economic inequality, but also includes various
other dimensions. In order to capture these three dimensions and features of these
statistical data, the coefficients of variations are used to calculate the disparity.
Coeffience Variation (CV) is one of the most widely used measures of regional
inequality in the literature – examples include Dev (2000), Decressin (1999), Sachs
(1999), Tsui (1996), Akita and Lukman (1995), Lyons (1991) and Williamson (1965),
The CV is a measure of dispersion around the mean. So, in this chapter, the CV, as
defined below, attempts to capture the dispersion of indices. This measure is
standardized and can be used to make comparisons between counties and over time.
In the following analysis, the CV is an unweighted measure and is calculated as below:
U
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where iy is the per capita index of county i, N is the number of regions and Uy is
the mean. Uy is computed as the mean of the regional per capita index without
weighting by population as follows:
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There were several main reasons for selecting these indices. First, I wanted to
provide the most up-to-date information possible, and also focus on changes through
time. Therefore, the analysis concentrated on data for 2006. Second, per capita Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) is one of the most widely used measures of economic
production. The GDP of a country is defined as the market value of all final goods
and services produced within a country in a given period of time (Eatwell, 1998).
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GDP has been widely used by researchers to provide a picture of a country’s
development status (Lu and Lo, 2006). Here, 2006 provincial and county per capita
GDP are chosen to reveal the difference between provincial- and county-level models.
Therefore, the correlation of QDI and Per Capita GDP, Per Capita Net Income of
Urban/Rural Residents, Per Capita Residents’ Savings Deposits, Per Capita Local
Government Revenue, Per Capita Local Government Expenditure, Per Capita
Outstanding Loan of Financial Institutes, Student Numbers per 10000, Hospital Beds
per 10000, Number of Social Welfare Nursing Centre Beds per 10000 are listed as
follows.
139
Table 5- 1: Correlations of PGDP, PLGR, PLGE, PSDUH, PCNIRH, PFI, HB, SWB, SE and QDI
Correlations
1 .846** .820** .854** .385** .843** .395** .321** .108** .876**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1931 1931 1928 1928 1921 1928 1920 1832 1931 1823
.846** 1 .793** .818** .347** .858** .262** .218** .099** .802**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1931 2056 2053 2040 1921 2046 2010 1910 2056 1823
.820** .793** 1 .784** .128** .748** .475** .280** -.009 .835**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .700 .000
1928 2053 2053 2038 1918 2044 2007 1908 2053 1823
.854** .818** .784** 1 .310** .877** .316** .273** .188** .848**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1928 2040 2038 2040 1918 2040 1998 1900 2040 1823
.385** .347** .128** .310** 1 .345** .038 .142** .128** .284**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .093 .000 .000 .000
1921 1921 1918 1918 1933 1918 1910 1822 1930 1813
.843** .858** .748** .877** .345** 1 .279** .241** .130** .814**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1928 2046 2044 2040 1918 2046 2003 1903 2046 1823
.395** .262** .475** .316** .038 .279** 1 .555** -.089** .533**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .093 .000 .000 .000 .000
1920 2010 2007 1998 1910 2003 2019 1903 2011 1823
.321** .218** .280** .273** .142** .241** .555** 1 .048* .569**
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .035 .000
1832 1910 1908 1900 1822 1903 1903 1917 1910 1823
.108** .099** -.009 .188** .128** .130** -.089** .048* 1 .239**
.000 .000 .700 .000 .000 .000 .000 .035 .000
1931 2056 2053 2040 1930 2046 2011 1910 2068 1823
.876** .802** .835** .848** .284** .814** .533** .569** .239** 1
.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
1823 1823 1823 1823 1813 1823 1823 1823 1823 1823
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
PGDP06
PLGR06
PLGE06
PSDUH06
PcNIRH06
PFI06
P10000HB06
P10000SWB06
SE06
@06QDI
PGDP06 PLGR06 PLGE06 PSDUH06 PcNIRH06 PFI06 P10000HB06
P10000
SWB06 SE06 @06QDI
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**. 
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*. 
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Table 5- 1 shows the Pearson Correlation for ten indices. First, it is found that
the QDI is highly correlated to its all nine indices, which indicates that there is a
strong relationship between the QDI and its nine variables. Therefore, it can be
claimed that the QDI is a reasonable measure of the three dimensions of development.
This index is able to measure the process by which citizens’ options are widened,
giving them greater opportunities when it comes to income, savings, public
infrastructure, education, health care and welfare. Therefore, the QDI is also able to
rank counties by their level of ‘quality development’, which usually also determines
whether a county is a developed, developing or underdeveloped county. Although this
index has some limitations, like the Human Development Index (Ul Haq, 1998), it is a
broad index able to measure three development dimensions. This multivariate index is
a better measure of quality of life than any single index, which only measures one
dimension. This also proves the theory that development is not just economic, but also
has social, political and ideological dimensions.
Second, per capita GDP has a very high correlation with five other indices but a
low correlation with student enrolment. This means per capita GDP has a strong
relationship with personal income, savings, government revenue and expenditure, but
a weak relationship with student enrolment numbers. This is also supported in
research by Qian (2008) and Hannum (2007)
Third, there is negative coefficient between local government expenditure and
student enrolment, and there is also an extremely weak relationship between them. In
this case, it means when local government expenditure increases, student numbers
decrease or do not change.
Therefore, I use QDI (a multivariate index) to represent development index and
CV of QDI and its components indices to stand for inequality index. Then, I test
Kuznets Curve by using QDI and CV.
Due to China’s economic, social, political and ideological conditions, there has
never been an applicable development theory or strategy to guide the prevailing
situation and development. There are some theories and strategies for understanding
and explaining China ’ s rapid development and worsening disparities, but they are
limited to certain historical situations or specific conditions (for example, Fan and Sun,
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2008; Ho and Li, 2008; Lu, 2008; Wang, 2007; Li, 2006; Jun, 2006 and Woetzel,
2004) and are inadequate for understanding the overall development of China in the
last few decades.
In the debates about the relationship between development and disparity, the
proposal made by Björn and Johansson (1999:586) has received widespread attention,
as the phenomena described are quite evident in many developing countries: ‘in the
early stage of development, economic inequality increases over time while a country
is developing, then after a critical average income is attained, it begins to decrease’.
Among the existing development theories and strategies, Simon Kuznets’s ‘inverted
U-curve hypothesis’ is the most influential statement on inequality and development.
The debate surrounding the existence of the Kuznets Curve (or the Kuznets model)
has not settled in academia since 1955 (Candelaria et al., 2009; Lahiri and Dillon,
2007; Khasru and Jalil, 2004; Thornton, 2001; Tisdell, 2001; Higgins and Williamson,
1999). As one of the earliest researchers of development economics, Simon Kuznets
(the Nobel Laureate in Economics), proposed the Kuznets Curve (or the Kuznets
model) in 1955. It is an empirical model (for development) as shown in the graph
below, where the horizontal axis measures the increase of economic development
(presumed to correlate with time), and the vertical axis measures income inequality.
The curve is an inverted U-curve, which means that economic inequality increases
over time while a country is developing, and after a critical average income is attained,
it begins to decrease (see Figure 5- 14)
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Figure 5- 14: Kuznets Curve
In order to understand the current situation of China’s development and inequality,
Kuznets model is used here to test China ’ s development stage. The reasons for
choosing Kuznets model are as follows:
First, the Kuznets Curve is deeply rooted in many development theories. For
example, a few well-known development models, such as Lewis’s (1972) Dual Sector
Model of Development, Hirschman's (1958) Unbalanced Growth Model and Rostow's
(1956, 1960) Stages of Economic Development, all argue that there is a disparity in
income distribution during economic development in low-income countries. The
distinction of Kuznets’s inverted U curve is that it has incorporated the inequality or
the Gini coefficient on the Y axis and economic development or per capita income on
the X axis. In addition, Kuznets (1955, 1966, and 1995) also gives a theoretical
explanation for the shape of the curve based on development theories. For example, he
explains the stages of developments. In the early stages, economic growth is mainly
driven by investment in physical capital. By distributing resources towards those who
save and invest the most, inequality normally encourage growth. However, in mature
economies, if physical capital accrual is still the main source of growth and human
capital accrual has not been incurred, inequality slows growth because education
standards are lowered and poor people lack financial support for their education in
imperfect credit markets. All these explanations fit very well with China ’ s
development situation.
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Second, because the empirical model is very important for understanding how
inequality changes during development in various countries, the Kuznets Curve has
been widely used to test many different countries’ data since its publication (for
example, Bahmani-Oskooee and Gelan, 2008; Lahiri and Dillon, 2007; Tisdell, 2001;
Thornton, 2001). However, the debate has not reached a clear conclusion. Kuznets
(1966, 1995) himself proved that income inequality (shown on his vertical axis)
increases first and then decreases in developed countries according to historical
statistical data from the UK, USA and Germany; for the horizontal axis, he also
examined the income distribution of both developing and developed countries after
World War II. The result shows that income inequality is much higher in developing
countries than in developed countries. The majority of research conducted in the
1960s and 1970s supports the Kuznets model. However, after the 1980s, empirical
results from the Asian countries labelled the ‘Four Little Dragons (Hong Kong,
Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore) ’were found to directly contradict the Kuznets
model (Heikkila, 2003). For example, Vogel (1991) concludes that during the rapid
development of Asia’s Four Little Dragons, income distribution improved rather than
deteriorated. It becomes apparent that Kuznets’s conclusion that inequality must
increase before decreasing is only true in the case of ‘cross-sectional’ data being used,
i.e. the U-shape of the curve cannot be formed from the progressive development data
of any individual country. In his data set, many of the medium-income countries were
in Latin America, a region with historically high levels of inequality. However, if
Latin America is excluded from his datasets, the U-shape of the curve tends to
disappear. In China, there has also been a debate over the Kuznets Curve. For example,
Zhang and Zou (2012) conclude that the Kuznets’s hypothesis does not work in the
context of empirical analysis of China; however, Zhou and Li (2011) reach the
opposite conclusion based on his empirical analysis. Therefore, the theoretical
question of whether the Kuznets Curve fits with Chinese development is of critical
importance; in particular, it is of interest to discern if/when the different stages of the
U-shape will occur and if/when inequality might start to decrease.
Third, compared with other western models, Kuznets’s (1955) inverted-U model
has had the most prevailing influence on China ’ s recent development. China is
different from the typical developing economy. Due to its history of planned
(balanced) development under state ownership and its poor industry base, aiming for
144
unbalanced growth in China is one development strategy. This model had given
comfortable reassurance to the Chinese authorities in choosing such an unbalanced
development strategy from the beginning of the reform period. The renowned ‘getting
rich first’ policy proclaimed by Deng (1983) was actually based on belief in Kuznets’s
model and the idea that the regional inequality will rise during the initial stages of
development and then should decline at more advanced stages, i.e. ‘making people
equally rich eventually’ (Deng, 1983:25). Following the ‘getting rich first’ principle,
in the late 1980s Chinese authorities divided the country into three economic belts or
zones: the eastern, coastal, and central and western regions. Great attention, resources
and capital were concentrated into the eastern and coastal areas. In reality, under this
strategy, the coastal and eastern regions have claimed about 85% of total foreign
investment and 70% of total domestic investment for most of the past two decades,
leaving the central and western region far behind (Zheng and Ge, 2004; Cai et al.,
2002; Fan, 1997). Now the crucial question is whether the aim of ‘people getting
equally rich eventually’ can be achieved.
As China is a huge country and contains different development regions, I use
county-level data to represent unevenly developed regions instead of the nations at
different development stages used by Kuznets to test his model through static analysis.
The Kuznets Curve is tested using QDI as a development index and coefficient
variable (CV) of QDI and its componets as inequality indices. Identifying a measure
of inequality is very difficult because of the vast database required. In order to capture
the various features of statistical data, the CV rather than Gini coefficient is used to
calculate the disparity because it is almost impossible to calculate Gini coefficient
with such a huge database. In the literature, the CV is one of the most widely used
measures of regional inequality. Examples include Chen (2007); Lyons (1997); Jian et
al., (1996), Williamson (1965).
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Figure 5- 15: Regression graph of per capita GDP and CV of per capita savings (Source: author)
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Figure 5- 16: Regression graph of QDI and CV of per capita income (Source: author)
After testing the regression between the per capita GDP and CV of per capita
savings (Figure 5- 15), between QDI and CV of per capita income (Figure 5- 16), the
following conclusions can be drawn.
146
First, the Kuznets Curve is not obvious on all graphs and the Kuznets Model does
not apply to China according to the county-level data. In other words, based on
analysis of over 2000 counties using statistical data from China in 2001 and 2006, the
inequality of the counties with high income and savings and the counties with low
income and savings, is not higher than that of the counties with medium income and
savings. This result supports the arguments made by Zhang and Zou (2012) that the
Kuznets Curve does not exist in the Chinese context. Therefore, it can be concluded
that it is impossible to use the Kuznets Curve to forecast the ongoing trend of
inequality along with economic, social and political development.
Second, most regression fit lines are in a curve shape at the first half of the graph.
This indicates that the counties with high income and savings experienced greater
disparity than counties with medium and low income and savings in 2001 and 2006.
This outcome proves that China’s disparity is getting worse and has not yet reached its
maximum conversional point with high economic growth. This is also demonstrated in
the literature of Wan (2004, 2007, and 2008) and Gravier-Rymaszewska et al., (2010).
There is no sign that inequality has reached a downwards turning point. This outcome
supports the view of other researchers, such as Ho and Li (2008) and Hao and Wei
(2010).
Third, the R square of PGDP is similar to that of QDI in 2006, and the R square
of QDI is larger than the R square of PGDP in 2001 and 1997. This means that using
the Quadratic Regression Function is more reliable in finding a relationship between
the QDI and per capita income and saving, than between per capita GDP and per
capita income and saving. This finding again supports the definition of development
as not only economic growth or economic development, but also social and political
development.
Fourth, the R squares are very high in 1997 and 2001 but very low in 2006. The R
squares in 1997 and 2001 reach around 0.8, which suggests that it is very reliable to
use the Quadratic Regression Function for the analysis. However, the R square is only
0.05 in 2006, which then suggests that using the Quadratic Regression Function for
the analysis is inappropriate. Instead, the linear regression provides better results. This
most likely means that rich counties have a greater disparity than medium and poor
counties.
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In addition, in the light of Kuznets’s model, there are two questions about China
which need to be answered. First, is uneven regional development a ‘natural’ and
‘inevitable’ stage in China’s development? Second, should rising regional disparity be
tolerated? Some researchers, such as Ma and Yu (2001), use time series to examine
China ’ s regional per capita income convergence. He draws upon Barro (1992) and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin's (1995) theory, which suggests that regional disparities can
only be short-term phenomena, as they will generate self-correcting movements in
prices, wages, capital and labour, which will restore the tendency towards regional
convergence. This has happened in the United States and Japan (Fujita et al., 2004). In
contrast, Higgins and Williamson (1999) have warned the Chinese government that
Kuznets’s Curve and Williamson’s inverted-U approach are too theoretical and their
anticipated events may not happen. Even if such a model is realised, the turning point
could take a long time and possibly more than 30 years. Therefore, it is a great risk to
tolerate rising disparity. Yao (2001) suggests that regional growth and incomes do not
necessarily converge, even over a long period. Instead, regional divergence is the most
likely outcome, and regional incomes will tend to diverge. However, Zhou (2009)
proposes that both convergence and divergence of economic growth have appeared
successively in China. I may answer the above two questions through critical analysis
of the detailed and large quantity of county-level data. Uneven regional development
is an inevitable stage in China ’ s development because the Chinese government
launched preferential policies both historically between 1949 and 1978 as well as
during the process of economic reform since 1978. Therefore, the inequality
conversional point can only be reached through the efforts of the government to
reduce inequalities in production, education, health and politics, because the severe
disparity not only restrains economic growth but also affects social stability.
5.3 Understanding Regional Development and Reasons for Disparity
There are various reasons for the patterns of regional differentiation, such as
political preferential strategies, natural resource differentiation, access to large
markets and transport routes (Xu and Wang, 2006).
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5.3.1 Political Preferential Strategies
The previous section argues that, according to the analysis of county-level data,
disparity in China is getting worse and has not yet reached Kuznets’s maximum
conversional point, despite high economic growth. Many reasons have been put
forward to explain this phenomenon (Yao, 2009; Yao et al., 2004; Yang, 2002; Yao,
2001). The most common is that China ’ s transition process since 1978 has been
marked by a series of incremental and gradual reforms. The timing and significance of
China ’ s reform policies have significant influence on the evolution of regional
inequalities (Yang, 2006; Zhang and Zou, 1998).
First, coastal regions have been the beneficiaries of coastal region-biased policies
from central government and these regional development strategies cause regional
inequalities (Yao, 2009; Démurger et al., 2002). Since 1980, four SEZs have been
established in the two coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. Later, 14 open
coastal cities were set up in 1984. Hainan province and Shanghai Pudong
Development Zone were founded in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The rise of regional
inequalities has been directly contributed to by China ’ s regional development
strategies. Both domestic and foreign investments have become exceedingly
concentrated in the coastal regions due to preferential policies. In addition, more
advanced technologies and management skills have been brought to the coastal
regions by open-door policies. The coastal regions enjoyed high growth rates driven
by scale economies where industrial agglomeration took place. Golley (2002)
identifies industrial agglomeration (a so-called ‘cumulative causation effect’) in five
south-eastern provinces using data covering 22 industrial sectors in the period
between 1989 and 1994. In the meantime, a huge volume of labour was attracted
through migration to the coastal regions from inland regions. The coastal regions
benefited significantly from an initial take-off as a result of the preferential regional
development strategies in the 1980s, which then in turn led to steadily higher-than-
average growth rates in the 1990s due to the effects of agglomeration and increasing
returns (c.f. Kanbur et al., 2008). However, spill-over effects were not strong enough
to allow the inland regions to catch up with the rich coastal regions. Empirical
evidence from county-level data supports the view that preferential investment and
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trade policies are important determinants of growth differentials in China (e.g.
Démurger et al., 2002).
The second reason for regional inequality is urban-biased policies (Lu and Chen,
2006). The government installed a set of urban-biased fiscal and monetary policies
after 1985 in order to maintain economic and political stability. The government
subsidies to urban commodity prices totalled 71.2 billion RMB in 1998, which was
7.6% of the government’s budget. The Chinese government also subsidised the urban-
based, loss-making SOEs, which accounted for 19% of the government’s revenue
between 1986 and 1990, and 9% between 1991 and 1995. Such subsidies totalled
232.5 billion RMB and 206.1 billion RMB for the periods respectively (Yang, 2002).
The share of the budget devoted to cities ranged from 52 to 62% for the period
between 1986 and 1992 (Yao, 2001). The urban state sector also received preferential
credit allocations in addition to fiscal transfers, which caused a redistribution of
income in favour of urban areas. As a result, rural-urban inequality has been
constantly increased by urban-biased fiscal and monetary policies. This has
significantly contributed to rising inequality in China since 1985. Regions in China
differ widely in their rates of urbanisation (Yang, 2002) so widening rural-urban
inequality translates into rising regional inequality because counties with a higher
level of GDP per capita in general have higher urbanisation rates.
The third reason explaining regional inequality is public service delivery by the
inter-governmental transfer system. The local governments took responsibility for
fiscal support to most core public services, including education, health care, social
security and infrastructure (Tsui, 2005; Zhang and Fan, 2004). However, the present
inter-government finance system is not ensuring adequate delivery of public services
because the extensive decentralisation of the basic service delivery of education and
health care is associated with regional inequalities. Central government should
complement a strong inter-government fiscal transfer system to ensure education and
health care equality (Ma and Yu, 2001). However, the current inter-government
transfer system only plays a partial role and is unable to offer an adequate equalising
role because China’s per capita revenues and expenditure by local governments vary
greatly across provinces. Similarly, large disparities have also existed within
provinces. For example, the central government set up local government staffing and
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salaries according to local government fiscal revenue, which absorbs over two thirds
of local government budgets (Qing, 2005). The relative lack of autonomy in such a
major spending area, disparities in fiscal capacity and different levels of responsibility
largely explain why many local governments, especially those in poor localities, have
fallen short of ensuring adequate the delivery of public services. The long-term
financial constraints at the local level have resulted in many misrepresentations and
undermine efforts of poverty alleviation (Wan, 2008).
Fourth, internally, the question of regional economic development is a major
concern for national security planning. In general terms, China’s military and political
elites identify three major levels of security: the national, the regional in terms of East
Asia and beyond, and the global. The interactions between the three are clearly
important and the disputed ownership of Taiwan is an example of how one island
links all three geographical scales together. For the Chinese authorities, of course, the
reunification of Taiwan with continental China remains one of the most important
policy priorities. Traditionally, ethnic separatism and the disputed region of Tibet tend
to be viewed as an internal matter. More recently, there has been a far greater
awareness of how apparently localised issues might be connected to regional and
global flows of people and ideas.
In terms of ethnic separatism, one of the most important sources of tension has
been the status of Xinjiang province in the far west of China. The central government
has claimed in the past that so-called Uighur terrorists have been responsible for over
200 attacks between 1990 and 2001 (Dodds et al., 2009). Allegations have also
periodically surfaced that the central authorities have been particularly serious in
suppressing any anti-government or separatism activities. In 2000, a ‘Go West’
development campaign (the Great Western Development Strategy) was launched with
the purpose of developing the country’s western regions. It was seen as an explicit
recognition that China ’ s border regions were vulnerable to further unrest and not
helped by the fact that some of the poorest and non-Han Chinese communities were
located there. Economic development has been routinely cited as essential for
dampening down acts of subversion attempted by a small number of ethnic minority
people, such as the Uighurs.
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This is significant because it means that regional inequalities are not merely
social and economic questions for the authorities in Beijing. The border regions,
especially in the far west, have become ‘securitised’ in the sense that investment in
education and training alongside investment in infrastructure is widely perceived as an
essential element in restraining, if not crushing, ethnic separatism in Xinjiang
province. Under the remit of the Great Western Development Strategy, attention has
been devoted to improving school attendance figures in a province populated by eight
million Muslims who are culturally and linguistically distinct from local Han Chinese.
Evidence from the county level is significant because most religious minorities
including Uighurs live outside the main cities and towns. The strategy has combined
incentives with tougher measures to ensure the territorial integrity of China in the far
west. Incentives include preferential treatment for minorities with regard to university
entry and a growing Uighur middle class able and willing to access better school-level
education for their children who may well choose Chinese rather than Uighur
language schools. The Chinese government hopes that improved educational and
employment prospects will diminish secessionist pressures among a new generation
(Dodds et al., 2009).
In short, the Chinese authorities are eager to counteract regional disparities in the
far west and to address the perceived problem of ethnic separatism. Hence, the Great
Western Development Strategy, which has improved living and social-educational
conditions for minorities but has not shifted the dominance of the Han Chinese with
regards to positions of power such as membership of the CCP. In recent years,
therefore, it has been recognised that this is the number one internal security challenge
and not the question of Tibet, which requires the co-operation of India rather than the
Central Asian Republics. Elements of the Uighur population have become more
radicalised and experienced in terms of international training and fighting. By way of
contrast, Tibetan separatists and their overseas supporters are less inclined towards
violent struggle. Regional economic development, educational investment and
employment creation have become conjoined and this is likely to continue in the
immediate future (Morduch and Sicular, 2000).
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5.3.2 Geographic Diversity
Geography matters significantly. Substantial inequality in regional development
is not new and is found in almost every geographically large country (Williamson,
1965), such as the US, Brazil and Russia. In this sense, China is not unique. As the
fourth biggest country in the world (covering more than 9.5 million square kilometres),
China has the world’s largest population (over 1.3 billion), is marked by extreme
geographical differences in development conditions and has immense diversities in
geography, climate, natural resources, culture and population distribution. (Bao et al.,
2002) proposed that geographic factors have a significant positive relationship in
explaining regional disparity in China and this has been investigated in wider
scientific literature. Chang et al., (2002) applied new geographic theories to study
Chinese development since the reforms. The paper develops a theoretical model to
explain the regional growth pattern in China. According to the model, the geo-
topographic advantages of the coastal regions in international trade and transportation
are realised in the context of market reforms and open-door policies. As a
consequence, returns to capital investment in the coastal regions are superior to in the
rest of the country (Hertel and Zhai, 2006). Démurger (2001) discovered that the
interaction between the coastal dummy and the time effect has a significant and
positive impact on growth, which supports Chang et al., (2002), who argue that the
reforms have helped the coastal regions to realise their geographic advantages.
Geographic factors have an impact on income (Fan et al., 2000). As demonstrated
in Chapters Six and Seven, geographic conditions, climate, natural resources, culture
and population distribution have different effects on economic and social development
at the county scale. Therefore, in order to understand and analyse China’s economic,
social, political and ideological inequalities, it is important to underst and the immense
diversity to be found in geography, climate, natural resources, culture and population
distribution. The physical environment also plays an important role in regional
differentiation in China (Bao et al. 2002), with the topography, climate, soil and
hydrology all providing very different contexts for development. For example, low
land, mild climate, fertile soils and sufficient water provide the best conditions for
agricultural activities (see Figure 5- 17) in central and southern China. The land is
separated by broken hills, and millions of people live in these undulated regions and
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cultivate the valleys and lower slopes. The real main lowlands are those of the great
river basins and estuary plains, built up of alluvial deposits. This is why these great
river basins and estuary plains are well-developed areas such as the Yangtze River
estuary centralised around Shanghai, the Pearl River estuary centralised around
Guangdong and the Yellow River estuary around Shandong. Counties with a strong
development trajectory are concentrated in these areas, where agricultural products are
particularly able to flourish. Specialisation is indicated, for example, by the renown of
vegetables from Shouguang Xian and flowers from Guangrao Xian of Shangdong
province (the Yellow River estuary); grapes from Penglai Xian; and poultry, silk
worms and fish from Hai’an Xian of Jiangsu province.
Figure 5- 17: General geomorphology map of China (Source: White Papers of the Chinese
Government, 2006)
The possession of mineral, natural, water, cultural and historical resources are
particularly important in terms of county-level economic development. For example,
Huang et al., (2012) explain how resources have a positive influence on regional
development and Liang et al., (2004) highlight the relationship between tourism and
regional economic development. So far, China has discovered 171 types of mineral
and nearly 18,000 mineral deposits (mines) (see Figure 5- 18). More than 7,000 of
these deposits are medium to large in size, providing over 92% of China’ s primary
energy, 80% of its industrial raw materials and more than 70% of its agricultural
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means of production (White Papers of the Chinese Government, 2007). However,
these mineral resources are not distributed very evenly across China and possession of
mineral resources is one of the most important factors in some counties being more
developed in terms of their local economy than others. For example, Pinged Xian
(county) in Guangxi province has abundant aluminium mines; Tingyi Shi (city) in
Huizhou province has coal, aluminium and other metal mines; Edina I (I is the
equivalent to county in Mongolian) in Inner Mongolia has coal. Counties with rich
cultural, historical and scenic resources have also been attracting a large number of
both domestic and overseas tourists. For instance, the famous Guiling Shi in Guangxi
province and Yixing Shi in Guizhou province have been making profiting from
visitors who come to see their spectacular limestone castle landscape, caves and rivers.
Figure 5- 18: Distribution of metallic mineral resources in China (Source: White Papers of the
Chinese Government, 2007)
5.3.3 Economic Imbalance
The core of development is always defined as being economic, although
development also consists of social, political and cultural dimensions (e.g. Krugman,
1991; Martin and Sunley, 1996). Development theories, including the Neo-classical
Growth Theory (e.g. Cass, 1965; Koopmans, 1965; Solow, 1956), the Regional
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Development Theory (e.g. Kaldor, 1970; North, 1955) and New Institutional
Economics (e.g. Williamson, 1985, 1975; Coase, 1937), consider physical (e.g. labour
and capital) and human capital (e.g. education and health care) to be the key factors
for increasing productivity. Public infrastructure and public policies also have an
impact on regional productivity and stimulate regional development (c.f. Dawkins,
2003; Button, 1998). China ’ s development in general is not exceptional and the
economic factors are not only the consequences of political preferential policy but also
lead to uneven regional development and disparity.
First, although the central government preferential policy has promoted growth in
economies in coastal areas, the geographical location of these economies provides
them with a unique advantage in engaging in international trade, as well as enhancing
their potential for industrialisation to supply the trade in manufactured exports (Yao,
1998). Mody and Wang (1997) and Démurger (2001) have found that infrastructure
investment in communications infrastructure, such as roads, railway, waterways, and
telephones, can help inland areas to overcome geographical obstacles. Indeed,
transportation and telecommunication infrastructures are particularly important to
economic growth because China has huge distances and diverse geo-topographical
features between different provinces or even within the same province. Therefore,
investment in public infrastructure can improve productivity growth by assisting
market transactions. A few empirical works study the relationship between
infrastructure development and economic growth in China. Zhang and Fan (2004) find
that both telecommunication facilities and road network length had positive and
significant effects on growth for seven coastal provinces from 1985 to 1989.
Démurger (2001) finds a nonlinear relationship between economic growth and
transportation indicators. The development of telecommunication in rural areas
(measured by the number of villages with access to telephone services) has a positive
impact on growth.
Before the reform period, public infrastructure was evenly distributed across
regions in China. However, since the reform, the central government has built
infrastructure mainly in coastal provinces according to the regional bias in its
development policy. The central government has recently started to focus on western
provinces in order to stimulate western economic growth (Ding, 2008; Lu, 2002).
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Démurger (2001) suggests that economic policy measures may have a greater impact
on improving infrastructure equipment than in promoting per capita income
convergence. Furthermore, setting policy priorities to target public investments would
help to improve regional as well as national growth prospects. Figure 5- 19 depicts the
spatial distribution of per capita county government expenditure and it shows the
expansion and upgrading of fiscal expenditure by country government in western
counties, especially in Xingjiang and Inner Mongolia. Investment in the network of
telecommunications, distribution and storage services, as well as the transportation
network, would be particularly useful in most western counties, rural areas and
mountainous borders, to assign in the development of capable, competitive markets
and the diffusion of economic growth (Yang, 2002).
Figure 5- 19: Per capita local government expenditure (Source: author)
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Figure 5- 20: Per capita local government revenue (Source: author)
Second, fiscal decentralisation is another factor because local governments are
able to accumulate power and their relationships with local enterprises strengthen
during the process of fiscal decentralisation (see Figure 5- 20) (Jin et al., 2005;
Brueckner, 2000). From the beginning of the reform to decentralise its fiscal system,
Chinese fiscal reforms suffered from strict budgetary constraints. In the process of
reform, the contracts established between central and local governments started to
vary by regions and were subject to renegotiations when circumstances changed
(Zhang and Zou, 1998). The contracting system provided incentives for local
governments to increase their revenues and allocate their spending more efficiently
because it caused central government taxation rates to drop sharply. However, direct
empirical evidence shows that fiscal decentralisation has exacerbated regional
inequality in China. For example, Tsui (1991) uses a graph analysis based on data up
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to 1985 to demonstrate that decentralisation increased regional inequality. Kanbur and
Zhang (2002) discover that decentralisation had a significant and positive effect on the
degree of regional inequality and it especially widened rural-urban inequality (Qian et
al., 2008).
Tax contracting between central government and the provinces was implemented
during fiscal decentralisation. Each fiscal contract – ranging from fixed lump-sum
contracts for five years to highly complicated (province-specific) revenue-sharing
formulas – was individually negotiated. For example, Guangdong and Fujian
provinces must hand over a fixed lump-sum in fiscal revenue to central government
while other provinces, such as Hubei and Gansu, follow complicated (province-
specific) revenue-sharing formulas. The provincial governments, in turn, negotiated
individual revenue contracts with local governments such as those in the city and
county (Zhang and Zou, 1998). The motivations for the provincial and local
governments to engage in local economic development and generate tax revenue are
different because the marginal tax rate set by the central government varied
considerably across provinces. Practically, poor provincial governments reduced local
development expenditure to cover local expenditure from local revenue, which
formerly received fiscal subsidies from the central government (Wang, 2010). The tax
reform of 1994, which had value-added tax as its centrepiece, has reduced the
discriminatory elements of the fiscal system but it has not restored the fiscal capacity
of the state to significantly help poorer provinces (Chen and Feng, 2000).
The negative effect of fiscal decentralisation on local economic growth has been
found to be constantly strong and significant in China (Jin et al., 2005). Zhang (1998)
claimed that provincial spending has failed to deliver the widely expected rapid
economic growth. Fiscal reforms began in China in the early 1980s, since when it has
clearly failed to promote the country's economic growth (Zhang, 1998). This counters
arguments that fiscal decentralisation generally makes a positive contribution to local
economic growth. So, the merits of fiscal decentralisation have to be calculated
relative to existing revenue and expenditure obligations as well as the stage of
economic development. Zhang and Fan (2004) points out that the central government
may be in a much better position to carry out public investment in the early stages of
economic development. Further decentralisation may cause slower economic growth,
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particularly if local governments already have high shares of total fiscal revenue and
expenditure.
Third, since 1978a variety of industrial organisation forms have emerged,
including SOEs, TVEs and foreign-owned enterprises (Knight, 2008; Wei, 2004; Lin
et al., 1992). Inland SOEs dominate the development of the local economy but in
coastal areas, TVEs or foreign-owned enterprises dominate the local economy (Ng
and Tuan, 2003; Tong, 1999). Compare to inland areas, China ’ s coastal areas have
competitive concentrations of TVEs and FDI due to business traditions and their
geographic locations (Zhang, 2005a).The economic development of counties is above
all related to their commitment to local industry. Rural industrial growth has provided
one of the most important growth engines in China. For example, the development of
southern Jiangsu, known for the TVE-centred Sunan Model of development, has been
conceptualised as local state-led development. Township and village governments
acting as managers or board directors directly control TVEs and treat them as
components of a larger corporation. In addition, local states control TVEs through
labour and resource allocation, and they run their authorities like industrial firms
(Walder, 2002). In market economy environments, China ’ s state sector has been
lagging behind the non-state sector in economic growth due to its low efficiency and
high production costs. Therefore, Chen and Feng (2000) has proposed that local and
central governments should promote private enterprises because booming non-SOEs
caused high growth rates in the coastal provinces. However, the reform of large SOEs
may cause some political problems and remains one of the biggest challenges for
China because it may be accompanied by greater unemployment and an increase in
regional inequality (Renard, 2002).
Fourth, FDI is heavily concentrated in coastal China, especially in the coastal
cities, which enjoy preferential policies and agglomeration economies. This is partly
because of the state’s gradual opening up policy initially launched in coastal cities and
partly because the coastal cities have geographical advantages (e.g., Ng and Tuan,
2003). The role of the state is significant in the decision as to where to locate foreign
investment, and the state’s intervention and selected openness have improved foreign
investment in China (Yeung, 2006). As a result, China has adopted a strategic policy
to upgrade technology and boost economic growth by attracting FDI and Hong Kong
160
and Taiwan Direct Investment (HKTDI) (Zhang, 2005). It is generally believed that
FDI has been one of the most important factors contributing to China ’ s rapid
economic growth, as supported by researchers including Cole et al., (2009); Cheng
(2008); Zhang (2005); Gao (2005); Giner and Giner (2004); Bao (2002); Wu (2001).
HKTDI has been secured particularly because of China’s large pool of cheap labour,
their unique links with China and linguistic, cultural and geographic attractions,
especially of Guangdong, Fujian and other coastal areas (for example, Giner and
Giner, 2004). In contrast, FDI from Europe, the US and Japan is attracted mainly
because of China’s large market. As China’s domestic markets become more open to
foreign investment, the share of HKDTI becomes smaller (Zhang, 2005).
According to the standard growth theory, the accumulation of capital is facilitated
by FDI and it also enhances the adoption of more advanced technologies from abroad.
Moreover, in China, FDI is closely related to exports because most products of FDI
are exported abroad. For example, in 1999 exports of foreign invested enterprises
accounted for 45% of the country’s total exports (c.f. Fu, 2004). According to the
Export Base Model, exports help a region realise its comparative advantages through
specialisation and economies of scale (Huang et al., 2003). This may also alleviate a
region’s foreign exchange constraints and thus allow the region to import more
advanced materials and machinery. Therefore, FDI and export have become two
major driving forces behind China’s economic growth since the reform and open-door
policies. However, the spatial distribution of FDI and exports are uneven in China for
various social, economic and geographical reasons, such as the central government’s
regional development strategies (Cheng, 2008). In the meantime, the coastal regions
declared 90% of the country’s total exports. In 1999, the average ratio of export to
GDP was 4.8% in the inland regions but 25% in the coastal regions (Fu, 2004).
Therefore, exports have been the major driving force of economic growth for coastal
regions, but not for inland regions. Furthermore, Fu (2004) suggested that the export-
led growth in the coastal regions has not spilled over significantly into the inland
regions, widening the regional gap. Similarly, sufficient empirical evidence has
proved that the uneven spatial distribution of FDI and exports has contributed
significantly to increasing regional inequality (c.f. Cheng, 2008; Giner and Giner,
2004; Brun et al., 2002; Démurger, 2001; Fujita and Hu, 2001)
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5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I combined nine indices to construct Quality Development
Index to measure development rather than simply using the economic dimension. By
using multivariate analysis through critical analysis of the detailed and large quantity
of county-level data, I test Kuznets Curve model and key findings from testing it as
follows: first, uneven regional development was inevitable in China ’ s development
because the Chinese government introduced preferential socio-spatial policies both
historically, between 1949 and 1978, as well as during the process of economic reform
beginning in 1978. Second, the inequality conversional point can only be reached
through government efforts to reduce inequalities in production, education, health and
politics because the severe disparity not only restrains economic growth but also
affects social-spatial stability. Third, although the Chinese government is making
efforts to reduce disparities, the analysis of data relating to economic growth and
economic, social and political inequality –both statistical data from the last 30 years
and my fieldwork data –suggests that the government’s policies are inadequate for the
purposes of reducing entrenched patterns of county-level and regional inequality. This
situation has been proved by Zhang et al. (2008), Wei (2007) and Fleisher (2006), as
well as by my thesis’ analysis of using county level data.
Then I explore the social, economic, and political factors underlying China’s
impressive macro development progress, based on a database of all counties in China
from 1999 to 2006. The results show that all counties experienced rapid economic
growth together with widening inequality during this time. In addition, through
analysis of economic growth and income diversity over the last 20 years, it is found
that income inequality increased with economic growth. The main causes of the
inequalities are preferential policies such as regional development strategies, urban-
biased policies, inter-governmental transfer systems, public service delivery and
national security planning. Economic factors include regional public infrastructure,
FDI and exports, fiscal decentralisation, the reform of SOEs and inter-regional trade
protection. In addition, diverse geographical factors such as topography, climate, soil
and hydrology, natural resources, culture and population distribution also play an
important role and have different effects on economic and social development at the
county scale.
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The next three chapters aim to examine and ascertain how different groups of
people understand and react to rapid economic development and widening inequality,
and how these uneven regional developments and disparities influence the attitudes
and opinions of people with different backgrounds, varying as to gender, age,
education, marital status, place of residence, ethnicity and social status.
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Chapter 6 Economic Inequalities: Income and
Consumption
6.1 Introduction
The Chinese economy has had an annual per capita growth rate of about 10%
since 1990 (Liu and Zhang, 2007; Jones et al., 2003). However, growth has been
uneven and unequal. There is much debate about the implications of growth for
regional development and the related inequality between rural and urban areas as well
as between coastal and inland areas (Knight, 2008；Sicular et al., 2007; Lu and Chen,
2006; Meng et al., 2005; 2005; Lee, 2000; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999). Not every area
has benefited equally from the economic success, although lagging inland and rural
areas have started to catch up in recent years because of central government
development efforts (Zhou, 2009; Tsai, 2001).
Income and consumption are the most important popular indicators of economic
development because they are seen as measurements of household purchasing power
(Wong and Lu, 2002). As a basis for development, certain physical conditions such as
household purchasing power largely determine quality of life, and are a concern for
most citizens. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of people's lives, local
authorities have sought to address both income and consumption because these play
key roles in terms of economic development and associated inequality. However, in
parallel with economic growth, income and consumption inequality has also been
widening since 1980 (Fleisher and Chen, 1997). The reasons for China ’ s widening
income and consumption inequality have been extensively debated. Some studies
describe the impact of government policies on inequality (Gustafsson et al., 2008;
Giner and Giner, 2004; Fan et al., 2002) with some blaming this on corruption and
unlawful activities (Zhu, 2012; Li et al., 2000). Other studies focus on inequality
between rural and urban areas and between coastal and inland areas (see for example,
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Gustafsson et al., 2008; Tsui, 1993; 2007; Brun et al., 2002). However, most of this
research has only addressed inequality at the provincial level, among groups of
provinces or between rural and urban areas. Therefore, this chapter aims to fill a gap
in the literature by using county-level field survey data in five counties to analyse how
income and consumption inequalities are expressed in a wide range of changing
indicators such as gender, place, location, social status and ethnicity. In order to
achieve this aim, section 6.2 shows how residential households’ quality of life
improved remarkably; section 6.3 discusses the definition of income and grey income
in the context of Chinese development; section 6.4 concentrates on income inequality
by exploring it between genders; section 6.5 analyses income and consumption
inequality between different locations; section 6.6 examines income and consumption
inequality between urban and rural areas; section 6.7 explores income inequality and
consumption patterns between different social classes; section 6.8 presents the main
findings of this chapter.
6.2 Residential Households
In the past 30 years, China ’ s economy has been growing and annual GDP has
been increasing by approximately 10%, faster than any other country (NBS, 2001-
2011). According to Chi (2008), income and quality of life have a positive
relationship to economic development. Similarly, almost all participants in my
research felt that their personal lives had changed remarkably during this period, and
for the better. The following set of photographs taken from Guangdong, Hubei and
Gansu provinces show, for example, how participants’ private properties have
improved over time.
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Figure 6- 1: Improvements in the condition of residential housing in Gulang (Source: author)
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Figure 6- 2: Improvements in the condition of residential housing in Wuchang (Source:
author)
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Figure 6- 3: Improvements in the condition of residential housing in Boluo (Source: author)
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Figure 6- 1 illustrates three dwellings constructed in Gulang, Gansu province;
Figure 6- 2 shows dwellings in Wuchang County, Hubei province; and Figure 6- 3
provides examples from Boluo County, Guangdong province. These are typical
residences belonging at different times to the same families and which were
constructed prior to the 1980s (top), between 1980 and 2000 (middle) and then after
2000 (bottom).
As well as residential housing development, China has made substantial
improvements in public infrastructure (Banerjee et al., 2012). For example, the
city/town squares that exist in almost all Chinese urban areas provide a prominent
public open space for gatherings and recreational activities, and are often considered
to be a symbol of the cultural spirit of an individual city/town. In recent years, these
squares have been refurbished or rebuilt by many local authorities at as much expense
as possible. Although there is no research available on the relationship between
city/town squares and local economic strength, the photographs below show that the
quality and lavishness of the square in Guangdong is clearly superior to those in many
other cities because Guangdong has more fiscal revenue than, for example, Hubei and
Gansu (Figure 6- 4, Figure 6- 5 and Figure 6- 6 show the civic squares of Gansu,
Hubei and Guangdong respectively). It is also noticeable that north China favours
more traditional architecture than central China and the coastal regions.
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Figure 6- 4: Liangzhou Square in Gansu province (Source: author)
Figure 6- 5: Wuchang Square in Hubei province (Source: author)
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Figure 6- 6: Boluo Square in Guangdong province (Source: author)
Speaking more generally, a communist party cadre, aged 72, commented that:
‘ Generally speaking, the living standard has greatly improved. I am quite
satisfied with my living conditions and government policies. Compared to the past,
before the initiation of reform in 1978, people, including urban and rural residents,
now have much bigger houses (of decent quality); higher incomes; better
transportation systems; beautiful cities and towns with plenty of plants and clean,
wide streets; and sufficient possessions’ (Qian-72-M-U-Officer-Jinchang).
Similarly, a 54-year-old peasant from Gulang commented that:
‘Our peasants no longer have to pay tax for growing crops. Before the initiation
of reform in 1978, we had to pay a heavy tax. We now have our own lands and can
decide what to grow and are no longer told or forced to farm certain crops. I support
our government policy and the reform is very good’ (Xing-54-M-R-Peasant-Gulang).
However, a few workers who have been ‘laid off’ (Xia Gang, 下岗) do complain
that their quality of life is not as good as in previous years. Issues about SOEs and
workers made redundant have been discussed by Cai (2002) and Bai et al., (2006)
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who conclude that a large percentage of laid off workers suffer urban poverty. Thus, it
is clear that not all local people shared the benefit of China’s increasing development.
For example, a 49-year-old female worker stated that:
‘I have to admit that China has undergone great improvement and people have
more opportunities to make money. However, I am so miserable. I had been working
in a national stock enterprise for nearly 20 years as a worker. We had lots of welfare
provision and I was so proud. Then, I was laid off by the state-owned enterprise. The
only compensation I got were dozens of stocks which were worth nothing. I do not
have specific skills, decent education or work experience that is highly demanded in
the job market. Anyway, I will be retired next year and I am able to receive a basic
pension from the central government. I only hope that my son will be able to get rich
in the future’ (Wang-49-F-U-Worker-Wuchang).
Similarly, a male worker complained:
‘I belong to the unlucky generation that straddled all of modern China’s political
stages, just as the proverb says: when we were of school age, it happened to be the
cultural revolution and all the schools were closed for revolutionary activities; when
we were of working age, it happened to be the campaign called upon by Mao for
young people to go to the countryside and work as peasants; when we were of
marriage age, it happened to be the time when people were forced to abide by the
one-child policy; and now that we are close to retirement age, it happens to be the
time of non-pensionable redundancy’ (Zhang-52-M-U-Worker-Liangzhou).
In sum, 98 out of 105 interviewees took a positive view and only 7 out of 105
were neutral in terms of understanding ‘development’ in China. This supports the
findings of most publications that the initiation of economic reform in 1978 led to a
rise in average incomes and a drastic reduction in poverty over the past 30 years,
driven by rapid economic growth and to the benefit of most of the population (Chen
and Lu, 2008; Coes, 2008). However, as the Chinese economy continues to grow,
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income is becoming more unequally distributed among different groups of people, as
shown in my field survey.
6.3 Understanding Income
Income and consumption are the most popular indicators of economic
development so their unequal distribution plays a key role in explaining development
disparity (Yao et al., 2005). Before analysing income and consumption inequality it is
important to clarify the meanings of ‘official’ and ‘grey’ incomes in China. The
definition of income has changed since the initiation of reform in 1978 and is still in
transition, making it crucial to define the contents of income clearly before it can be
thoroughly analysed. The main components of income, as agreed by most researchers,
are shown in Table 6- 1 (Hao and Wei, 2010; Khan and Riskin, 2005; Chang, 2002)
Table 6- 1: Income components in China (Author derived from Hao and Wei, 2010; Khan and
Riskin, 2005; Chang, 2002)
Urban Rural
1 Labour
compensation.
Wages, bonuses,
pensions and other
forms of labour
compensation.
All output of farm, forest
and fishery products, plus
non-farm household
enterprises and subsidiary
activities.
2 Non currency income.
3 Private, individual and joint venture enterprises, plus income from the
collective welfare fund.
4 Property, including interest on savings deposits and bonds, dividends,
and rent on land, houses and other property.
5 Other, which consists of private transfers and minor sources of income
not classified under other headings.
However, during my survey, although I emphasised that income includes wages,
pensions, bonuses, bonds, dividends and rent, participants commonly considered
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‘income’ as derived only from labour compensation. This is because income other
than labour compensation was only introduced after the Reform. This means that
much research aimed at estimating income in China may generate inaccurate figures
(Holz, 2004a). Even now, capital gains tax has not been established in China, which
means that income from property is free from tax. Therefore, participants’ restricted
understanding of the components of income is unsurprising. For example, one of my
participants was an elderly woman who had a job selling buns on the street. In
addition, she has another two other sources of income: a minimum income allowance
from central government and monthly compensation from her daughter. When asked
about her monthly income, she only considered the profit from selling buns as income.
However, I discovered that her consumption was more than her earnings due to
additional sources of income coming from allowance and compensation.
‘Grey income’ (between white and black income) has a special meaning in China
(Wang, 2007). In popular parlance, legal income is termed white income and illegal
income is termed black income. Defining grey income thus requires an understanding
of what is legal and what is not. In practice, grey income is termed semi-legal or
elusive income (Lv, 2004). Lv (2004) and Wang (2007) have also shed some light on
income inequality in relation to occupation by pointing out that some people,
particularly government and industry officials, teachers and medical staff, receive
grey income in the form of ‘service fees’, ‘consulting fees’ and red packets (money
wrapped in red paper from patients or students) (He, 2000). Grey income therefore
has a close connection to individual occupations and the common saying that ‘power
generates money and money exchanges for power’ (Zhang-52-M-U-Worker-
Liangzhou).
Similarly, grey income did not exist before the Reform because the salary scale
was transparent; certain professions had a fixed salary range and all income other than
fixed salaries was illegal before 1978. Since 1978, income components have changed
dramatically due to increasingly diversified economic activity. Hence, grey income
refers particularly to income in addition to an individual’s nominal salary and is
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received by many people, especially government and industrial officials, teachers and
medical staff (Wang, 2010). For example, teachers receive payment from students for
giving extra tutoring; lecturers request consultation fees from commercial companies;
medical doctors accept red packets; government officials take bribes, which include
cash, commodities, free meals or other forms of entertainment; and certain
superstitious occupations enjoy the benefits of ‘non-currency income’, such as
insurance for medication, education and unemployment (Wang, 2007). In addition,
the prices of medicines in hospitals are generally much higher than in ordinary
pharmacies and doctors tend to make excess prescriptions or prescribe for expensive
medicines as they can receive cash-back payments from pharmaceutical companies.
Grey income was even considered to be evil by many of my participants:
‘Unfortunately, such evil has spread into educational and hospital systems which
is awful’ (Ye-79-M-U-Retired Cadre-Wuchang).
The actual amount of grey income varies from region to region and from case to
case. There is a dearth of literature about the levels of grey income in different parts
of China because it is highly sensitive and data collection remains problematic.
Similar to my investigation, in 2008 Credit Suisse (2010) launched a survey to
analyse Chinese grey income in 19 provinces, 64 cities and 14 counties, with a total
sample size of 4,000 individuals. The results showed that the total grey income in
2008 was estimated to be as high as 10 trillion RMB (Credit Suisse, 2010: 29). All of
my participants admitted that they had to give a certain amount of cash to the doctor
and anaesthetist, as otherwise they might receive worse treatment. For example:
‘Generally speaking, in Liangzhou where the salary scale ranges from 300 RMB
(lowest skilled workers) to a couple of thousands RMB (government officials),
patients need to give 1000 RMB to the doctor who actually does the surgery and 200
RMB to anaesthetist (otherwise the patient may receive an inaccurate dosage of
anaesthetics due to his ignorance of the importance of the anaesthetist)’ (Sun-45-F-
U- Teacher-Liangzhou)
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My own smaller field survey supports Credit Suisse’s conclusion that grey
income could reach 30% of GDP (Credit Suisse, 2010: 29). Based on this estimation,
income inequality is much worse than statistical data presents.
It is also worth pointing out that, in general, income has been increasing
considerably in China over the past three decades (Chen and Li, 2010; Hao and Wei,
2010; Benjamin et al., 2005; 2008; Khan and Riskin, 2005; Chinese Statistical
Yearbook, 2006-2011), a change of which every participant approved:
‘Of course, my income has hugely increased. Before the Reform in 1978 I earned
150 RMB per month which was good compared to other workers. Now I earn 5000
RMB per month because of my special skills. If I retire in two years, I will be able to
find a job in a private company which will enable me to earn more’ (Gao-58-M-U-
Engineer-Boluo).
Even the retired participants confirmed that their pension had also increased
dramatically in the last three decades. For example,
‘When I retired in 1987, my pension was 170 RMB every month. Now, I am able
to get 1500 RMB every month, which is nearly 10 times more’ (Chen-73-F-U-Retired-
Jinchang).
However, from my field data, it is evident that there have been widely occurring
income and consumption inequalities in the five counties studied. In general, it is very
difficult to ask respondents about actual personal income since it is a very sensitive
question for many people, although in China it is recognised that different groups of
people have different attitudes to answering this question. For example, participants
working in SOEs, where the salary scale is quite transparent, and other professions
with a fixed range of salaries were very willing to tell me how much they earned, but
those participants who probably earn grey incomes avoid this question. Therefore, it is
very difficult to judge how much grey income they might receive and, in turn, their
true total income. However, consumption data reflects hidden or grey income to make
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up for this potential flaw in income data and is itself an important measure of
economic development. Thus, in my questionnaire I structured income questions to
give more space to cover possible extra income. In order to analyse income inequality
in more detail, I have broken it down according to the following indicators: gender,
location, place, social class and ethnic group.
6.4 Gender and Income Inequality
Income inequality based on gender has been a common social problem in many
developing and industrialised countries (Wang and Cai, 2008; Rozelle et al., 2002),
particularly in transitional economies such as Russia (Brainerd, 2000). In China, it
was only in the 1990s that researchers began to shed light on gender inequality related
to income because China was committed to gender equality during the planned
economy period (1949-1978) and the Chinese constitution guaranteed women equal
rights to men in all aspects of life. This was particularly the case in the labour market,
where pay for equal work equal reflected famous slogan ‘Women hold up half the
sky’ (Tao et al., 2004). Therefore, it is commonly agreed that income inequality
between genders became apparent only after 1978 and since then it has been
continuously rising (Wang and Cai, 2008). Furthermore, wage discrimination against
women has emerged as a major phenomenon of income inequality during ongoing
Reform processes (Zhang et al., 2008). Rozelle et al., (2008) argue that most existing
literature (such as Ng, 2004 and Shu and Bian, 2002) is outdated and only covers the
period between 1988 and 1995. Large-scale empirical research into gender wage
inequality is therefore urgently needed.
My field survey data in 2008 investigated gender inequality in income and is
therefore able to contribute to filling this literature gap by examining more recent data
and also covering different geographical locations due to the analysis of five counties
in coastal, middle and western areas.
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Figure 6- 7: Gender and income inequality in five counties (Source: author)
My field survey indicates that economic reform has resulted in considerable
gender income inequality as a result of education, experience and marital status,
which supports the conclusion of studies such as that of Rozelle et al., (2008). My
data indicates the existence of gender inequality in incomes, which is consistent with
most existing literature (Zhang et al., 2008; Bian et al., 2000). Figure 6- 7 shows that
most female participants’ annual income was less than 30000RMB, whereas male
participants’ income was spread evenly between 10000RMB and 100000RMB. In
addition, job discrimination and wage discrimination against females was evident:
‘In my factory, compared to men, women have fewer opportunities to be
promoted to senior positions’ (Chen-20-F-R-Worker-Boluo).
Further to this, gender inequalities in income are mainly caused by education and
marital status (Song and Tan, 2004). Although the establishment of the Compulsory
Education Law in China in 1986 established a legal basis for gender equality in
schooling, household economic considerations and culturally related expectations
regarding males and females at home and in society are the main influences on girls’
school enrolment rates (Li and Tsang, 2003). According to the survey data, the
number of school years is lower for female than for male participants (see Table 6- 2).
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Table 6- 2: Average school years (Source: author)
Age Group Average School Years
Male Female
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Under 30 11.2 8.5 10.85 7.3
30-49 10.6 7.4 9.53 5.44
Over 50 9 5.5 6.73 3.8
As a result, average female income is lower than male income because the
number of years in school is strongly positively correlated to income (Song and Tan,
2004). Marital status is also an important index because women are judged by
employers as not devoting all their energy into their work if they are married or
mothers. In the past two decades, many privately-owned enterprises in the
manufacturing and service sectors have hired a large number of young female workers
(see Figure 6- 8) with limited education especially in the flourishing coastal cities
(Lee,1998). However, this kind of employment is recognised by both the female
migrant workers and employers as being a temporary phenomenon until the women
get married.
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Figure 6- 8: Female migrant worker in China (Source: Xinhuanet, 2008)
‘I was always asked whether I was married and whether I had a child or not in
job interviews. If I was married and planned to get pregnant, most likely I would not
get the job. This discrimination is very common in China. Sometimes women are
asked to sign a contract that they will not fall pregnant in the first five years’(Shen-
32-F-U-Accountant-Wuchang).
At the same time, overall salary differences between genders in China are
relatively small in comparison with other countries such as Eastern Europe (Brainerd,
2000), particularly among urban residents because the Maoist gender equality
ideology has been maintained in the transition to a market economy (MacPhail and
Dong, 2007). Although the employment of female migrant workers is temporary,
women are considered as working productively and efficiently due to an accumulation
of work experience and their care, patience and conscientiousness. As a result, female
workers are able to receive similar salaries to their male colleagues in the long run.
My field survey results suggest that firms which do not discriminate against women
are able to achieve higher productivity and efficiency than those that do, especially in
the textile industry (see Figure 6.8). For example,
180
‘My factory is one of biggest knitwear manufacturing companies in China and we
export most of our products abroad. In my factory, if you have a few years of
experience and good skills, you will be promoted to be a small team manager and
then a big team manager. Male workers only take care of machines. Female workers
have more options than male workers in my factory’ (Xin-25-F-R-Migrant Worker-
Boluo).
6.5 Regional Inequality in Income and Consumption
Spatial inequalities in income growth in different regions have also been on the
rise in China. Numerous studies such as those conducted by Chan and Wang (2008),
Zhang and Yao (2001) and Tsui (1993) have addressed issues of regional inequality in
China, but largely at the provincial level. Previous research has shown that income
inequality between the coastal area and the rest of China has been growing since the
1980s (e.g., Hao and Wei, 2010; Liu and Li, 2006; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999; Mody
and Wang, 1997; Tsui, 1993; Vogel, 1989). This research also concludes that related
government policies play an important role, such as regional policies that enhanced
capital investment (including foreign investment) in coastal provinces and open zones
(e.g., Hao and Wei, 2010; Wei, 1999; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999); the decentralisation
of education and other previously centralised services (e.g., Qian and Smyth, 2008a;
Postiglione, 2006; Gregorio and Lee, 2002); central fiscal transfers to less developed
regions (e.g., Qing, 2005); industrialisation and economic agglomerations (Chen and
Lu, 2016; Wei et al., 2011; Ke, 2010); and market expansion leading to improved
labour mobility (e.g., Wu, 2001). In addition, endowments such as location,
infrastructure and labour also lead to inequality (e.g., Démurger et al., 2002a; 2002b;
Bao et al., 2002; Chen and Fleisher, 1996).
My field survey supports such findings, revealing substantial difference between
income growths in the three provinces investigated (Guangdong, Hubei and Gansu).
181
Table 6- 3: Annual income in five field survey counties (Source: author)
Table 6- 3 presents the estimated annual income of participants in Boluo,
Wuchang, Jinchang, Liangzhou and Gulang. It shows that in Boluo 90% of
participants has an income of above 30000RMB; while in Gulang 83% of participants
have an income between 2000 and 50000RMB. Development economists have
promoted foreign investment and foreign trade, the symbols of the open economy, as
the engines of growth for those who lack the capital and technology to initiate
development (Hu, 2007). Until the 1980s, the Chinese central government’s policies
were focused on coastal provinces in order to attract foreign investment and foreign
trade. Boluo was among the counties that attracted such trade (Qiao et al., 2008; Yang
and Zhang, 2003). In the 1990s, these preferential policies expanded to some open
zones in central provinces such as Wuchang (Fan et al., 2011; Démurger et al., 2002)
(see Chapter Five for details of the preferential policies). I contend that key reasons
for income inequality between Guangdong (Boluo), Hubei (Wuchang) and Gansu
provinces (Jinchang, Liangzhou and Gulang) are capital investment levels (especially
FDI) in local manufacturing and booming private enterprises. Although Jinchang,
Gulang and Liangzhou in Gansu benefited from central fiscal transfers and
preferential policies in the 2000s (e.g., Wang, 2007), lower industrialisation levels
meant they were unable to attract foreign investment and therefore prevent income
Annual
Income
(Yuan/
RMB)
Below
2000
2000
to
5000
5000
to
15000
15000
to
30000
30000
to
50000
50000
to
100000
Above
10000
0
Boluo 0 1 3 6 41 28 21
Wuchang 1 11 17 37 23 5 6
Jinchang 0 9 13 22 32 19 5
Liangzhou 2 13 21 30 20 12 2
Gulang 5 16 45 14 12 8 0
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inequality from reaching a new high. Section 6.3.1focused on the impact of
industrialisation on local economic growth, and in this section I elucidate the impacts
of industrialisation on regional income.
The industrialisation level in Boluo is much higher than in the other inland
counties because FDI from both Hong Kong and Taiwan took the lead in Boluo’s
economy (Lei and Yao, 2009; Zhang, 2005; Ng and Tuan, 2003). Here, arable lands
were converted into special zones and roads to facilitate the building of factories, in
common with most other areas of the Pearl River Delta. In the transition to
industrialisation in countries such as China and India, land acquisition and the need to
compensated farmers has become a significant issue (Chan, 2003).
As a result of its industrialisation, the current average income in Boluo is much
higher than in the other four inland counties. In addition, as also shown in Lu (2008),
income mainly comes from private, individual and joint venture enterprises, collective
welfare funds and property, rather than mainly from compensation for labour. For
example, Mr. Yuan was a peasant in Boluo. He told me:
‘My income mainly comes from two sources: one is from the village welfare fund.
The village rents our lands to enterprises. Every month each resident in the village is
able to get 3000RMB as compensation. The other source of income is from my shop. I
sell all kinds of consumables to factory workers from which I am able to get
5000RMB per month’ (Yuan-50-M-R-Peasant-Boluo).
In my field survey, after witnessing the whole interview process and how the
compensation was calculated, I found that participants were generally very satisfied
with the compensation they received in this part of China. For example, at the time of
my field survey in 2008, a couple of villages in Wuchang were purchased by Foxconn
Group. Foxconn were severely criticised by the media because of a range of suicide
cases among its employees in 2010. Yet, the suicide rate for Foxconn in 2010 was 1.5
per 100,000 making it well below the national average (around 7 per 100,000) (Chan
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and Pun, 2010). According to my research, Foxconn was greatly welcomed by both
the local government and peasants due to its investment scale and high salary levels.
In addition, Foxconn employs more than 1 million people in 9 of its 13 factories in
China, which translates into a huge number of new jobs at the local level– although
these can involve difficult labour conditions such as long working hours (Chan and
Pun, 2010).
One of my participants, Mr. Wu, received a large amount of compensation and
new apartments recently constructed by Foxconn Group (see Figure 6- 9). In exchange,
his family sold all their farm land and residential houses to Foxconn to allow them to
build a new factory. The calculation of compensation depends on land registered with
the local rural HuKou and the size of the houses. For example, Mr. Wu has three sons
and one daughter. His sons are working in Shenzhen as migrant workers and his
daughter is married and lives in another village. Mr. Wu, his wife and three sons all
have local rural residences as well as the land distributed to them by the government.
He also owns three-storey houses with a total surface area of 210m2 (Figure 6- 10).
On top of the compensation for his land, his family is allowed to buy up to five
apartments, of which 210m2 are free, another 20% of 210m2 can be purchased at 500
RMB per square metre and the rest of the area can be purchased at the market price,
which is 1500RMB per square metre (see Table 6- 3 in detail).
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Figure 6- 9: Mr. Wu’s house (Source: author)
Figure 6- 10: Residential apartments constructed by Foxconn (Source: author)
Table 6- 4 shows that every member of Mr Wu’s family except his daughter
received an apartment and nearly 4.66 times their previous annual income. The
compensation paid to those displaced has been criticised as being inadequate and the
cause of social and political tensions (Chan, 2003). According to the results of my
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field survey, I argue that the problems of compensation have not necessarily created
social and political tensions. The amount of compensation and the process of
determining and implementing this compensation are crucial, and highly positively
correlated to the satisfaction of the peasants. During the implementation of
compensation, it is highly likely that embezzlement of compensation by village cadres
triggers social and political tensions. However, the peasants themselves welcome
conversion to industrialisation because it not only provides them with some capital
endowment, which helps them to run their own businesses, but the large amount of
labour released from the land also provides a base for industrial development. My
arguments are similar to the debates of some scholars such as Ding (2007).
Table 6- 4: Wu family compensation for their land and house (Source: author)
Age Local
Rural
HuKou
Compen-
sation for
land
(RMB)
Compen-
sation for
house
Cost of
apart-
ment(R
MB)
Remaining
Compen-
sation
(RMB)
Ratio to
average
annual
income
Mr. Wu 55 Yes 150000 2-bedroom
apartment
(70m2)
33900 116100 4.66
Wu’s
wife
54 Yes 150000 None None 150000 6
Wu Fei 30 Yes 150000 2-bedroom
apartment
(70m2)
33900 116100 4.66
Wu Jun 28 Yes 150000 2-bedroom
apartment
(70m2)
33900 116100 4.66
Wu Dong 24 Yes 150000 2-bedroom
apartment
(70m2)
33900 116100 4.66
Wu Ai 21 No 0 2-bedroom
apartment
(70m2)
33900 -33900 -1.34
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Compared to Boluo and Wuchang, Jinchang, Gulang and Liangzhou are
characterised by a lower level of industrial development and agriculture is still the
dominant sector (see Figure 6- 11). Most farmers had to stay on their land because of
limited local non-farming opportunities and the potential cost of migration to other
regions. The income of famers living in Gulang consists of two parts, as indicated in
the following interview response:
‘My income mainly comes from two sources. One is from farming; I plant wheat
and some vegetables to feed my family. If I am lucky, I am able to sell the rest to earn
1000RMB per year. The other one is from labour. Sometimes I am able to find non-
farming work to support my family. For example, I can earn 15RMB per day from
helping to build houses or plant trees for the government. But it is not easy to find this
kind of job’ (Gao-50-M-R-Peasant-Gulang).
Figure 6- 11: Arable lands in Gulang (Source: author)
Unlike the causes of income inequality at the provincial scale, within one
province the physical environment and infrastructure are key factors causing income
inequality. However, these reasons are often ignored in the current literature. For
example, the reasons for income differences between Liangzhou and Gulang in Gansu
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province are fairly noticeable: environmental disadvantages; infrastructure
deficiencies such as a particularly insufficient road network and a shortage of water
facilities (compare Figure 6- 12 and Figure 6- 13); rudimentary agricultural markets
and under-developed non-agricultural industries. Under these circumstances, farmers
in Gulang are struggling not only with low agricultural productivity but also with few
casual employment opportunities. In contrast, Zhang village in Lianzhou is located in
the valley (see Figure 6- 14 and Figure 6- 15) and is equipped with a reservoir and
water facilities. This village produces some vegetables and fruits which are very
popular in cities. Their Township-Owned enterprises (TVEs) and good road
infrastructure make a great contribution to economic growth and average income in
the village. As a result, the average income in Liangzhou is higher than that in Gulang.
Figure 6- 12: Wheat field in Gulang (Source: author)
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Figure 6- 13: Greenhouse in Gulang (Source: author)
Figure 6- 14: Wheat field in Liangzhou (Source: author)
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Figure 6- 15: Greenhouse in Liangzhou (Source: author)
Yao et al., (2005) suggests that there is a positive relationship between household
income and household consumption structure when it comes to economic
development: the higher the household income, the more likely the consumption
structure is to shift from basic necessities to luxury goods. All participants in the
focus groups conducted in Gansu, Hubei and Guangdong admitted that they now have
more disposable income after the initiation of the Reform in 1978. However, the
consumption pattern of the three locations is varied, which demonstrates that
consumption is a reflection of income. This is well exemplified by taking the example
of three of my interviewees from different counties: the top three most expensive
items bought by Mr. Song Xuan from Guangdong in the south are jewellery, a car and
a computer. For Mr. Wang Peng (primary school teacher) from Hubei, the three most
expensive items of consumption are a computer, a motor-bicycle and a TV. For Mr.
Meng Xiang from Gansu in the north, the three most expensive items he has bought
are a TV, a refrigerator and air conditioning.
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6.6 Income and Consumption Inequality between Urban and Rural
Areas
The majority of the Chinese population still lives in rural areas, which have long
lagged behind urban areas in terms of social and economic development. Current
literature draws common conclusions about the difference between urban and rural
incomes in China, which are that the gap is large, has increased over time and
contributes substantially to overall inequality (e.g. Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010b;
Zhou, 2009; Sicular et al., 2007; Lu and Chen, 2006; Luo, 2006; Yao et al., 2005; Lu,
2002; Levin, 2001; Knight and Song, 1999). For example, Sicular et al. (2007)
investigated the size of China’s urban-rural income inequality between 1995 and 2002;
their key findings are that the gap remains large and has increased over time. The Gini
coefficient for urban and rural residents jumped from 0.389 in 1995 to 0.417 in 2000,
above the international danger level of 0.4. The mean per capita income in urban
China is estimated to be more than triple that in rural area and is one of the highest
urban-rural income ratios in the world (Lu and Chen, 2006). Similarly, my field
survey (Figure 6- 16) shows that rural per capita income in 2008 was 50% less than
urban per capita income in all five counties studied. Survey data also shows that rural
residents, especially in Gulang, are living on less than $1 a day, further proving that
poverty mainly afflicts people living in rural China. Urban-rural inequality was
initially caused by the central government’s urban-biased policy, through which rural
populations were severely restricted from undertaking any sort of migration,
particularly to urban areas, and urban residents were provided with various subsidies
at the expense of their rural counterparts. In order to reduce this gap, the Chinese
government has recently launched a series of policies such as the ‘Build a New
Socialist Countryside’ campaign (Sicular et al., 2007). These policies aim to boost
public spending in rural areas in order to reduce the rural-urban income gap.
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Figure 6- 16: Rural and urban per capita income in the five counties (Source: author)
Drawing on both national statistical data and my survey data, it is evident that
rural income is much lower than urban income. However, my field survey also reveals
two further important observations: the misjudgement of migrant workers’ income
and the living cost disparity between rural and urban areas; and that the actual rural-
urban income gap is not as severe as the data suggests.
First, family members in China have strong relationships, especially between
parents and children. Following the initiation of the Reform in 1978, there were
approximately 4 million rural migrant workers in urban areas in 2007 (Population and
Family Planning Commission of P. R. China, 2010). Chinese migrant workers have
the highest savings rates in the world (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010b) and it is
common for migrant workers to remit most of their savings to the countryside to
support their family (Wu, 2004). However, to date this income has been calculated as
belonging to temporary residents in an urban area. This is problematic in the face of
evidence that large amounts of remittances have been transferred back to rural areas
but are not calculated as rural household income. For example:
‘The more the better with saving and the less the better with spending. I send
80% of my money back to my family. My parents are going to build a new three-
storey house with one floor for them, one for me and one for my little brother’(Fei-28-
M-R-Migrant worker-Wuchang).
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Second, China’ s initiation of economic reform in 1978 has effectively changed
the income balance between urban and rural areas, especially since the early 1990s.
Prior to the 1990s, the majority of urban residents had the benefit of the ‘three irons’
(guarantees): iron bowl (food), iron chair (position) and iron bed (housing) (Shah et al.
2006). However, since the 1990s, urban poverty has become a severe challenge
because of the collapse of the state ownership of firms and the dismantling of the
welfare systems formerly provided by SOEs (Wu, 2004). ‘In 2001, the official
unemployment rate was 3.1% but, taking into account laid-off workers, the urban
poverty population could be as high as 14 million, accounting for 3.6% of the urban
population’(Wu, 2004:401). Fang et al., (2002) claimed that rising urban poverty in
recent years does not change the overall conclusion that income inequality between
urban and rural areas is substantial. However, living costs such as food and house
prices are much lower in rural areas than in urban areas. Therefore, my field survey
shows a different picture behind the statistical data:
‘The living condition of those urban residents with low incomes is much worse
than some of the poorest peasants in the countryside. We are struggling to make
money for basic living costs, i.e. food, clothes and house energy bills, etc.’ (Yue-45-
M-U-Laid Off Worker-Gulang).
This situation was confirmed by several of interviewees in urban areas (Figure
6- 17) who had been made redundant by SOEs. They state that living costs are too
expensive for them to afford: if they do not receive housing benefit they are unable to
secure proper shelter, and they cannot afford to warm their houses sufficiently in the
winter, or to eat meat once a week, because of inflation. However, in rural areas
(Figure 6- 18), people are generally able to feed themselves adequately because they
own houses and land, and the energy costs are exceedingly cheap.
‘The government is giving us financial aid if we grow crops. Even the poorest
peasants are able to have enough food and energy supplies (coal, gas or electricity).
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Nowadays, we don’t admire urban residents anymore.’(Hu-50-M-R-Farmer-
Liangzhou).
Indeed, the ongoing economic reform processes in China have, to a certain extent,
had a positive impact upon the urban-rural income disparity. Further, if we consider
the remittances sent from urban to rural areas by migrant workers, as well as the rural-
urban disparity in living costs, the gap in quality of life is not as severe as the
statistical data shows; it is also clear that the urban poor rather than the rural poor are
now at the bottom of the income hierarchy.
Figure 6- 17: Apartment in urban area (Source: author)
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Figure 6- 18: House in rural area (Source: author)
Generally speaking, living standards have greatly improved at all levels, and
interviewees are quite satisfied with their individual living conditions and surrounding
environmental conditions. Both urban and rural residents now have much larger
houses (of decent quality) and most farmers now have their own lands and more
spacious houses because of the low cost of building materials. A critical point that
needs to be emphasised here is that even though many people remain relatively poor,
almost everyone has witnessed a decided improvement in their living standards over
the last 20 years, and this has an important influence on their perceptions.
However, with house prices soaring, urban residents have to pay much more
when purchasing apartments. This is inevitably a huge burden, especially to those
with low incomes. As one focus group participant in Gansu said:
‘Purchasing a commercial house is considered to be one of the ‘three new big
mountains’ (alongside education and health care fees) for urban residents. However,
rural residents do not have such feelings about their houses, as they have their own
land on which they can build whatever houses they can possibly afford’ (Huang-42-
M-U-Worker-Liangzhou).
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The pattern of consumption can also be appropriately used to assess people’s
quality of life, in particular when it comes to testing Engel’s Law that the proportion
of income spent on food falls as income rises (Garner, 1993). Based on my
investigations, Table 6- 5 presents the three top household expenses differentiated by
urban and rural residents in the five counties.
Table 6- 5: Top three household expenses for rural/urban participants in the five counties, 2008
(Source: author)
Rank 1 2 3
Rural Food Health Care Education
Urban Accommodation Education Health Care
Four main factors and processes help to explain these different consumption
patterns between rural and urban areas:
First, in urban areas, purchasing a house or apartment is the most expensive item
of consumption for a family. Prior to the initiation of economic reform in 1978, most
urban Chinese residents were provided with reasonable accommodation by local
governments, SOEs or work units. However, this proved neither financially viable nor
sustainable during ongoing reform processes. The Housing Reform, launched by the
central government in 1998, aims to provide affordable houses for most people to
purchase, and in the meantime terminates free accommodation welfare (Hui and
Wong, 2004; Hui 2006). In the last few years, house prices have been soaring
continuously such that buying a house has gradually become an unreachable goal for
many young people. For example, the average house price in Boluo was 400RMB/m2
in 1998 and 2100RMB/m2 in 2007 (Boluo Statistical Yearbook 2008). As a result,
access to housing is now becoming another major factor inducing disparity (Hui and
Wong, 2004).
Second, food remains the most significant household expense in rural areas. It is
generally believed that rural residents spend less money on entertainment than urban
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residents. My field survey result supports Engel’s Law that as income rises, the
proportion of income spent on food falls, even if actual consumption of food rises
(Economypedia.com: Engel’s Law). Thus, the consumption pattern can be used to
explain the income disparities between urban and rural areas (Gibson, 2003).
Third, in both urban and rural areas the cost of education is another major
expense for households. Since 2006, rural students in western provinces have been
exempted from tuition fees for nine years of compulsory education. In 2007, the
exemption policy was expanded to the central and eastern regions. ‘China will exempt
all tuition fees for nine years of compulsory education for students in urban areas
from 2008,’ said the Chinese State Councillor Chen Zhili in 2007 (China Daily, 2007).
However, whether the tuition fees for nine years of compulsory education are charged
or not, almost every school or educational institution charges various additional fees,
such as for extra tutoring, school selection and other concocted fees, which demand a
large proportion of ordinary people’s incomes (Zhang and Kanbur, 2005). The most
expensive education fees are actually charged for secondary and higher education.
Many of my interviewees said that supporting a student at university could make an
ordinary family utterly destitute.
Fourth, health care is another essential cost for every individual and household.
After food, health care has now become the largest cost for ordinary households in
rural regions; and the third most significant cost in urban regions after
accommodation and education. One patient could drag a family into a desperate
situation (see Case 7-1 in Chapter Seven), as ‘spending on medication can be like the
blow of air from a broken balloon (constant drips)’ (Bjorn and Li, 2004:295).
6.7 Income and Consumption Inequalities between Social Classes
In present-day China, social class stratification is still in its transition stage and is
much more complicated than in Mao’s era (c.f. Bian, 2002). Both Bian (2002) and Li
(2005) have suggested a system for classifying Chinese social stratification (see
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section 7.3 for detailed analysis). However, these two classifications have ignored the
fact that China ’ s economic development, particularly in the last decade, has
significantly diversified occupation-based social classification, and such
classifications no long reflect the reality of social status. Therefore, to correct these
problems, I designed a four-tier class structure: upper class, upper-middle class,
middle class and lower class. According to my analysis, the upper class includes
communist party cadres (administrative, managerial and rural), private entrepreneurs
and managers; the upper-middle class consists of senior managers and professionals;
the middle class includes household business owners, individual manufacturers and
intellectuals; and the lower class consists of peasants living on agricultural production,
migrant workers (peasant labourers in urban areas) and urban workers (Chapter Seven
further details the definition of these social classes).
Occupational status has started to induce class stratification as well as associated
income inequality between individuals (Lu, 2004; Wang, 2007). In order to
demonstrate the occupationally orientated social classes/status and their relationship
to economic conditions such as income, consumption and welfare, four cases are
illustrated below, one for each social class. The four examples were all selected from
the urban area of Gansu to avoid locational and specifically urban-rural variations, in
order to keep the focus on social status. All the individuals in these case studies are
from a similar age group but have different occupations, which characterise the
various social classes.
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Table 6- 6 illustrates the experiences of four individuals to demonstrate income
and consumption inequalities between different social classes.
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Table 6- 6: Income and consumption inequality between different social classes (Source: author)
Mr. Gao Mr. Xing Mr.
Wang
Mrs. Yang
Social
Strata
Social Class Upper Class Upper-
Middle
Class
Middle
Class
Low Class
Profession Cadre Entrepreneu
r
Teacher Laid-off
worker
Income Salary Middle High Middle Low
Non-
Currency
Income
Yes No Yes No
Grey
Income
Yes Yes Yes No
Consum
ption
Accommod
ation
Large and
almost free
Large and
pay market
price
Medium
and pay
market
price
Small
rented
accommod
ation
Education Best and
free schools
Best but
high fees
Median
and fee
depends
on
schools
Local
schools
Health Care Best and
almost free
Best but
high fees
Median
but high
fees
Can only
afford
basic care
Welfare Other
welfare
Free car,
free meals,
etc.
n/a n/a n/a
Upper Class
The reason for placing communist party cadres in the upper class is that in China
cadres have absolute power, and power can generate wealth. Power promises
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privileges, such as receiving free (or almost free) accommodation, free luxury cars,
free chauffeurs, and a high social and political status (Nee, 1996). For example, Mr.
Gao states that,
‘The local government has allocated me a car and a personal car driver, of
which the costs are totally covered by the government’ (Gao-52-M-U-Cadre-
Liangzhou)
Wang et al., (2002) comments that income inequality is much worse than
suggested by the statistical data gathered from different groups. Indeed, ‘true income’
in different social classes varies considerably. The rich are able to hide their wealth,
whereas the poor must declare it openly. The income of members of the upper class
includes a salary, non-currency income and grey income, while the income of those in
the lower class only includes a salary or government allowance. Apart from their
salary, cadres also receive non-currency income such as free rice, cooking oil or even
shopping cards, which are worth approximately 30% of their salary (Wang, 2010).
Compared to their salary and non-currency income, grey income is highly confidential.
Although it is very difficult to judge how much grey income cadres could earn, some
of my other participants were willing to talk about it:
‘Although the salary of cadres is normal, they receivea large amount of grey
income, some five to ten times higher than the normal salary, through various
channels, such as being a consultant for a private company’(Xing-57-M-U-
Entreprenurer-Liangzhou).
However, cadres are also very cautious about what they can and cannot accept, as
obvious bribes would lead to terminal damage to their career and future.
‘My desire for the future is to be promoted to a more senior position. Salary,
accommodation and all other benefits depend on my level. There is no rule as to who
can be promoted and who cannot. It only depends on whether or not you have support
from high-ranked cadres’ (Li-58-M-U-Cadre-Boluo).
201
Promotion to the upper level is always very competitive, because the upper level
means more power and more privilege. A cadre either has to be rich or well-
connected because bribes and nepotism are the two key factors enabling promotion.
As a result, constructing a safe network is very important because cadres need to
exchange power for wealth while also ensuring that these exchanges will not destroy
their careers.
‘The cadres know very well the rules of exchanging the usage or misusage of
their power with real materialised interests. We have to take him to very expensive
clubs and treat him to very expensive dinners, each of which may cost over
10,000RMB (equivalent to £1000)’ (Xing-57-M-U-Entreprenurer-Liangzhou).
As well as their salary, non-currency income and grey income, cadres also have a
special pension system. They do not need to make any contributions to pension funds
during their career. After retirement, the government guarantees a pension amounting
to 90-100% of their salary (Li and Sen, 2003). They also keep their other privileges if
they reach a certain level within the cadre system. For example, if they obtain a rank
similar to the mayoral level, they are able to keep their car, driver and the same salary
after retirement. Figure 6- 19 shows the Boluo leisure and entertainment centre for
retired cadres.
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Figure 6- 19: Boluo leisure centre for retired cadres (Source: author)
My field survey revealed that accommodation, health care fees and education
fees are the top three expenses for urban households (Figure 8.4). They have been
termed the ‘new three mountains’ for Chinese people (Xinhuanet, 2007). However,
for cadres, these top items of consumption are not as costly. For example,
accommodation is allocated by the government at a very low cost. In addition, the
surrounding environment of cadres’ apartments is much more pleasant than ordinary
residential areas, adorned with plenty of plants. The area is also very secure because
all cadres working for the government live in the same district or compound tightly
guarded around the clock (unfortunately, the guard did not allow me to take photo).
This type of accommodation is called welfare housing, which is a very different usage
of the term compared with its meaning in the West. The size of the welfare housing
allocated to cadres depends on their grade or position. The cadre normally pays just
one tenth of the market price of the welfare housing or it may even be completely free.
The cadres’ children and even grandchildren attend privileged free schools and they
can also receive care in elite hospitals for little cost.
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‘To our utter astonishment, cadres don’t need to spend any of their salary at all. I
totally believe the credibility of what the local proverb says: “basic wages don’t need
to be spent, daily necessities don’t need to be bought”, implying that cadres receive a
significant amount of non-currency income and grey income’ (Yang-50-F-U-Laid off
Worker-Liangzhou).
Upper-Middle Class
Compared to the upper classes, the upper-middle class is prominently
characterised by owning the most evident private wealth. Wealth, as the most
important and decisive factor determining an individual’s overall life in present-day
China, can also be exchanged for power, although this is not necessarily always
successful. The obvious characteristics of members of the upper-middle class are that
they have large houses and luxury cars; employ private chauffeurs and maids; and
some of them hold positions of power in society (Watson, 2010). This can be seen
from Mr. Xing, who once repaired shoes on the street and is now a successful
businessman in Liangzhou:
‘My first priority is to make these cadres happy. In order to achieve such a goal,
I need to invite the cadres for meals and play ‘Ma Jiang’ [traditional Chinese
gambling game] with them’ (Xing-57-M-U-Entreprenurer-Liangzhou).
As mentioned earlier, cadres are now very cautious about being caught taking
bribes and a way around this is to ‘win’ cash through gambling.
‘If atthe end of the day things don’t go well, their only fault is being involved in
playing a game, or the serious term, gambling. So I always intend to deliberately lose
my money to them to make them happy’ (Xing-57-M-U-Entreprenurer-Liangzhou).
He described the successful businessmen of privately owned enterprises as
owning large houses in urban areas, normally over 500m2 in area. Their families also
often buy properties in other cities. The typical entrepreneur is characterised as being
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extremely busy keeping his company running smoothly so that he rarely has time to
have a meal with his family and is able to count the number of days he has actually
spent with his family each year. Although typical businessmen of privately owned
enterprises often suffer from hyperlipidaemia– Xing’s cholesterol level also being
higher than normal –they are very proud of their success in accumulating wealth.
‘I am a very successful businessman but I am very tired. In China, you never
know what tomorrow will be. Yes, my salary is very high but my main wealth is
actually bonuses frommy company’s shares. I own a reasonable share of my
company’s equity. If my company shares could be traded in public, my wealth could
expand by as much as 50 times, and I could safely and happily take retirement by that
time’ (Gao-52-M-U-Cadre-Liangzhou).
In spite of the global recession that began in 2008, the number of wealthy people
in China continues to grow such that ‘by 2015, the country will hold the world’s
fourth largest concentration of wealthy people’ (Atsmon and Dixit, 2009:1). The
upper-middle class is very distinct from other classes in China, not only in income but
also in consumption behaviour: they still seek status labels and display their wealth,
which often triggers social and economic tensions because of the huge inequalities
compared to lower classes.
Middle Class
Compared to the upper class and upper-middle class, members of the middle
class generally work hard turning their knowledge and experiences into wealth, as in
the case of intellectuals. Before the Reform, intellectuals were slandered as the
‘stinking number nine – ignominiously assigned to the bottom of the list after
landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, rightists, spies, enemy
agents, and capitalist roaders’ (Li, 1995:27). However, in present-day China,
intellectuals are very well treated and have regained prestige and respect from wider
society. The middle class is nevertheless suffering from the ‘three big mountains:
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accommodation, health care fees and education fees’ (Xinhuanet, 2007) because of
the housing, health care and education reforms. In China, the housing reforms started
in 1988 but it was only in 1998 that the government decided to stop distributing
apartments to employees and urban residents, and to allow people to buy their
apartments from the housing market directly (Hui and Wang, 2006). Since 2006,
house prices have increased dramatically, with house prices in major cities increasing
by nearly 10% per month and doubling in just one year (Liang and Gao, 2007). Many
young graduates are eager to buy their first city apartment in order to get married and
achieve their dream of being urban residents. However, high mortgages have led
these young graduates to become ‘house slaves’, as they have to work so hard to save
the money to pay off their mortgages (Brockmann et al., 2008; Sato, 2006).
For example, Wang Peng is a primary school teacher whose salary is around
2,000 RMB per month and his wife earns 1,000 RMB per month. Their income is
reasonably high in this small city. However, every month he has to pay 1,500 RMB
towards the mortgage for their first apartment (see Figure 6- 20). He is always
worrying about becoming ill or losing his job as they cannot afford high hospital
medication fees. Luckily, he and his wife are young and so far they have had no
health problems. They wanted to have a baby but are afraid of the high cost of raising
a child. However, they are fortunate compared with many other young people because
they are at least on the property ladder. In order to pay off his mortgage as early as
possible and have a baby, Mr. Wang has to teach special training classes after work
and at weekends, which bring him an extra 1,500 RMB per month. He normally
works in school from 8:30am to 5:30pm and an extra two hours from 7pm to 9pm in
order to gain the cash payment from extra tutoring. On Saturday he works from 9am
to 4pm. He only takes a break on Sunday.
‘I heard teachers work really hard on such private training courses. Teachers
also examine students deliberately using a certain amount of materials that were
given during their private training courses, forcing students to pay extra tuition fees
to take the after-school training.’(Yun-45-F-U-Housewife-Wuchang).
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Figure 6- 20: Wang Peng lives in one of the many apartments in this multi-storey modern
building (Source: author)
The middle class represents a large majority of Chinese people especially in
urban areas. Atsmon and Dixit (2009) estimates that the middle class could reach 580
million people; however, these people have not yet reached their full spending
potential. Similarly, my field survey shows that high saving rates and low
consumption rates are the key features of this class, although the people in this class
also earn a reasonable salary and grey income. Members of the middle class are very
concerned about their mortgages, health care, children’s education costs and their
retirement.
Lower Class
People in the lower-class tier include urban workers and peasants working on
agricultural land and floating in urban areas seeking temporary labouring jobs. They
have no power in society, lack luxury possessions and have not had proper
educational training. They are basically living at the bottom of society and are
struggling to get by, as is the case for Mrs Yang who I interviewed at Liangzhou in
Gansu province.
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Mrs. Yang Liping was made redundant from a SOE and looks much older than
her true age because of the challenges she has experienced in life. The SOE Mrs.
Yang worked for went bankrupt and was bought out by a new private company. She
was paid a lump sum of 30,000 RMB for her redundancy on condition that she gave
up any welfare or pension entitlements.
She lives in an urban area but her living conditions are basic: she has few
household assets except for some small ordinary domestic appliances, such as a TV,
electric fan and refrigerator (Figure 6- 21). She does not have specific skills, decent
educational qualifications or work experience that is in high demand in the job market.
Her typical day involves getting up at 5am before riding a wobbly old bike for an hour
to reach rural farms, where she buys as many vegetables as she can carry directly
from farmers for a low price. She then takes these vegetables to the local market to
sell to urban residents. Her son, now aged 13, is growing up very fast. She needs to
buy him an egg a day and two pounds of meat per week. If she is lucky, she makes 20
RMB per day to cover the living costs of her whole family.
In the afternoon, Mrs. Yang returns home and cooks for her husband and son. Her
family enjoys little entertainment because it is too expensive for them. Mrs. Yang has
to save especially carefully in winter when she cannot make enough money from
selling vegetables and the cost of heating is high. She is very unhappy and her only
hope is that her son might go to university and find a decent job after his graduation,
escaping from his current bitter life.
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Figure 6- 21: Yang Liping and author (Source: author)
Mrs. Yang belongs to the unlucky generation who have experienced all the
challenges of modern China, as demonstrated by the proverb: ‘When they were of
school age, it happened to be the cultural revolution and all schools were closed for
revolutionary activities; when they were of working age, it happened to be the
campaign when Mao called for young people to go to the countryside to work as
peasants; when they were of marriage age, it happened to be the one-child policy; and
when they are now close to retirement age, it happens to be the time of non-
pensionable redundancy’.
‘What I worry about the most at the moment are the health care and education
costs for my only son. If I became ill, I would not be able to afford the health care fee.
Thus, I always buy non-prescribed cheap medicines from the pharmacy for any light
illnesses and, luckily, so far I have not been very ill or needed hospital treatment. The
lump sum of 30,000RMB compensation is saved for paying my son’s university
tuition’ (Yang-57-F-U-Laid-off Worker-Liangzhou).
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The millions of people in the lower class are struggling for basic needs such as
food, shelter and health care. This is consistent with Engel's Law that the lower a
family’s income, the greater the percentage spent on food.
6.8 Conclusion
This chapter used county-level field survey data to analyse how income
inequalities involve a wide range of changing indicators such as gender, place,
location and social class. By using this framework, the results show that, overall, per
capita income has increased and decreased unequally over time. The income gap
between the western, central and coastal areas widened as income increased faster in
the coastal areas. The rural-urban income gap was not as severe as statistical data
suggested. In addition, the coastal rural-urban income gap is narrower than the gap
inland. The income inequalities between genders and between different ethnic groups
are widening. In addition, income inequality and stratification into different social
classes leads to social and economic tension. Consumption patterns are shaped
differently across urban and rural areas, coastal and inland counties and different
social classes.
Due to the restrictions of my field survey, large-scale empirical research
exploring the effects of economic reform on gender income inequality is urgently
needed. Research is also required into how to judge the total amount and distribution
of grey income, as well as how to judge income inequality in different social classes.
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Chapter 7 Social Transformation and Inequality
7.1 Introduction
Sociologists such as Bian and Logan, (1996), Nee (1991), Szelenyi and Manchin
(1987) have argued that the shift from a planned economy to a market economy is
likely to reduce social inequality as a result of the redistribution process. For example,
Szelenyi and Manchin (1987:124) analysed the privatisation of urban housing in
Hungary and concluded that the overall effect of market reform on the cadre elite led
to a ‘gradual erosion of its privileges’. Similarly, studies of economic reform in
Eastern Europe agree with this view (Kornai, 2006). However, in contrast, Chen and
Qiao (2002) and Chen and Li (2010) emphasised that social inequality has worsened
under China ’ s economic reform and transition because of regional and urban-rural
development inequality. Furthermore, Hu (2001) argued that Chinese society is
experiencing frustration, bitterness and even resentment about the severe social
inequality between different groups of people and in particular the widespread
corruption. Chapter Two, in providing a conceptual framework for the thesis,
highlighted the importance of the research question related to development and
inequality under China ’ s economic transition since 1978. Bian (2002), Beller and
Hout (2006), Hesketh et al. (2005) and Anagnost (2008) interrogate the ways in
which changes in the structure of birth control policy, social class and social mobility
have resulted in social transformation. This chapter presents county-level field survey
evidence from five Chinese counties in order to analyse the ways in which China’s
socio-economic reform has shaped a range of social perspectives upon issues such as
birth control policy, social stratification, education and social mobility. In order to
achieve these aims, section 7.2 examines how China ’ s birth control policy affects
population fertility and gender inequality, and how it is causing an ageing society and
gender imbalance (Zhang, 2012). Section 7.3 focuses on how social stratification is
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forming within a transitional society and section 7.4 explains the relationship between
education and social mobility.
7.2 Birth Control and Gender Equality
China is the only country in the world to directly and deliberately penalise people
for violating population policy (Bongaarts and Greenhalgh, 1985). Under the one-
child policy, each married couple is allowed to have one child and, under some
special circumstances, couples from minority ethnic groups and rural areas are
allowed to have two children, in order to control the country’s population growth
(Kane and Choi，1999). The depth of its social impact means that many arguments
have been advanced about the wide-ranging ways in which the one-child policy has
affected society and whether or not it has succeeded since it was introduced in 1979.
For example, Feng et al., (2012) stated that the one-child policy contributed to two
decades of impressive economic development by cutting population growth to an all-
time low. However, Hesketh et al., (2005) argued that the costs of the one-child
policy consist of a growing proportion of male births and an outsized proportion of
elderly inhabitants without sufficient government or family support. This section aims
to clarify whether the one-child policy has been necessary for controlling China ’ s
population growth as well as assessing how it causes social inequality and impacts on
a range of familial issues such as family size, gender roles and the ratio between
elderly parents and adult children (Yi, 1992).
It is widely recognised that the main benefit of the one-child policy has been the
changes to marriage and fertility rates. The average age at which women get married
has increased gradually from about 23 in 1980 to 25 in 2000 (Ding and Hesketh, 2006)
and the total fertility rate has declined from about six births per woman before 1970 to
two in 2004 (Hesketh et al.,2005). However, behind the statistical data, my field
survey has revealed that satisfaction with the one-child policy is low, with 22% of
women in urban areas and 3% of women in rural areas demonstrating support. In
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addition, there is a large inequality in the fertility rate between urban and rural areas.
Table 7- 1 shows that in urban areas, 95% of families have only one child born after
1979 but the number of children born in 90% of rural families averages between two
to five.
Table 7- 1: Number of children per family amongst sample population (Source: author)
One Child Per
Family (%)
More Than One Child
Per Family (%)
Urban 95% 5%
Rural 10% 90%
One reason for this disparity is the cultural tradition of favouring sons and the
influence of patrilineal culture, deeply rooted in rural areas (Ebenstein, 2010), which
encourages couples to attempt to ensure at least one male offspring. In addition,
peasants have left their hometowns, where they were subject to government control,
and succeeded in finding ways to have more children (Ding and Hesketh, 2006).
Therefore, in 1989 the government introduced a new policy, allowing rural couples to
have a second child if their first child is a daughter. This permits couples to have more
children while approving and encouraging the customary preference for sons. As a
result, it is no surprise that one participant said publicly:
‘As the Chinese proverb says, the more male offspring, the more luck the family
receives’ (多子多福). In our village, every family has at least three children. I have
three sons. My elder brother has five daughters and one son and my younger brother
has two daughters and two sons’ (Wu-46-M-R-Peasant-Wuchang).
Another reason for the disparity is that different punishments are enforced in
urban and rural regions. In China, couples who have obtained an official permit are
only supposed to have one child. ‘Unplanned’ pregnancies (pregnancies without a
birth permit) must be terminated by abortion (Edlund et al., 2003). The heavy
punishments associated with violating the one-child policy are widely publicised in
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policy regulations and media propaganda (Li, 1995). For example, in rural areas, it is
common to see one-child policy slogans painted on walls (Figure 7- 1). Penalties are
enforced by local authorities. For example, heads of work units or villages have to
make sure that the number of infants born in their unit or village fits the birth quota
allocated by the upper level of administration. Heads of work units or villages are
themselves under various economic and disciplinary pressures to ensure their
compliance. A direct financial penalty is also regarded as a powerful means to limit
childbearing (Li, 1995).
Figure 7- 1: Slogan: ‘If you run away to avoid the one-child policy today, you will lose all your
property tomorrow’ (Source: Beijingwanbao, 2009)
In addition to financial penalties, urban residents, especially those working in
SOEs, universities and hospitals (99% of which are state owned), and cadres are
under direct government control and at risk of more severe punishment beyond direct
financial penalty. People who violate regulations are discharged from employment
immediately and cannot be employed by similar employers (Hesketh and Zhu, 1997).
Therefore, the different punishments between urban and rural areas are one of the
main reasons for fertility inequality. For example, one employer of a university
complained:
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‘My wife and I have always dreamed about having our second child. But it is
impossible because we are working in the same university. If we dare to have our
second child, both of us would lose our jobs and lose our pensions. In addition, every
member of staff in my university would lose their bonus that year. It is unfair that
those peasants can pay fines to have many more children but we don’t get any
changes’ (Zhu-39-M-U-Reader-Wuchang).
A benefit of the one-child policy is that it may allow Chinese women to achieve
social equality in the long run (Fong, 2002). Although the right of women to control
their own reproduction was abolished, the one-child policy decreases the time women
spend childbearing to a comparatively short period in their adult lives. Women are
able to prepare themselves for work and spend more time on their careers. Therefore,
it is not surprising that a decline in fertility has been accompanied by a drastic rise in
the number of women participating in the labour force since 1979. Although
patrilineal traditions are still very dominant in the social and economic lives of the
Chinese, especially in the countryside, the one-child policy may eventually transform
Chinese society into one where the patrilineal kinship system ceases to be a
significant factor in everyday life. The most common observation is that Chinese
women are distinctly underrepresented in non-traditional jobs outside the home, such
as high-level positions in the political and economic sectors (Hong, 1987), although
there are some exceptions. All married female participants in my focus groups
claimed that they have spent more time doing housework in comparison to their
husbands, and all male married participants admitted that their wives do most of the
housework regardless of age, social class and location. Thus, during my field survey it
was common that the wife prepared the food in the kitchen (Figure 7- 2) while the
husband enjoyed dinner with guests (Figure 7- 3).
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Figure 7- 2: A wife cooking in the kitchen (Source: author)
Figure 7- 3: A husband drinking with guests while his wife prepares the food (Source: author)
The fundamental reason for this divide is that in Chinese ideology a woman’s
success is judged on her family’s happiness, rather than individual career achievement.
As Miss Niu commented:
‘A woman is highly praised if she sacrifices herself and takes the best care of her
husband and children. Females are commonly thought unlucky and unhappy if they
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are not married or get divorced even if they have a very successful career’ (Niu-29-F-
R-Teacher-Liangzhou).
The one-child policy may instead gradually reduce the significance of patrilineal
kinship and lead to gender equality. A combination of these factors could reshape the
traditional role of Chinese women and create social equality in the long run.
Although the one-child policy has some social benefits, the policy has been
widely criticised because of its potential social consequences (Ebenstein, 2010). First,
the one-child policy has caused gender imbalances (see Figure 7.4). The neonatal sex
ratios have been increasing, from 1.06 in 1979 to 1.11 in 1988, which is considerably
higher than the expected standard of about 105 male to 100 female births (Edlund, et
al., 2003). In 2006, neonatal sex ratios reached 1.17, as 117 boys were born for every
100 girls (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007).
Figure 7- 4: Neonatal sex ratios (Source: derived from CSB yearbook, 2007)
The data of Figure 7-4 show that China has an extremely high ratio of boys to
girls, which Kane and Choi (1999) suggested is unlikely to occur in a natural way and
which gives cause for concern at many levels. Traditionally, the son and his spouse
have responsibility for most duties related to caring for elderly parents (Hong, 1987).
Therefore, in the attempt to ensure a son, some Chinese families have chosen sex-
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selective abortion after ultrasonography, leading to a large proportion of the decline in
female births (Ebenstein, 2010). Actual figures are impossible to obtain because sex-
selective abortion is illegal, although it has been carried out by growing numbers of
private sector companies. Regardless, the impact of the one-child policy on the sex
ratio has received much attention, as have the potentially unfortunate social
consequences of this sex imbalance.
Second, two demographic indicators reveal that China is an ageing society due to
falling fertility and increasing longevity over the past few decades (from 1950 to 2010
life expectancy increased from 41 to 71 years) (Pei,1999). The rapid decrease in the
birth rate combined with improving life expectancy has led to an increasing
proportion of elderly people. The ratio between elderly parents and adult children has
also enlarged. In China, this problem has been named the ‘4:2:1’ phenomenon (four
grandparents, two parents and one child), meaning that increasing numbers of couples
will be responsible for the care of only one child but four parents. The low fertility
rates in urban areas caused by one-child policy mean that even more urban residents
will reach their final years without any surviving children or only one child. For
example, in the urban section of my field survey, 65% of senior citizens lived alone in
homes which were not suitable for the elderly, but they would feel disgraced to move
and spend their final years in a nursing house because of tradition (Pei, 1999). In rural
areas, too, family support systems for the elderly are weakening. This is primarily
because of the increasing numbers of young people who have immigrated to urban
areas (Luand Wang, 2006; Li, 2003; Zhao, 2000). It is very common for young
couples to leave their parents and children behind in their rural homes (see Figure 7-5).
This situation has become very precarious and must be addressed, as for most elderly
rural population the family remains the primary source of care (Fong, 2004).
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Figure 7- 5: Mr. Zhang and his grandson (Source: author)
Caring for older parents now poses a major challenge to the nation because
traditionally they were cared for by extended families, but this is no longer an option
for most Chinese.
‘We will try our best to be financially secure. But if we were sick I think we
would still expect our son to fulfill some of his responsibilities like coming to visit us,
since money cannot buy everything, especially things like the emotional support of the
family. Nowadays, our pensions are pretty good, but who knows what is going to
happen later. The government should offer some security for the elderly like other
countries’ (Xu-68-M-U-Doctor-Boluo).
My interviews exposed that most parents, particularly those in urban areas, now
accept that it will be impossible for a single child to care for two parents and four
grandparents (4-2-1) in future. For this reason, parents are now making their own non-
traditional and independent plans for their futures if they are financially able to do so.
However, not all urban residents have the financial capacity to make such plans, and
many rural residents are unable to afford financial planning for their future retirement.
Therefore, the role of government in solving the problems caused by the one-child
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policy needs very serious consideration. Although the government vowed that it
would care for the elderly in 1980 (see Figure 7- 6), as problems have emerged
institutional changes and government policy still lag far behind.
Figure 7- 6: Poster stating: ‘The one-child policy is brilliant and the government will care for the
elderly’ (Source: Xinhuanet, 2008)
Unless the elderly in China are universally provided with adequate security, they
will remain dependent on their children for financial and social support.
‘I am the only child in my family. I remember the last time my mother was ill and
my father was abroad. I had to care for her day and night, unlike others who can
share this type of burden with their siblings. At that time I was not even in good
physical shape myself. It was a really difficult time for me until my father hurried
back from abroad. Since I do not have any siblings I will have to care for my parents
and there is no possible escape or valid excuse’ (Xu-32-F-U-Nurse-Boluo).
In addition, the one-child policy has greatly changed the structure of Chinese
families because the average size of the Chinese family is much smaller than it was
before. The traditional extended family with married brothers living together has
become rare. Instead, the nuclear family (assuming there are no more than two
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generations in the family) has become the dominant family form (Short and Zhai,
1998). However, in light of the deeply rooted traditional Chinese ideology favouring
large families, the three generation family remains an important family type in
Chinese society. According to my field survey, three generation families account for
22.3% of all families. Several other local surveys conducted by Western scholars
show similar patterns (for example, Reher, 1998). As a result, grandparents such as
Mr. and Mrs. Ma in Figure 7- 7 typically take care of grandchildren in the three
generation family.
‘My son and daughter-in-law are working in city. Nursery care is very expensive
there and my wife helps them to take care of their children. When they come back, we
will all live together’ (Ma-59-F-R-Housewife-Jinchang).
Figure 7- 7: Mr. and Mrs Ma and their grandchildren (Source: author)
In sum, my research reinforces the findings of previous researchers who have
suggested that the one-child policy has strongly affected the fertility rates in urban
areas but resistance to the one-child policy nevertheless remains common among
peasant women. The one-child policy has a positive relationship to gender equality
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and the reduction of the average family size. However, it has also caused severe social
consequences such as sex imbalance and an ageing society.
7.3 Social Class and Stratification
7.3.1 HuKou and Social Stratification
Chan (2009) defined China ’ s political system as a centralised multidivisional-
form hierarchy structure (M-structure). Under this structure, the household
registration system, HuKou, was launched in the 1950s as an instrument to solidify
administrative control, and it is still in place today (Wu and Treiman, 2004). Figure
7- 8, Figure 7- 9 and Figure 7- 11 illustrate respectively the cover, first page and
contents of an original HuKou book. Figure 7- 10and Figure 7- 12 are corresponding
translations of Figure 7- 9 and Figure 7- 11.
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Figure 7- 8: Cover of a typical copy of China’s Household Register Book (Source: author)
Figure 7- 9: First page of a HuKou book in Chinese (Source: baidu.com)
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Figure 7- 10: First page of a HuKou book in English (Source: author)
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Figure 7- 11: The contents of a HuKou book in Chinese (Source: author)
Figure 7- 12: The contents of a HuKou book in English (Source: author)
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Using the contents of the HuKou books and the household details they supply, the
government can categorise the population according to various groups, such as
location, gender, ethnic group, occupation and agricultural (rural) or non-agricultural
(urban) status. This offers both the principal basis for establishing identity, citizenship
and proof of official status but also presents a means of controlling population
movement and mobility through the implementation of a code of laws and regulations
(Wong et al., 2015; Solinger, 1999a). Chan and Zhang (1999:2) argue, 'HuKou's
functions go far beyond simply controlling population mobility but regulating
population distribution and serve many other important objectives desired by the state'.
The aim of the HuKou system is to enable the central government to define the urban-
rural relationship and shape state-society relations. Gao from Hubei explained:
'The HuKou book is essential for every aspect of daily life; without registration,
one cannot obtain employment, go to school, marry or enlist in the army'.(Gao-40-F-
U-Policewoman-Wuchang)
In particular, there is a sharp differentiation of rights and privileges between
those recorded in their HuKou books as having agricultural status and those of non-
agricultural status, exacerbated by the stringent conditions governing conversions
from rural to urban status (Lu, 2002). For example, only urban residents are entitled to
government-provided benefits such as housing (Wu, 2003), job opportunities (Knight,
Song and Jia, 1999), education (Qian and Smyth, 2008a; 2008b), health care (Zhang
and Kanbur, 2005), pensions (Li et al, 2012), inter-generational occupational mobility
(Wu and Treiman, 2007; Davis, 1992) and migration (Whalley and Zhang, 2007;
Ganzeboom et al., 1989). As a migrant from a rural to an urban area, Hu complained:
‘I was born in a village in Hunan Province. I have been working and living in
Boluo for about 10 years. But I still don't have a local urban HuKou book. As a result,
my child cannot go to public school for education and all my family cannot receive
the same social services and beneﬁts as native residents' (Hu-38-M-U-Engineer-
Boluo).
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Since the 1950s, the government has only allowed local HuKou holders access to
these social resources and welfare, meaning that administrative rank is often an
indicator of the degree to which an individual or group of individuals can profit from
socio-economic development. The value of the HuKou book is roughly stratiﬁed with
province-level cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou at the top, followed by
prefecture-level cities and county-level cities, with rural areas at the bottom (Wang,
2005b). It is estimated that the total number of rural-urban migrants reached 211
million in 2009 (National Population & Family Planning Commission of P.R. China,
2010). Li et al., (2010: 146) argue that 'the central government is neither moving to
abolish the HuKou system, nor does its importance in major cities appear to be
diminishing although it has undergone numerous adjustments over the past 30 years’.
Instead, HuKou is still an important tool serving multiple state interests under China’s
current economic and political system. However, Tao (2009) and Zhang and Wang
(2010) have argued that the HuKou system is no longer as relevant to people’s lives
because of economic development and changes in the migrant population, although it
still to some degree determines access to resources and one’s life chances. As one of
my participants said:
‘I would prefer to have an agricultural HuKou classification rather than a non-
agricultural one because the government only distributes land to those with
agricultural classifications. When our agricultural land was converted into land for
industrial projects, my family received a large amount of compensation and five two-
bedroom flats in exchange for our agricultural land and house. The urban HuKou
holders say that our lands grow houses rather than crops(种房子 ).’(Wu-55-M-R-
Peasant-Wuchang)
7.3.2 Social Stratification
Social class and social stratification are key topics in sociological analysis
(Grusky and Weisshaar, 2001). Analysis of social class and social stratification
demonstrates that one social class may own and enjoy more economic resources than
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another. Similarly, one social class may be held in higher esteem, or it may be in a
position to control other groups. The analysis of social class is concerned with
understanding how inequalities like these arise in the first place and the impact that
they have on other aspects of society. For example, Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992)
analysed a set of practices in order to structure social differentiation and extended this
social differentiation to social, economic, cultural aspects. Contemporary China
provides an excellent example of the complexity of social differentiation that occurs
when a society undergoes economic and structural change. Li (2005) suggested that
the discourse of social stratification has become increasingly dominated by the
approach that grasps the widespread and total impact of market reform and
globalisation on Chinese society in a time of rapid social and economic
transformation.
Social groups can be stratified using various methods. For example, there are
systems of stratification based on gender or ethnic groups (Anthias, 2001). It may also
be possible to identify stratification operating on the basis of age, religion or caste
(Saunders, 2006; Ahmad, 1978). Therefore, in this section, two key questions need to
be clarified: (i) how can we define different social classes? (ii) how does social
stratification shape Chinese social and economic inequality? Giddens et al. (2003) has
devised a three-fold classification model for social class, consisting of the upper,
middle and lower classes. However, Warner et al. (1949) have created a six-tier
classification model for social class: the upper-upper, upper-middle, upper-lower,
lower-upper, lower-middle and lower classes. In addition, Watson (2010) has spoken
of three major types of class stratification: economic, political and occupational. As
Barbrook (2006:6) commented with respect to social classification: ‘in every society
the most basic class distinction is between the powerful and the powerless’. In
contemporary China, distinct social classes are not yet apparent as the development of
social class is still in its transition stage (c.f. Bian, 2002). During the Mao era, social
classification was rather simple, as society was divided into peasants, workers,
intellectuals, cadres, soldiers and black elements (Anagnost, 2008).
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At present, the stratification of social classes in China is very complicated. Bian
(2002) has redefined Chinese social classes as follows: peasants living by means of
agricultural production; peasant labourers floating in urban areas; the working class;
cadres (both administrative and managerial); rural cadres; private entrepreneurs;
managers; household business owners; individual manufacturers and traders;
professionals; and intellectuals. More recently, the sociologist Li (2005:8) has
suggested an alternative model of Chinese social stratification: ‘in China today, there
is a peasant class, a working class (urban state worker and urban collective worker,
urban non-state worker, and peasant worker), a capitalist class (about 15 million),
and a class of cadre (about 40 million) and quasi-cadre (about 27 million)’. However,
there is problem with both of the above classifications, as they tend to ignore the fact
that China’s economic development, particularly in the last decade, has significantly
diversified occupation-based social classification, and such classifications no longer
reflect the reality of social status.
My field survey results favour Giddens et al. (2003) observations that there are
several factors determining a person’s social class. The most important of these
factors is the personal or household per capita income or wealth, which is influenced
by the ownership of land and property, means of production and occupation,
educational qualifications and family background. With this in mind, I outlined 12
occupations as a basis for observation and asked my participants to give scores
between 1 and 12 for each occupation in terms of power, wealth, education,
occupation and family background. For example, in the column headed Power in
Table 7- 2, the cadre, considered to be the most powerful occupation in China, is
given a score of 12. Table 7- 2 displays my questionnaire and interview results,
culminating in a final average score for each occupation. Based on these scores,
incorporated with field observations on people’s living conditions, I have divided the
twelve occupations into four groups, each consisting of three occupational
subdivisions. This classification model provides a much more accurate reflection of
229
China’s current social stratification, based on the observations and comments of those
I engaged with during my field research.
Table 7- 2: Scores based on occupation and other related factors (Source: author derived from
field interviews and questionnaires)
Factors Power Wealth Education Occupation Family
Background
Total
Scores
Cadres 12 10 10 10 12 54
Rural cadres 10 9 6 9 10 44
Private
entrepreneurs
9 11 9 11 9 49
Managers 11 12 8 1 11 43
Professionals 8 8 11 8 8 43
Traders 7 6 12 6 7 38
Intellectuals 6 7 7 7 6 33
Household
business
owners
4 5 5 5 4 23
Individual
manufacturers
5 4 4 4 5 22
Urban worker 3 3 3 3 3 15
Peasant
labourer
2 2 2 2 2 10
Peasants 1 1 1 1 1 5
According to my scores, the upper class consists of cadres, rural cadres and
private entrepreneurs; the upper-middle class consists of managers, traders and
professionals; the middle class consists of household business owners, individual
manufacturers and intellectuals; and the lower class consists of peasants living by
means of agricultural production, peasant labourers floating in urban areas and urban
workers (see Table 7- 3).
Table 7- 3: Components of social classes (Source: author)
Social Class Scores Occupation
Upper Class Above 43 Cadres
Rural cadres
Private entrepreneurs
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Upper-Middle
Class
38-43 Managers
Professionals
Traders
Middle Class 22-33 Intellectuals
Household business owners
Individual manufacturers
Lower class Below 3 Urban workers
Peasant labourers in urban areas
Peasants living by means of agricultural
production
Three aspects of these results are particularly worth noting. First, they show that
being a member of the party cadre is a key element of belonging to the upper class.
This conclusion was also drawn by Li (2005) and Bian (2002), who both defined
cadres as being part of the upper social class because they have been given high social
status and socio-economic privileges from the Mao era to the present day. For
example, it was recently revealed that a state-owned-coal mine in Shanxi worth 200
million RMB had been sold to a relative of a cadre for 375,000 RMB (Feng,2012)
Hao and Johnston (1997:85) concludes that ‘it is very common that cadres’ children
and spouses accumulate wealth directly and indirectly via secret methods using their
privileges’. Tian (2009) likewise indicates that the reason why cadres enjoy various
privileges is the lack of mechanisms for legal supervision. Section 6.6 further
investigates how cadres enjoy privileges in income and expenditure and explores in
detail the inequality between cadres and other social classes. One participant Mr. Yue,
for example, indicates that:
‘Cadres are a privileged class who have power and high social status. Although
they swear they are servants of the people, they never are. They use their power to
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control more economic resources. Even their offspring have many more opportunities
to be wealthy and maintain a high social status’ (Yue-45-M-U-Policeman-Wuchang).
Second, as Weber (1994) and Kerbo (2006) have argued the middle class consists
of people who have some property but little education and people who have little
property but can command high wages by virtue of their education and qualifications.
However, on the contrary, according to my definition, the upper-middle class is
represented by the professional and managerial occupations that both own property
and receive high wages as a result of the economic transition. The middle class is
characterised by household business owners, individual manufacturers and
intellectuals: people who either own some property or receive reasonable wages by
virtue of their education and qualifications (Murthy, 1984). Dividing the middle class
into upper-middle class and middle class is necessary because in the past three
decades the former have been able to earn much higher wages than the latter as a
result of being involved in China ’ s rapid economic development. In particular, the
disparity between the upper-middle class and middle class in terms of wages and
social status has significantly diversified the occupation-based social classification
system, which needs to reflect the reality of social status.
Third, at the bottom of society, peasants, peasant labourers floating in urban areas
and urban workers are considered as comprising the lower class because they have
low income, less social welfare and are the most vulnerable groups (see Figure 7- 13
and Figure 7- 14) (Li, 2005 and Bian, 2002). Section 6.6 explores in detail the
inequalities of income and expenditure between the lower class and other social
classes. Figure 7- 15 shows that, according to my research, 43% of participants’
dream of working in the government, hospital and education sectors; and only 1% of
participants wish to be peasants or workers, revealing that in reality there is a
universal view that this group has a low social status.
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Figure 7- 13: A peasant comforts his son (Source: cishan.net)
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Figure 7- 14: A low-income peasant (Source: author)
Figure 7- 15: Ideal jobs of Chinese inhabitants (Source: author)
In conclusion, China’s social classes are still in transition but occupation-based
stratification as well as associated inequalities between groups is now very evident. In
this section, I have demonstrated why and how I define four occupationally orientated
social classes. Significantly, inequalities in economic conditions such as income,
expenditure and accommodation, as well as healthcare and social security, are highly
related to differences between these four social classes.
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7.4 Education and Social Mobility
The last section in this chapter explores how Chinese social classes are not
determined at birth and social mobility is permitted. Social inequality is a common
concern in research on social stratification and social mobility. Erikson and
Goldthorpe (1992) emphasised that the level of relative social mobility within a
society (at a particular time) can be taken as a measure of its openness; that is,
whether or not it provides its citizens with equal opportunities. Education plays an
important role in modern societies both as a way of encouraging social mobility and
as a tool for social reproduction (Ishida et al., 1995). Breen and Jonsson (2005)
investigated how educational attainment mediates the relationship between social
class of origin and social class of destination; while Breen and Luijkx (2004) also
claimed that educational attainment was an important driver of social mobility in
Europe between 1970 and 2000. However, Shavit and Blossfeold (1993) conducted a
cross-country comparative study in which they found that class inequalities in
educational attainment have remained substantially unchanged over time in many
countries including the UK. Shavit and Muller (1998:1) showed that ‘education is a
crucial intervening link between the social background of individuals and their later
class destination’ by conducting a cross-country comparative study. Saunders
(1990:68) pointed out that patterns of social mobility in all industrial societies include
intra-generational mobility (the movement that may occur within one individual’s
lifetime) and inter-generational mobility (the movement that may occur between
generations as children achieve a different position from that occupied by their
parents). Breen (2004) stressed another important feature of class systems, which is
that movement between classes, may occur in both directions. In other words,
movement may involve both upward mobility and downward mobility.
Since 1949, China has made tremendous efforts to improve education with the
aim of promoting economic and social development. For example, China introduced
nine years of compulsory education in 2007 (Li et al., 2007) and education
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expenditure increased from 26.5 billion RMB in 1986 to 1214.8 billion RMB in 2007
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2007). Figure 7- 16 shows that 100% of urban
and 95% of rural students receive nine years of compulsory education according to
my survey data from five counties.
Figure 7- 16: Social disparity between urban and rural regions (Source, author)
(Graph labels should read: Completely free, compulsory education; Free health
care for children under 18 and above 65; Health insurance for all aged 18-65; National
pension for retirees over 65)
Blaug (1985) found that the improved level of education in developing countries
leads to higher labour productivity and, for the individual, an increased income level.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) emphasised that education plays a key role in
economic growth. Lucas (1988) and Cai et al. (2002) have also demonstrated the
significant positive relationship between education and the growth of GDP per capita
using data from 29 Chinese provinces between 1978 and 1998. However, as Farrell
and other scholars have pointed out, inequality in education has many different
dimensions including socio-economic status, gender, ethnicity, race and geographical
location (Wang, 2008; Liu and Li, 2006; Kwong, 2006; Zhang and Kanbur, 2005;
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UNDP, 2005; Yang and Zou, 2003; Farrell, 1994 and 1999). Chapter Five presented
the main arguments surrounding inequality in education and the reasons for it, as
suggested by the national statistical data. This section uses my survey data to explore
educational inequality with a particular emphasis on the impact of education upon
social mobility, bearing in mind the special contexts of education and social mobility
in China (Jackson et al., 2005).
Similar to previous research, my survey data suggests that regional inequality in
the attainment of education has largely existed because of the imbalanced distribution
of educational resources and inequality in educational policies (Mok, 2005; Yang,
2000). For example, poor people often live, dispersed, in remote areas in which the
central government rarely establishes proper education facilities. Figure 7- 17, Figure
7- 18 and Figure 7- 19 show three local schools in Gansu: a local village school, a
local town school and a local city school respectively. The facilities and conditions of
the schools in larger settlements are considerably better than those in smaller
settlements. In addition, fewer qualified teachers serve poor western localities (World
Bank, 2003:15). However, the government has vowed to reduce educational
inequality by launching new educational policies (MOE, 1996; 2009). For example,
my field survey revealed that qualified teachers are increasing noticeably in some
village schools and most town schools. In Gulang, my participants pointed out that the
government has increased its educational budgets since the 1990s. Now, the
government pays each teacher in a town school at least 3000 RMB in salary per
month, meaning that most teachers in town schools have graduated from university.
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Figure 7- 17: Village school in Gansu (Source: author)
Figure 7- 18: Town school in Gansu (Source: author)
Figure 7- 19: Secondary school in city in Gansu (Source, author)
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The cost of secondary school education has soared since educational reform in
the 1990s and is arguably the main reason for educational inequality in recent years
(Wu, 2010；Liu, 2007; Tsang and Ding, 2005; Hannum, 1999). However, China’s
schooling policy was revised in 1986, for urban areas, and 2007, for rural areas, so
that pupils studying in primary and secondary schools during the nine-year
compulsory period of education now only need to pay a small amount of money to
cover the cost of books and supplementary classes, and no longer need to pay tuition
fees (Li and Wang, 2007). However, fiscal reform in education in the early 1990s
shifted the responsibility of funding education to local governments. Local
governments in less developed areas were then unable to gather sufficient funding for
education (Mok, 1997). As a result, tuition and other miscellaneous fees can reach
several thousand RMB per child following the nine-year period of compulsory
education.
‘My son and younger daughter are within the nine years of compulsory education
so I pay around 200 RMB tuition fees per child per year. However, after my children
reach the end of the nine years, I need to pay 3000 to 4000 RMB in fees per child per
year to the secondary school’(Yang-45-M-R-Peasant-Gulang).
Until the mid-1980s, higher education (HE) was free in China and the state even
subsidised students’ living costs so HE was affordable to all qualiﬁed students (Qu,
2008). A market ideology has gradually been adopted in tertiary education since the
economic reform, beginning with the admittance of a small proportion of self-funded
students (Wang, 2008). Notably, compared to the average income for urban and rural
residents (which increased by nine and six times respectively) and GDP (which
increased by almost four times), tuition fees in higher education have increased 25
times from 200 RMB (30USD) in 1989 to over 5000 RMB (700USD) in 2007 during
the same period of time (Figure 7- 20; NBSC, 2008).
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Figure 7- 20: Tuition fee increase against income and GDP growth (Source: author)
Moreover, a report by the National Development and Reform Commission
recently estimated that in the last decade, each undergraduate student in a public
university has needed to spend over 10,000 RMB (1400USD) per year to cover tuition
fees and accommodation costs (NDRC, 2007). Family support has turned out to be the
primary source for university funding in the face of inadequate access to the existing
student loan and grant system (MOE, 2009). Therefore, higher education has become
unaffordable for many low and middle-income families (Wang and Yao, 2003; Tsang,
1996). In absolute terms, tuition fees in China are much lower than those in many
other countries such as the UK (BBC, 2009). However, in China 60% of the average
household’s disposable income is taken up by tuition fees, compared to 22% in the
UK (Office for National Statistics, 2010). Therefore, the soaring cost of higher
education and its disproportionate relation to household income has become a
significant source of educational inequality (People’s Daily Online, 2006). Supporting
such arguments, the participants in my focus group living in poor areas disclosed that
they are unable to afford such a burden and that their children often leave secondary
school before they are qualified. Tuition fees for university study are even further out
of reach figure for many people in poor areas, as emphasised by one of my
interviewees, Ma Qing:
240
‘The university tuition fee is around 8000 RMB per year and the living costs are
5000 RMB, which is equivalent to the total income of our household over three years.
Universities do provide some subsidies, but they are far from enough. For the sake of
our children’s future, we have to borrow money to pay for the costs of education’
(Ma-50-F-R-Peasant-Jinchang).
In my opinion, the central government is to blame for this phenomenon because it
deliberately devolved financial responsibility for higher education to governments and
individuals at lower provincial levels. Government expenditure on higher education
decreased sharply from 93.5% of all HE income in 1990 to 42.6% in 2006, while
GDP almost quadrupled (NBSC, 2008). Meanwhile, the promotion of multi-method
and multi-channel funding strategies has led to increased tuition fees because other
support mechanisms have not been introduced. Education has therefore been
commoditised by the replacement of the merit-based selection mechanism with
selection based on financial criteria. This transition has excluded students from
vulnerable groups, low-income families and families in the lower social class.
In line with Guo (2005), my survey data shows that China’s educational policy
has not improved chances for disadvantaged groups to advance to a higher level of
education. Therefore, students living in poor areas are often forced to abandon further
education if their parents cannot borrow the large amounts of money required to
support them, resulting in a shortage of intellectuals and consequently exacerbating
the poverty trap. A typical example of such a situation can be found in Gulang County
in Gansu (see Case 7-1). However, for many Chinese people, access to higher
education is still a matter that transcends individual circumstances. This is mainly due
to the influence of traditional Confucian values (Cummings, 1996). For example,
when I asked survey participants about their views of education, over 85% of them
stated that they strongly encourage their children to gain as good an education as
possible without considering the cost. Many mentioned the traditional proverb
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‘Education is always more of a priority than anything else in one’s whole life’ (万般
皆下品，唯有读书高)’. Mr. Zhang was one of them:
‘I hope that my children can go to university and that they will have a bright
future. I know I might not be able to afford the tuition fee. However, I will support
them even if there I have to sell every family possession’ (Zhang-48-M-R-Peasant-
Liangzhou).
7.4.1 Case 7-1: Education fees, medical fees and inequality
Mr. Yang lives in the countryside in Gulang County, Gansu province, and is a
typical rural peasant in north China (Figure 7.20). His income is above the average,
according to his own assessment. His income comes from raising pigs, growing
vegetables in his greenhouse and doing part-time, low-level jobs in the local building
trade. He raises 100 pigs every year and sells around ten pigs each month, from which
he makes an annual profit of 8000 to 10000 RMB. The vegetables he plants in his
greenhouse include peppers; tomatoes and so on, which bring him around 10000
RMB per year (see Figure 7- 21). Occasionally, if he is free, he accepts invitations to
help build farmers’ houses or work on local roads, at a standard local rate of 60-70
RMB per day. Therefore, his total income is around 35000 RMB per year. His
family’s top two expenditures are education and healthcare fees. He has three children:
his eldest son, now 20 years old, has a serious heart disease; and his two younger sons
are university students. Every year, the tuition fees and living costs of the two
students totals 15000 RMB. He has already spent50000 RMB on his eldest son’s heart
surgery and expects more medical fees. He commented that:
‘Normally, in my village, people who are elderly, have too many children or are
not good at farm work, are very poor. However, my family is pulled into poverty
because of the children’s university fees and surgery fees. The university only offers
my children 3000 RMB of financial aid each per year. And the government only
provides each person with 48 RMB per year under the Rural Cooperative Medical
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Schemes. This is like a drop in the bucket. So I have to pay all the tuition fees and
medical fees myself. I have already used up all my savings and have started to
borrow money from my relatives.’
Figure 7- 21: Mr. Yang and the author (Source, author)
Figure 7- 22: Mr. Yang’s greenhouse (Source, author)
In China, many people are experiencing similar problems. Before the initiation of
the Reform in 1978, everyone received free higher education and healthcare. However,
following the initiation of the Reform in 1978, people have to pay near to the full cost
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of their higher education and medical fees. With tuition and medical fees soaring, the
cost of education and healthcare has become a major burden for ordinary people.
However, it is true that in China education can help children from disadvantaged
backgrounds to change their status in society: since the initiation of the Reform in
1978, upward social mobility has become a common phenomenon (see Case 7.2).
Beller and Hout (2006) explore how education polices affect social mobility using
cross-national data. Hannum (2005) has presented constructive insights into the
origins and current trends of inequality in Chinese education. However, there is a
notable lack of analytical frameworks connecting educational inequality and social
mobility. According to my survey, it is worth noting, common to all industrial
societies. Rates of inter-generational mobility have generally become more
considerable over time. It is now far more common for children to enter the workforce
at a much higher position than their parents attained when they started work (Wu,
2007). The reason for this is that since 1978, China has come to place greater
emphasis on formal qualifications, which have expanded educational provision over
the past thirty years. University degrees therefore play a key role for upward social
mobility.
7.4.2 Case 7-2: Example of upward social mobility via education
Chen Yingdi is a 77-year-old woman from Hubei. Her family members, including
children and parents, have been actively helping each other in almost every possible
way. Before 1949, Mrs. Chen’s father was a capitalist, owning several trucks used for
transporting goods and passengers, etc. She was educated in a religious school run by
American Christian missionaries, which only children from wealthy families could
afford to attend. However, after 1949, all their private property was appropriated by
the CCP. Her father was incarcerated during the ‘Three Anti and Five Anti
movement’ in 1951 and 1952 (see section 4.2 for details), where he died aged 52 from
a high fever without receiving proper or timely treatment. After her father’s death, the
family had no income. Mrs. Chen became a child labourer when she was 11 years old
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in order to support the family as she had two younger brothers to look after. Since
then, she has had no opportunity to participate in full-time education. As she was so
keen on learning, she attended an evening school operated by the local government.
Mrs. Chen also has very strong family values: she gave one third of her salary to her
mother even after getting married, and financially helped to raise her two younger
brothers until they both went to university. She has three children born in 1960, 1963
and 1967 and holds a strong belief that ‘education is very important for children’s
careers and futures’. All her children went to university and became a professor,
lawyer and government officer respectively. She felt very lucky that tuition fees were
free twenty years ago; otherwise she would not have been able to afford them. She
worked for SOE as a worker for forty years and her pension is only 1000 RMB per
month. Fortunately, every month her children give her 3000 RMB, which makes her
life very comfortable. Yet, many of her friends and colleagues are not so lucky. As a
rule, if their children did not attend university they were unable to find a professional
job. Most of them have had to stay in the same or a similar SOE to their parents, or
have been laid off as a result of the large number of SOE bankruptcies in the 1990s.
Consequently, many of these parents have had to use their pensions to support their
adult children and even grandchildren. Mrs. Chen said that, ‘knowledge is vitally
important to our family’s fate’, and that education can indeed help children from
disadvantaged backgrounds to attain a higher status in society.
Upward social mobility has therefore become a common phenomenon in China
and it is this form of mobility that education encourages, rather than downward social
mobility. One possible cause of this trend is that technological changes have
expanded the number of jobs in the service sector while the demand for unskilled
manual labour has declined. Similarly, in China it is noticeable that the generation
born in the 1960s has had greater access to high-status jobs than their parents and,
therefore, some degree of upward mobility is inevitable. The mere existence of
upward mobility in turn indicates the existence of an open class system in the 1980s
245
and 1990s, following which a considerable number of people have moved upward
from lower to higher classes (Bian, 2002).
However, it has become more and more difficult for people to move between
classes under the current Chinese educational system. The existing socio-economic
disparities in education are likely to block the channels through which children from
disadvantaged backgrounds can move up to the higher social classes (Waters, 2006).
According to my field survey, the children of peasants and workers are increasingly
excluded from upward social mobility.
Figure 7- 23: Number of university graduates between 1977 and 2010(Source: author)
The main reason for this is that there has been an expansion in university
provision since 1999and the numbers of graduates are soaring (see Figure 7- 23).
Iannelli and Paterson (2007) explain that the role of education in promoting social
mobility may relate to employers’ recruitment processes. Consequently, the soaring
number of university graduates results in a highly competitive job market and
education and qualifications no longer guarantee a highly paid job. Therefore,
compared to their parents’ generation, upward social mobility is becoming more
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difficult for those people born in the 1980s and 1990s. Mr. Wang expressed the
confusion he felt after graduating from university:
‘Originally, I believed that knowledge could change my fate. Now, I know that
finding a good job doesn’t depend on your ability and knowledge but the power and
the social network of your father. As the child of a peasant, how can I move my social
class upward if I cannot even find a job in the city?’(Wang-22-M-U-Student-
Liangzhou).
The inequalities between the different age groups are very significant. For
example, Mr. Shi and his eldest son are peasants. His niece, younger son and eldest
grandson were university students.
‘After graduating from university, my niece became a high-ranking cadre in the
1980s and now belongs to the upper class; my younger son found a job in a state-
owned bank in the 1990s and belongs to the middle class. But, nowadays, my
grandson could not find a job in the city’ (Shi-65-M-R-Peasant-Jinchang).
Notwithstanding such unjust phenomena in education, all participants in my
focus groups admitted that the overall quality of education has improved dramatically
since the initiation of economic reform in 1978. As Figures 7- 17, 7- 18 and 7- 19
evidently show, fiscal investment in school buildings and facilities varies wildly
between rural and urban areas. However, although Gansu, Hubei and Guangdong
provinces are exceedingly far away from each other, there is not much difference
between the city-level schools in terms of building conditions, teacher qualifications
and other facilities (see Figure 7- 24 and Figure 7- 25). This is because the central
government’s educational endowments were evenly spread across all regions after the
initiation of the Reform in 1978. Another reason for such consistency is the
commercialisation of the education system across the whole of China. In particular,
all educational institutes above secondary school level receive high tuition fees from
students, which enable them to accumulate capital and continuously improve their
247
conditions. Tuition fees aside, these institutions also demand other fees, such as the
‘voluntary’ donation which creates another large burden for many families.
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Figure 7- 24: Secondary school (top: old campus, bottom: new campus) in Wuchang, Hubei
Province (Source: author)
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Figure 7- 25: Secondary school (top: old campus, bottom: new campus) in Boluo, Guangdong
Province (Source, author)
Access to education has been widely established as a human right to which
everyone is entitled. Under calls for universal education, nations throughout the world
have become more devoted to the promotion of educational equality (UNESCO,
1990). However, since the Chinese educational reform in the 1990s, education has
become more like an investment than a public good, which has caused great
250
inequality in education and reinforced the effects of social exclusion. My field survey
reveals that the educational inequalities experienced between different age groups,
between urban and rural areas and between social classes are significant and become
more pronounced above secondary school level. Educational attainment may no
longer significantly correlate with upward social mobility.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has dealt with several key sociological issues, namely birth control
policy, social stratification and the role of education in promoting social mobility. The
results from the field survey confirm that the transition from a planned to a market
economy is likely to increase social inequality between places, urban and rural
regions and different groups of people (Chen and Li, 2010; Hu, 2001). In sum, China’
s birth control policy has reduced population fertility but it has also generated an
ageing society and gender imbalance. Social stratification is still forming within
China ’ s transitional society and education has lost its importance within social
mobility processes.
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Chapter 8 Geospatial Analysis of Political Policy
and Corruption
8.1 Introduction
Over the past three decades, economic growth in China has meant that hundreds
of millions of Chinese people have been lifted out of absolute and relative poverty
(see Chapter Six), which has led to radical changes in every aspect of Chinese society
as a growing middle class has emerged (see Chapter Seven). Persistent and widening
socio-economic inequalities continue to exist amongst different regions, different
groups of people and between urban and rural areas (Li and Wei, 2010; Fan and Sun,
2008; Chen and Fleisher, 1996). However, compared with this rapid and effective
economic reform, political reform in China has been smaller in scope and slower in
implementation.
As an extra-legal political party, the CCP is committed to preserving an
everlasting power monopoly (Wu, 2005). Individual rights such as free speech and
political participation are not embraced by the political system (Goel and Nelson,
2005). The political atmosphere has remained largely unchanged and has even
become more charged under the new Chinese leader, Xi Jinping. For example, the
Supreme Court (2013) has released a judicial interpretation of criminal law stating
that anyone who advances opinions which seriously endanger social order and
national interests via internet channels and which receive over 5000 hits or 500 shares
will be jailed. This regulation has limited the range of ideas expressed in the public
sphere and statements pertaining to anti-corruption via internet platforms such as
Twitter. Fewsmith (2013) has pointed out that the new leaders of the CCP are unlikely
to launch large-scale political reform and restructure the political system. Therefore,
the tightening of political power does prevent (even limited) political reform in the
future.
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The longevity of China’s current political system is understood to depend on the
sustainability of its successful economic transition. However, researchers have
brought this argument into question, particularly in recent times. Montinola et al.
(1995) argue that the Chinese political system shares much in common with Western
federal states. The Chinese approach to the federal political system provides
considerable support for China’s economic reforms. Shirk (1993) explain that there is
social support for China’s current political order. However, Goel and Nelson (2005)
and Fewsmith (2013) have pointed out that, under the current Chinese political system,
the method of governance faces rigorous challenges from the disparities in
bureaucratic rank, legal implementation and ideology. These disparities have the
potential to have a negative effect on political stability, social uniformity and
economic development. Therefore, in this chapter I use field survey data from five
Chinese counties to address these inter-related concerns. Section 2 presents how the
participants understand the various challenges faced by the government. Section 3
explains how political centralisation and preferential policies shape inequality
between regions, between urban-rural locales and between different ethnic groups.
Section 4 analyses why corruption has become such a pressing concern in China and
interrogates the spatiality of corruption.
8.2 Participants' Understanding of China’s Challenges
The statistical data show that great socio-economic disparities exist in China
between different regions, urban and rural communities, and the rich and the poor (see
Chapters Five). It has been widely debated whether these disparities pose a threat to
China’s future stability. Zhang et al. (2008) question whether such a long period of
high economic growth can be sustainable. Fleisher (2006) and Knight (2008) believe
that major inequalities will affect China’s economic, social and political stability in
the future. In contrast, Kanbur et al. (2005) believe that China will be able to maintain
its rapid economic growth and keep the disparities under control. Knight and
Gunatilaka (2010) consider that a new, wealthy generation will raise the bar for the
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less prosperous. However, Jun (2006) warns that growing inequalities will eventually
affect China’s economic and social stability, and envisages that China’s economy will
soon collapse. These questions are becoming a matter of grave concern as well as
posing both a theoretical and a practical challenge. More recently, and Fewsmith
(2013) pointed out under the current Chinese political system, the method of
governance and resultant disparities have the potential to have a negative effect on
political stability, social uniformity and economic development. The Chinese
government has admitted that such disparities exist in China between different regions,
urban and rural communities, and the rich and poor. Thus, the ideology of the latest
two Five-Year Plans (the 12th and the 13th) has changed emphasis from ‘getting rich
first’ to ‘common prosperity’ (Fan, 2006), in order to maintain sustainable and
harmonious development. In line with these debates, my field survey show how
participants understand China’s challenges.
The participants of three focus groups in Liangzhou ranked five challenges
currently faced by the government in order of importance. Figure 8- 1 lists these
challenges as follows: 1. struggles for independence in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, 2.
Natural Disasters, 3. Corruption, 4. Socio-economic Inequality, and 5. Other or no
challenges. Then, questionnaires were conducted in five counties according to the
order. The results show that36% of participants think the most important factor
affecting social stability is corruption and 32% of participants believe the most
important factor the government ought to tackle is worsening inequality. Only 8% of
participants consider territorial integrity to be the most important challenge (shown in
Figure 8- 1). The results of these questionnaires reflect the potential of corruption and
social-economic disparity to cause political crisis.
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Figure 8- 1: Challenges facing the government (Source: author)
Therefore, my research shows that a large percentage of participants regard
corruption and socio-economic inequality as the two most pressing challenges:
‘Corruption and inequality are big challenges for our government. If they do not
act seriously against corruption and alleviate the socio-economic disparities, the
community party might lose their political power’ (Yuan-35-M-U-Journalist -Boluo).
My research also revealed the severity of the corruption. For example, the fact
that an official cadre position is a purchasable post is an 'open' secret.
‘There is a saying in Jinchang that to register as a potential official, one needs to
spend around 5000 RMB , but in order to get appointed, one has to pay 10,000 to
100,000 RMB . The appointment of the vice mayor of Jinchang costs 400,000 RMB ’
(Wang-70-M-U-Retired-Jinchang).
Therefore, in line with participants' understanding of the various challenges
facing the government, section 8.3 analyses the key political reasons underlying
inequality and in particularly analyses how preferential policies affect ethnic groups.
Section 8.4 investigates why corruption is so severe and explores the spatiality of
corruption.
255
There are noticeable discrepancies in the empirical results gathered in the three
different provinces in which this study was conducted (Hubei, Gansu and Guangdong
provinces). Out of all the provinces, Hubei demonstrated the smallest percentage of
respondents considering the claims for independence in Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan as
a major influence on social stability. This can be explained by its location: Hubei is an
inner province of China, and its inhabitants have not had immediate contact with the
voices that demand independence. Naturally, therefore, they only exhibit a modest
concern about such threats. However, in Gansu province, which is in close to Xinjiang
and Tibet, and Guangdong province, close to Taiwan, there are more individuals from
ethnic minorities either involved in or vigorously supporting independence-orientated
activities, such as the denouncement of preferential policies and the direction of anger
towards not only the government but also ordinary Han Chinese inhabitants (Björn
and Li, 2003). Therefore, people living in these two provinces are greatly concerned
about the threats such actions pose to social stability. The second greatest cause for
concern in Gansu province is corruption, which could be explained by the fact that the
province has many poor areas with lower standards of governmental administration,
and in which corruption is widespread (Dewoskin and Stone, 2006). Finally,
Guangdong province has the highest percentage of replies in the ‘other or no
challenges ’ category. The majority of population in the province is sufficiently
wealthy and their satisfaction with their current quality of life is illustrated by the fact
that many of my respondents were unable to think of a single challenge that might
pose a threat to their lifestyle.
8.3 Preferential Policies and Inequality
As Ding (2005) argues, the development model in China is based on the concept
of political centralisation, which enables the central government to introduce
preferential policies in support of development in particular sectors or economic
growth in particular areas, and to favour a particular group of people to ‘get rich first’.
The most common of these is that the coastal provinces have been the beneficiaries of
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preferential policies from the central government (Démurger, Sachs and Hu, 2002).
Also, compared to rural residents, urban residents have benefited from central
government policies (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010b). In addition, central government
policies favour the minority ethnic groups rather than the Han (Mackerras, 2005). The
challenge for the government is how to maintain the imbalance between coastal and
inland provinces, urban and rural residents, and minority ethnic groups and Han
Chinese. HuKou is an instrument to block the free flow of resources (including labour)
between agriculture and industry and between cities and the countryside (Wu and
Treiman, 2007) (see section 7.3.1for more detail).
8.3.1 Preferential Policies between Locations
As the most important cause of regional inequalities, preferential policies were
investigated in section 5.3. From the field survey data, it is worth noting that public
infrastructure policies also play an important role in regional development and
disparity at the county level. Prior to reform, public infrastructure was evenly
distributed across the regions in China. However, after reform, central government
built infrastructure mainly in coastal provinces according to its biased regional
development policy. Démurger (2001), Fleisher and Chen (1997), Mody and Wang
(1997) find that infrastructure investment in roads, railways, waterways and telephone
networks have had significant and positive effects on growth for seven coastal
provinces. The coastal Guangdong province was the first province chosen to test these
preferential policies and it received enormous benefits in the form of public
infrastructure (Démurger et al., 2002b).
However, as a western province, public infrastructure is unevenly distributed
across Gansu. This is due to the fact that different local authorities have had different
capacities to invest in public infrastructure since the Reform. For example, Liangzhou
County, a network centre for local transportation, has a long railway (Gansu
Statistical Yearbook, 2007). In Jinchang, a wealthy county, the density of first-class
roads (highways) is 372km per 1000 km2, well above the national average of 237km
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(Jingchuan Statistical Yearbook, 2006) (see Figure 8- 2). In Gulang, a poor county,
the density of first-class roads is only 23km per 1000km2 (Wuwei Statistical
Yearbook, 2003) (see Figure 8- 3). The development of public infrastructure is an
important determinant of local economic growth across regions. This is vividly
confirmed by my field observations: at Gulang, characterised mainly by hills and
mountains, many of the remote villages have no vehicular access. We had to leave our
car and walk long distances to interview peasants. I was told by Mr. Wang Fusheng
(peasant, 58) that the cost of transporting crops and fruit to market is very high,
meaning that peasants are unable to profit if they fail to sell their products at a
reasonable price. Thus, peasants must work very hard to grow economically viable
crops, especially fruit and vegetables such as Solamwnmuiealnm, which was recently
introduced to China from Peru.
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Figure 8- 2: First-class road in Jinchang (Source: author)
Figure 8- 3: Road in Gulang (Source: author)
Furthermore, the policy of fiscal decentralisation plays a key role in county-level
government development. For example, Guangdong province’s tax contract was
individually negotiated with the central government within a complex (province-
specific) revenue-sharing formula. The Guangdong provincial government then
negotiated individual revenue contracts with the Boluo local government. The
marginal tax rate lay down by the central government varied considerably across
provinces and Guangdong province and the Boluo local government have
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considerably more tax revenue than local governments in inland and western China.
As the result, the tax rate for FDI is lower in Boluo than in Wuchang, Jinchang,
Liangzhou and Gulang.
Therefore, these preferential policies have had an important impact on
interprovincial inequality and have specifically enabled the residents of Boluo to
become richer than those in the other four counties (Ying, 1999). All participants in
my focus groups acknowledged that Guangdong province swiftly grasped the
opportunities available, enabling it to have a higher per capita income than Hubei and
Gansu provinces and to become the richest province overall (with the highest GDP).
Consequently, labourers from middle regions of China, such as Hubei, Hunan and
Sichuan, flow into Guangdong seeking better jobs and higher earnings. With
economic development and FDI accelerating, it is estimated that there are thousands
of company villages in Guangdong (Bao, 2006).
8.3.2 Preferential Policies between Urban and Rural Regions
As Zhang (2008) suggest, the urban-industrial sector has been a development
priority of the early PRC. This meant government jobs (and related welfare) and food
for all urban residents, but left the rest of the rural population fundamentally outside
governmental support. Before 1978, the government considered urban areas to be
state developmental priorities and their residents automatically became the state’s
responsibility. The government budget provided urban areas with housing, food,
water, sewage disposal, employment, schools, transportation, medical facilities, police
protection, etc. (Yao et al, 2005; Knight and Song, 1999). However, the countryside
received none of these benefits, nor any of the other fundamental services and welfare
entitlements regularly provided to urban residents. Rural residents have relied on the
highly differentiated resources allocated by self-reliant rural communities (villages) or
their collective sub-units (production teams) (Gustafsson and Li, 2002). All
participants in my focus groups acknowledged that urban areas greatly benefited from
the preferential policies and that this privilege provided urban areas with much more
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developed infrastructure and industrialisation. In addition to fiscal transfers, urban
state sectors are also given preferential credit allocations, causing a redistribution of
income in favour of urban areas. As a result, urban preferential fiscal and monetary
policies have led to a steady increase in rural-urban inequality, which has made a
significant contribution to rising inequality in China since 1985 (World Bank, 2011;
Zhou, 2009; Khan and Riskin, 2005; Yao et al., 2005; Lu, 2002).
However, the following case study provides a different perspective, showing the
ways in which a village company in Boluo, Guangdong province has been governed
by a self-reliant rural village. It also shows how the per capita income of the village
residents and their welfare are similar to, or even in excess of urban residents in
Gulang, Gansu province.
8.3.3 Case 8-1: Company village governance in Boluo, Guangdong
province
Chen Jiao is a female peasant in Boluo, Guangdong. Like most women living in
Guangdong province, she does not need to work because her family has enough
money for her to stay at home to take care of her family and play Ma Jiong in her
spare time. China’s preferential policy has brought remarkable benefits and wealth to
the people of Guangdong. Mrs. Chen lives in Boluo, near to the city of Guangzhou,
and her land has been rented by a FDI enterprise which intends to build a factory there.
Of the 1000mu (a mu is a traditional unit of land area in China, equating to about
666.6m2) of land in the village, 900mu have been rented out. The village is governed
like a company. As the land is owned collectively by the villagers (consisting of 250
households), no one villager has the power to make an individual decision about the
lease of their land. Rather, the village cadres act like company managers who decide
how to lease the land. At the end of each year, the village cadres distribute the rental
income to households as dividends according to the official register of villagers. In the
present economic climate, each villager could get around 10000 RMB per year. The
status of being an officially registered villager is transferred through a patriarchal
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system; women can only gain dividends through her husband’s family. Like most of
the inhabitants of Guangdong, Chen Jiao is very appreciative of Deng Xiaoping’s
open-door policy. However, before 1978, people’s living conditions were very low.
People in her village had insufficient food and clothes and most young men went to
Hong Kong as illegal immigrants, leaving behind women and children as well as the
old, weak, unwell and disabled. Chen Jiao’s husband is lame so he stayed behind and
eventually became the head of the village. In Chen Jiao’s words, 'Time can change
our direction in life dramatically (30 年河东，30 年河西)'. Those who risked their
lives to travel illegally to Hong Kong have had mixed fortunes. Some of them died at
sea while swimming across the strait in the dark; others were shot dead by soldiers at
the border. Although most finally reached Hong Kong, they were then unable to find
good jobs. When China opened the door in 1978 they returned to visit and seemed to
be much wealthier than those who had remained behind. However, 30 years later,
their living conditions are worse: 'They have to work really hard to make a living.
Their apartments (flats) are tiny in Hong Kong. They do not receive a very large
pension'. In contrast, villagers such as Chen Jiao do not need to work hard as every
year, they receive dividends. Chen Jiao also runs a shop which sells every day
necessities to workers. Villagers also have a large house and a car, as well as a private
pension, so they do not need to worry about money when they get old. The village
society is very friendly and everybody knows one another. Residents obey the one-
child policy but if a villager does disobey the policy, the whole family loses five
years’ worth of dividends and is also fined. The village cadre will also issue a warning
if anyone violates local regulations or customs, such as gambling, fighting or arguing
with others, or disrespecting parents or the elder generation. After several warnings,
the offender’s dividends will be reduced. Thanks to these measures, the village
society is dominated by a friendly, polite and harmonious environment. Village cadres
are elected by all villagers and every villager has the right to vote on important issues.
Although village cadres have power, Chen Jiao does not think they misuse it.
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This example demonstrates that, following economic reform in 1978, the great
division between urban and rural regions could no longer be maintained because the
income of rural residents of coastal provinces accelerated beyond that of urban
residents in the middle and western provinces.
8.3.4 Preferential Policies between Ethnic Groups
Björn and Li (2003) argue that minorities in China have historically faced
obstacles to status attainment, including geographic remoteness, poverty, language
and cultural barriers. China ’ s 55 minority ethnic groups, which include Muslim,
Mongolian, Tibetan and Uruguay (Xingjiang), comprise 2% of the population.
Ninety-eight per cent of population is Han Chinese, who originally inhabited China’s
central territory (China statistical yearbook, 2007). Rising regional and rural-urban
inequalities have had a negative impact on minorities because most minorities live in
remote rural China (Björn and Ding, 2009). However, reform era preferential policies
implemented by central government aim to promote the overall development of
minority ethnic groups, many of which are vastly superior to the policies to which the
Han Chinese are subjected (Postiglione, 1992). For example, the one-child policy only
applies to Han Chinese, while those from ethnic minorities can have up to three
children (Fong, 2004); minorities tend to be promoted to high-level positions more
easily than Han Chinese in a work unit; and the children of ethnic minorities need
lower examination scores to enrol into universities (Brown and Park, 2002). These
policies are meant to improve the population size, social status and educational
opportunities of ethnic minorities, which can in turn alleviate the poverty and
inequalities between them and the Han Chinese (Postiglione, 2010). However, in my
field survey such preferential policies were seen as discriminatory by Han Chinese
participants, especially in areas where mixed ethnic groups live together, such as in
Gansu province. There is a lot of sensitivity about ethnic different in Gansu and
conflicts occasionally occur, largely due to jealousy on the part of the Han Chinese.
Conflict also occurs when minorities demonstrate dissatisfaction and demand more
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benefits from central government, which in turn arouses hostile feelings among the
Han Chinese leading to protests and counter protests. As Mr. Zhang said:
‘I am Han ethnic. I think the preferential policies are fundamentally wrong, as it
has not only hurt the feelings of the Han, but discouraged minorities from working
hard’ (Wu-50-M-U-Doctor-Liangzhou).
However, although the minority ethnic groups have privileges in their careers,
education and birth rights, they are dissatisfied with the central government’s
religious policies because, as far as they are concerned, religious freedom is more
important. For example, Uncle Ma is a Muslim who owns a house similar to his Han
neighbour (see Figure 8- 4 and Figure 8- 5), and who makes a living by feeding cattle
(see Figure 8- 6). He is satisfied with his living conditions but disapproves of the
government’s religious policy because it is very strict. For example,
'During the cultural revolution, we were treated badly, being forced to raise pigs,
etc. But nowadays, the government policy is very fair to us, and I am not
discriminated against at all. We Muslims even have some privileges over Hans. I have
a nice house and enough money. But the government seems very nervous about seeing
us worship in mosque'(Ma-62-M-R-Peasant-Liangzhou).
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Figure 8- 4: Translator, Uncle Ma, his wife and author (Source: author)
Figure 8- 5: The first house from the left belongs to Uncle Ma (Source: author)
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Figure 8- 6: Uncle Ma's cattle (Source: author)
Uncle Ma is not the only person to complain about the government’s religious
policy. Most participants agreed that China ’ s economic development has greatly
improved people's livelihoods. However, compared to economic achievements,
beliefs and value systems are far from being the centre of attention. On the contrary,
they have been regularly attacked and challenged. The main reason for this is that
relations between religion and state power in China have long been contested (Gries
and Rosen, 2004). As a result, the socialist transformation and policies of political
monopoly challenged the social bases of Chinese folk religion during the Maoist
period (Figure 8- 7) and attacked organised religion (Potter, 2003). Although the
regime adopted a more tolerant perspective on religion in post-Mao China,
bureaucratic control of religion remains a major theme. According to party policy
Document 19, only five religions are recognised in China: ‘Buddhism, Daoism, Islam,
Catholicism and Protestantism’, ‘in an effort to exclude folk religions, superstition
and cults from protection’ (Overmyer, 2003). In addition, atheism was encouraged
and CCP members were strictly prohibited from believing or participating in religion;
this legislation was also used to control the educational system so as to marginalise
religious belief (Chan, 2005). As a result, it is not surprising that 98% of my field
survey participants have no religious beliefs and only 2% of participants identify with
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one of the five religions listed above, with most of these found in minority ethnic
groups.
Figure 8- 7: The scrapped ancestral hall in Boluo (Source: Author)
Religion’s ability to satisfy social and spiritual needs helps to reduce shock,
especially when it operates as consolation for socio-economic dislocation. With
economic reform, the Chinese state has supported economic opportunity for a few
privileged individuals and groups, leading to growing socio-economic inequality.
Although some informal networks and social safety nets are available in China,
religion provides an important source of comfort for the dispossessed. However,
partly because of bureaucratic control of the policy on religion, according to my field
survey results only one participant in Boluo believes in Catholicism, one living in
Wuchang believes in Buddhism and eight Muslimsin Gansu believe in Islam. My
field survey data shows that 46.7% of people belonging to an ethnic minority (7 out of
15) are atheists; while 99.6% of the Han ethnic group (2 out of 485) are atheist. The
result reflects a number of interesting points. First, overall, the high percentage of
atheists arises from the fact that government policy strictly controls religions. Second,
in Boluo and Wuchang, all participants interviewed in my field survey are majority
ethnic Han people because most ethnic minorities settled down in the western part of
China. Thus, atheists are much more numerous in these two counties than in the three
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counties studied in Gansu. Third, Boluo was opened up by the Second Opium War
(since 1880) when Catholicism was introduced (Dean, 2003), so it is not surprising
that a county-level Catholic church was built there (see Figure 8- 8). In contrast,
Wuchang is situated in the middle of China so traditional Buddhism is similarly
popular there (see Figure 8- 9). Finally, at present there are two main Muslim minority
ethnic groups in Gansu: Hui and Dongxiang (see Figure 8- 10). Respectively, they
represent 0.74% (c. 9.6 million people) and 0.03% (c. 0.39 million people) of the
national population (Israeli, 2002). In Gansu, therefore, more minority ethnic
participants, from either the Hui or Dongxiang groups, took part in this investigation.
Figure 8- 8: Christian church in Boluo (Source: author)
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Figure 8- 9: Buddhist temple in Wuchang (Source: author)
Figure 8- 10: Muslim mosque in Jinchang (Source: author)
In Gansu, the two main Muslim minority ethnic groups show certain differences.
To a great extent, Hui Muslims have adopted many aspects typical of the Han Chinese,
including language and lifestyle. The Hui people speak the Chinese language and
have adopted most of the cultural practices of the Han. In contrast, the Dongxiang
have their own spoken language (which sounds similar to Turkish) although Chinese
is their written language and most of them are able to speak Chinese. It is also well
known that the patriarchal Islamic religion is traditional in families among both Hui
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and Dongxiang groups (Chau, 2010). This means that, ideologically, both groups
retain their own distinct traditions, especially in areas of Muslim concentration.
‘I am a heavy smoker and drinker like other Han Chinese. According to Islamic
principles, smoking and drinking alcohol is strictly forbidden. But I have only broken
some light principles; it doesn’t mean that I am not a faithful Muslim. However, I
don’t eat pork and abide to other key Islamic principles’ (Ma-52-M-U-Professor-
Liangzhou).
‘I could not strictly abide to the tradition of the Ramadan; otherwise I would not
have the energy and strength to work or do other routine activities required by my job.
I pray at home and work whenever I feel like it. I do occasionally go to the mosque
(Figure 8- 10) to pray, but not regularly, because my work doesn’t allow me to have
that amount of spare time’(Xin-47-F-U-Businesswoman-Jinchang).
On the whole, minority ethnic groups such as the Hui and Dongxiang appear to
be satisfied with the central government’s policy in terms of career, education and
birth rights. However, in the context of gradual social liberalisation, the bureaucratic
control of religion faces an enormous challenge. The policy is seen by many people as
interfering in deeply personal matters. In addition, the policies aimed at controlling
religious practices have been widely criticised around the world for restricting human
rights, as a result of China’s expanding participation in the world economy. Therefore,
China requires a new policy on religious belief; a system which enables the
government to maintain adequate authority to ensure political control while also
presenting an image of tolerance.
8.4 Corruption
Tanzi (1998: 564) defines corruption as 'the abuse of public power for private
beneﬁt'. This definition is also the one used by the World Bank (Tanzi, 2001).
Corruption occurs in almost all societies but for different reasons and with varying
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consequences (Blackburn and Sarmah, 2008; Björnskovand Paldam, 2004; World
Bank, 1997; Adesand Di Tella, 1996). Today, endemic corruption in regional and
local government has been cited by the Chinese people, including CCP leaders. As
shown by the survey results in section 8.2, denying corruption would see it become a
fatal problem for China ’ s economy and society (Dewoskin and Stones, 2006; He,
2000). The CCP’s new leader, Xi Jinping (2012), warned that, ‘a large number of
cases show that corruption is unbearable and it will eventually destroy the CCP and
subjugate the nation’. Dongand Torgler (2012) associates corruption in China with
two general practices of local cadres: the practice of using their positions to extract
bribes (also see Gong, 1994) and the practice of misappropriating public property or
public funds for personal beneﬁt. For local inhabitants, the idea that cadres use public
funds to obtain generous housing and luxury cars or to travel abroad causes particular
cynicism. One participant, Mr Li, asserted that:
'Our village is poor but all cadres are embezzlers (无官不贪).They have power,
which they exchange forgery income in addition to their salaries. For example, our
village cadres embezzle our land compensation. The village received 110,000 RMB
compensation per mu of land from the central government but the cadres only gave us
70,000 RMB per mu. Our village party secretary is a very wealthy person, who owns
a big restaurant [see Figure 8- 11] and two cars'(Li-50-M-R-Peasant-Liangzhou).
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Figure 8- 11: The village party secretary's restaurant (Source: author)
8.4.1 Determinants of Corruption
Public opinion surveys in China and studies by international organisations
confirm that corruption is deeply rooted and widespread (Chen and Yin, 2008).
According to Yao (2002), in China corruption is caused by the Chinese political
system which shields the privileged. Wu Qinglian (2008) has also pointed out that
widespread corruption is generated by China ’ s political and economic system.
Duanmu (2011) observes that the cause of China’s current corruption problems is the
‘lack of separation between business and government brought about by efforts to open
up the Chinese economy’. It is worth noting that the ‘Princelings’ (太子党) (the most
privileged group in China) have led to widespread corruption and seize almost all the
wealth created by ordinary Chinese people. Princelings are a tiny percentage of the
offspring of the top CCP leaders and their former subordinates. They enjoy various
privileges, from entering the top universities to choosing the best occupations. Very
often, they have extensive social networks and may be selected as ‘successors’ by the
top leaders of the CCP, securing their monopoly of power (Yao, 2002). Although a
period of training and practice is necessary for these Princelings before they proceed
to their high-ranking posts, they dominate the central committee of the CCP and many
of its organisations and important governmental departments. With the exception of a
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small minority, all the highest-ranked officials in central government are members of
this privileged class, including current President of China, Xi Jinping (the son of
former Vice Premier Minister Xi Zhongxun), military generals such as Liu Yuan (the
son of former President of China Liu Shaoqi), provincial government officials such as
Shanxi Province Governor Li Xiaopeng (the son of former Premier Minister Li Peng)
and major SOE controllers such as China Power International Development Limited
Corporation CEO Li Xiaoling (the daughter of former Premier Minister Li Peng). In
the case of the latter, corruption has specifically Chinese characteristics because this
privileged group member uses his state-owned resources to do business through back
doors (开后门), work for himself, accumulate huge wealth and pay no tax against the
unrecorded grey income (灰色收入). Situations like this lead to widespread inequality
because ordinary people must bribe these high-ranked officials in order to do business
with them. Otherwise, any request could be denied by these officials even if the
request is within their duty. As Professor Wang state:
‘As China’s economy grows in the reform, many of the privileged group members
have learned how to utilise their monopoly power in the market. They became price
searchers, demanding higher and higher bribes for doing business with ordinary
people. The bribes could be very substantial amount of money and privately are
called ‘grey income’’ (Wang-45-M-U-Professor-Wuchang).
Gong (2006:87) pointed out 'opportunities for corruption arise to a very great
extent because the administrative controls still remain in the Chinese economy and
because the government of the PRC has not yet established mechanisms for
preventing the abuse of these controls'. In addition, there is only a low probability of
corruption leading to prosecution. Each year, there are more than 700,000 reports of
corruption received by the central government (He, 2000) yet only a handful of
ministerial-level officials have been convicted of corruption. Dr. Cui Zhiyuan (2010)
states that corruption is caused by the capitalist market mechanisms introduced by
China’s open-door policy. He argues that China’s rapid economic development over
the last twenty years has actually benefited from the solid economic foundation laid in
273
Mao’s era while inflation and corruption are the direct consequences of economic
reform. However, this argument is not well supported by the evidence collated during
my field survey; the majority of the my participants, including many unemployed
workers, were quick to recall the human impact of economic and political movements
such as the Great Leap Forward and the Great Cultural Revolution. The participants
stressed their dislike of corruption and dissatisfaction with the current economic
situation which, it could be suggested, has some historical precedence in the manner
in which Mao’s government protected privilege.
However, there are many diverse views among scholars when it comes to the
fundamental cause of corruption. Goel and Nelson (2010) used cross-country data for
about 100 nations and found that corruption is determined by historical factors,
geographic inﬂuences and the role of government. Similarly, Li and Wu (2007) hold
the view that corruption is rooted deeply in Chinese history and culture. They argue
that in several Asian countries, including China, the real source of corruption is a long
tradition of placing personal connections above the law (Pei, 2001). This implies that
no matter what political system China chooses, the problem of corruption is inevitable.
The CCP cadres and business leaders who took part in my study showed support for
this theory but are unwilling to admit in public that corruption is a real problem,
doubtless because acceptance of the situation is necessary for survival. The view that
corruption has its root in culture occludes the fact that China has never adopted a
democratic political regime which, along with an independent legal system, has the
potential to alter the prevalence of corruption by engendering a cultural shift in
people’s attitudes and behaviour.
Indeed, corruption in China has cultural, historical and political system
antecedents. However, the question remains as to why ‘corruption is now worse than
during any other period since PRC was founded in 1949 ’ (Sun, 2004:122). It seems
that corruption is so severe partly because the whole country has sustained a money-
oriented elite and a focus on materialistic values without the balance of a moral
standard since the economic reform. As Chen (2005) said, money has replaced
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Marxism and become China’s new god. Monetary value is now unduly praised and
personal wealth has even been used as a means of judging an individual’s success
(Wedeman, 2004). In addition, the government encouraged the more commercialised
educational system in which access to schooling has become more and more
dependent on one’s family wealth. Therefore, money has become necessary for
success across the generations, so individuals are in turn now much more willing to
admit their self-centred motivations.
My field survey data is consistent with the increasing role that money and a
money-oriented life style play in Chinese aspiration. The survey is of particular
interest because it reveals an open willingness of citizens to acknowledge the rising
value of money, in comparison with other cherished values.
‘At present there is a popular saying: men with money become bad; women who
become bad can get money. More and more modern people are becoming slaves to
money.’(Li-38-F-U-Hairdresser-Liangzhou)
Money emerged as a central topic for discussion because it has become important
for success in almost every key area of social life, including schooling, employment,
marriage and healthcare. When asked about the importance of money in their social,
economic and personal life, only 3% of respondents said that it was not significant,
while 86% said that it had great importance and a further 11% claimed that it was all-
powerful and enough to ‘make a ghost turn a millstone’(Li-38-F-U-Hairdresser-
Liangzhou). Unsurprisingly, my field survey found that local residents were ambitious,
impatient, and dissatisfied with the pace of reform and its lack of a positive effect on
their own lives, especially in the case of younger participants. Rural young people
were willing to find non-agricultural jobs; school graduates were seeking meaningful
employment; and everyone was demanding higher salaries, an opportunity to develop
their skills and a higher social status. Thus, 80% of interviewees thought that
improving the socio-economic status of young people was important and 68% were
not satisfied with their own status. The dominant desire for economic success and
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status, combined with a general dissatisfaction with current conditions, influenced
their views on morality. Thus, although the participants criticise cadres’ behaviour of
corruption and bribery, when asked if they themselves would offer a bribe, 54% said
that they ‘most certainly would’.
8.4.2 Spatiality of Corruption
The previous section investigated the cultural, historical, economic, political and
ideological reasons behind corruption in China. Goel and Nelson (2008) identify the
geographical determinants of corruption. Mo (2001) used panel data from 61
countries and over a period of 20 years to show that economic growth and income
distribution have significant effects on regional differences of corruption. Graeff and
Mehlkop (2003) indicate the impact of economic freedom on corruption. For example,
FDI is attracted to areas that exhibit relatively high levels of government efficiency
and are strongly involved in the fight against corruption. Gong (2006) has reported a
significant negative influence of corruption on FDI. My field survey verifies the
existence of regional differences in the effects of local corruption on economic growth
and income distribution. For example, Boluo has two shoe factories which have
received foreign investment because the central government’s preferential policies
favour coastal areas of this kin. The higher economic growth and the increased levels
of FDI urge the local government to become more efficient and reduce the occurrence
of corruption, such as that of governmental officials asking for free business meals or
profiting from construction projects. However, it is extremely difficult to collect
evidence to evaluate the spatiality of corruption during field surveys because of the
highly confidential nature of the information. Case studies offer a greater chance for
observation.
Case 8-1 (see section 8.3.3) portrays how the village government cadres of Boluo
in Guangdong province distribute the revenue from leasing village lands and how the
village residents benefit from FDI. The following case study introduces a village
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cadre and her experiences of local governance in Wuchang in Hubei province (located
in the middle of China).
8.4.3 Case 8-2: village cadres and governance in Wuchang (Hubei
province)
Xin Ning is a female village cadre in Hubei. She is 45 and lives in a village on
the outskirts of Wuchang. Her good communication skills mean he has been a village
cadre for about twenty years, as a female representative in the village committee. Her
duties cover a wide range of issues related to women. For example, if a couple falls
pregnant in contravention of the one-child policy, her role is to negotiate with the wife
and persuade her to have an abortion. She said,
‘Normally I would let them know the policy and in the case that they insist on
having more children, the other cadres and I would ‘keep one eye closed’ and pretend
that we were not aware of it (睁一只眼闭一只眼). We are peasants and it is fully
understandable that people want more children. At the end of the day, those couples
with more than one child are obliged to pay a fine at a fixed rate. Cadres have more
power and because of this, more opportunities to have free meals and drinks. In China,
every problematic issue can be sorted out over the banquet table [implying the bribing
of cadres to open back doors]. Such sorts of phenomena are not considered to be
offences against the party’s regulations in our village.’
Cadres are elected by villagers. Xin Ning has been in this position for a long time.
She commented,
‘Locals know me very well, so I have been elected in every round of elections. It
is important that all cadres have a good relationship with the villagers. Otherwise,
nobody would vote for you. Before 1978, we were very poor because the
governmental policies restricted our initiatives. However, since the economic reform,
our country has implemented very good policies. We can raise as many pigs as we are
able to, grow any vegetables based on our own choices, and have the freedom to take
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any sort of part-time job in the city if we feel it is necessary. This area is very close to
the city so it is convenient for us to find a job there. On the other hand, we are trying
to find some investors who are willing to develop the tourism industry in our area so
that people from the city can come here to have fresh food and enjoy the beautiful
rural scenery [e.g., Figure 8- 12 shows a restaurant built in middle of a local lake].
Recently, it has been said that our land will be leased to a big industrial enterprise.
This means that we shall soon lose most of our land. However the government will
build apartments for us and will offer everyone 40 square metres of house for free and
an extra 20 square metres for a low price if requested’.
Xin Ning has a family of six, meaning that they could be given 360m2 in total;
constituting three apartments (see Figure 8- 13). These properties are worth a huge
amount of money considering the current high housing prices in China. On top of this,
the government will also compensate each person with 20,000 RMB. It is unlikely
that the young single inhabitants of the village would have chosen to stay in the
countryside working on the land anyway; most, if not all, would have preferred to go
to the city to find a better-paid job. Thus, every villager is happy with this
arrangement and the compensation offered.
However, if an individual spent all of their compensation and failed to find a
sustainable job, they would fall into difficulties. ‘Nevertheless, one good thing is that
if the land were successfully leased, all of us would become urban residents, and of
course, our village committee would automatically become an urban residential
management committee (Figure 8- 14). All of us would be entitled to the same social
welfare that normal urban residents have at the moment’, added Mrs. Xin.
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Figure 8- 12: Restaurant in the middle of a lake (Source: author)
Figure 8- 13: New apartments for villagers (Source: author)
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Figure 8- 14: Urban residential management committee office (Source: author)
The following case 8.3 illustrates how a peasant of Liangzhou in Gansu province
(located in western China) is angry about this village cadres' corrupt behaviour.
8.4.4 Case 8-3: the corruption of village cadres in Liangzhou (Gansu
province)
Figure 8- 15: Li Tiande’s house (Source: author)
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Li Tiande is a fifty-year-old male peasant living in the area between the urban
and rural regions of Liangzhou (see Figure 8- 15). Most of his land has been retrieved
by the local government to be used for other purposes, such as building motorways
and buildings for industrial development, leaving him with 266.64m2. The
compensation for land retrieval is 70,000 RMB for each mu. With this compensation
and the income generated from the remaining land, Li needed to support his two
children through their university studies, quite apart from other routine expenses. He
feels very hard done-by. Before his land was retrieved, he grew tomatoes and other
fruit and vegetables in a large greenhouse, which could bring him around 10,000
RMB in income per annum. Now, the average expenditure for inhabitants in this area
is much higher than before. Despite the fact that poor urban residents are often placed
in a more difficult situation than their counterparts in the countryside, some of the
rural peasants who have lost much of their land are working in the city as labourers.
However, as Li says with disappointment, ‘I can’t do the same, because nobody wants
a labourer who is older than 40.’ Li states that before 1978 his situation was ‘bad’ and
that the best period for him was between 1978 and the retrieval of his land; since then
he has been unhappy with his situation. He commented, ‘The village committee is just
like the mafia and there is no honest cadre among them. I would prefer to have the
land and even let it remain unused; I didn’t want it to be retrieved.’ When asked why
he felt this way, he spelled out that the compensation he had received was too low:
‘The government actually paid 110,000 RMB for each mu of land, but by the time this
money reached our hands through the local village committee, it had become 70,000
RMB, and we were oblivious as to where the rest of the money had gone.’ He
believes that this disappearance can be attributed to the corruption practised by the
cadres, saying that,
‘Corruption among our cadres is common. In our township, we have 4000
families, out of which five families are entitled to receive the Minimum Social
Welfare Support. In our village, we have 800 families and are entitled to one
allowance, but this didn’t go to the poorest family. Instead, it was given to one of the
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village cadre’s relatives. The village cadres are the richest people in the village, as
they all have their own businesses, such as shops, restaurants or construction teams.
Figure 8- 16 illustrates the house owned by the village party secretary. The village
party secretary is the most powerful person in the village. He has a good personal
relationship with his direct chief, the party secretary of the township. In every election
the township party secretary selects candidates for the village cadre posts and then the
candidates bribe electors for votes. Once elected, each cadre is entitled to a fixed
salary of around 4600 RMB per annum. We are not satisfied with what they are doing,
but what can we do? Cadres protect each other (官官相护)!’
Figure 8- 16: The village cadre’s house (Source: author)
When questioned about his household expenditure, he said that most of his
income went into his children’s education, healthcare and the savings he has set aside
for his son’s marriage. He has one son and one daughter and he spent all the land
compensation he was given on his children’s education. After his graduation, his son
found a job in Shanghai. Li proudly said that, ‘my son only keeps part of his salary,
enough to cover his living costs and sends 3000 RMB per month back to us.’ His
daughter has got a job in the local area and her salary only covers her own expenses;
she has no spare money to send to him. Luckily, all of Mr. Li’s family members are
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healthy and he has not spent much money on healthcare. When questioned about his
main concern at present, he said:
‘I feel very miserable about my future. Without land, I do not have any income. I
am getting older and older and cannot find a part time job as a peasant labourer. We
have lost our land, but we are not urban residents. My only hope is down to my
children. If they didn’t look after (give money to) us, the only way we could possibly
survive would be by becoming beggars’.
Cases 8-1, 8-2 and 8-3 indicate that the participants of Liangzhou (Gansu
province) were more intolerant of local cadres’ corrupt behaviour than those in
Wuchang and Boluo. As Mauro (1995) and Li et al., (2000) suggest, the higher the
economic growth and income distribution, the lower the incidence of corruption
across different regions. For example, in the poor village of Liangzhou, where much
of the farmland has been occupied for urban expansion, farmers who lost their land
were told that they would be fully compensated. However, it is often the case that
about half of the compensation is taken by village cadres. One participant showed me
that the best houses in the whole village belong to the head and party secretary of the
village. Villagers whispered that ‘the biggest mafia around is the village authority;
and the head and party secretary are the local evils’ (Wang, 2008). ‘Corruption is
everywhere. For example, they buy and sell cadres’ positions; and even the minimum
subsidence allowances go to cadres’ relatives, not to those who are in real need,’ Mr.
Zhang Qian (2008) said.
According to according to Ying’s own experiences, corruption spreads to all
levels of the government and:
‘The corruption of governmental official include taking free business meals;
getting profits through undertaking construction projects; colluding with the mafia;
involvement ingambling; obtaining governmental official posts through
bribery’(Ying-35-F-U-Businesswoman-Guangdong).
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According to He (2000), if corruption spreads to all levels of government, it
slows down economic development, creates political instability and could cause a
legitimacy crisis for the regime. Since 1978, the Chinese government has made efforts
to reduce corruption. It has re-established and improved various anti-corruption
agencies and institutions such as the central and local Commissions for Discipline
Inspection of CPC, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and local Procurators, the
Ministry of Supervision and its local branches, and the Anti-Corruption Work Bureau
(Liang, 1994: 391–417). According to Wedeman (2005), the Chinese government has
also launched anti-corruption campaigns and aims to punish a huge number of cadres
who violated party discipline or engaged in corrupt activities.
8.5 Conclusion
Démurger (2002a) suggests that inequality is a political problem because it arises
from political policy. All my focus group participants believed that in China, political
decision making and policies have played an important role in uneven regional
development and are still the decisive factors in economic and other development
inequalities. In contemporary China, corruption is persistent and may create political
instability and cause a legitimacy crisis for the regime. Although the current Chinese
government has made an effort to organise anti-corruption campaigns, corruption has
increased dramatically since 1978 and has become even worse since the 1990s. It is
obvious that the central government’s anti-corruption efforts are quite inadequate
because of the character of the current political system (He, 2000; Wedeman, 2005).
Further political reform towards democracy is essential and could allow China to
control corruption more effectively.
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Chapter 9 Conclusion
9.1 Introduction
Since the initiation of economic reform in 1978, China ’ s economy has been
growing at a higher rate than any other country, with an approximate annual GDP
growth rate of 10% (see Figure 9- 1) (CBS, various years). However, during the
ongoing Reform, China is also suffering from large inequalities, such as in income,
education and health care, and especially between different groups of people
(according to age, gender and social class) and between different regions (Wang and
Chen, 2007; Hannum and Wang, 2006; Zhang, 2005; Gao. 2004; Levin, 2001; Lee,
2000).
Figure 9- 1: GDP from 1952 to 2012 (Unit: Billions of RMB)
This thesis comes to the conclusion that development involves changes in
economic structures and growth, and also contributes to inequality in a wide range of
spheres, such as education, healthcare and life expectancy. However, economic
factors are not alone in contributing to such inequalities resulting from development,
and historical, socio-political, demographic, cultural, institutional and ecological
factors are all demonstrated to be equally relevant to the study. Development can be
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assessed at a number of scales: the individual, the local community, the regional, the
national and the global (among others) (Liu and Wu, 2008；Deng and Moore, 2004;
Akita, 2001). Fine-scale analysis reveals more significant results when applied not
just at the macro, national scale, but also at a number of different local scales. In
comparison to the provincial level, researching at the county level results are in a
better understanding of development and economic, social, political and ideological
inequality in China. Such research offers a new vision of the relationships between
forces at the regional and national scales, and people’s daily lives in their
communities.
Thus, the central aims of this thesis are to understand the current spatial and
regional inequality in China at different scales, to explore the relationship between
development and inequality and to explain the factors contributing to and resulting in
the inequality underlying China’s impressive macro-economic development. By using
multivariate analysis through critical analysis of the detailed and large quantity of
county-level data, I find uneven regional development was inevitable in China ’ s
development because the Chinese government introduced preferential socio-spatial
policies both historically, between 1949 and 1978, as well as during the process of
economic reform beginning in 1978. Second, the inequality conversional point can
only be reached through government efforts to reduce inequalities in production,
education, health and politics because the severe disparity not only restrains economic
growth but also affects social-spatial stability. Third, although the Chinese
government is making efforts to reduce disparities, the analysis of data relating to
economic growth and economic, social and political inequality –both statistical data
from the last 30 years and my fieldwork data –suggests that the government’s policies
are inadequate for the purposes of reducing entrenched patterns of county-level and
regional inequality.
This thesis comes to the conclusion that development involves changes in
economic structures and growth, and also contributes to inequality in a wide range of
spheres, such as education, healthcare and life expectancy. However, economic
factors are not alone in contributing to such inequalities resulting from development,
and historical, socio-political, demographic, cultural, institutional and ecological
factors are all demonstrated to be equally relevant to the study. Development can be
assessed at a number of scales: the individual, the local community, the regional, the
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national and the global (among others) (Liu and Wu, 2008；Deng and Moore, 2004;
Akita, 2001). Fine-scale analysis reveals more significant results when applied not
just at the macro, national scale, but also at a number of different local scales. In
comparison to the provincial level, researching at the county level can present a better
understanding of development and economic, social, political and ideological
inequality in China. Such research offers a new mutli-scalar vision of the relationships
between forces at the regional and national scales, and people’s everyday lives in their
communities and counties. Therefore, the multi-scalar and quotient nature of regional
inequality should be studied further at an everyday level. County-level analysis can
achieve complementary insights to current provincial-level research rather than
replacing provincial-level research per se. Data at both levels should be used in order
to maximise its overall value because complementary insights can be obtained from
multi-scalar analysis. Similarly, Kornai (2006) examines the changes of the Central
Eastern European region and finds that the scale and pace of transformation is
astonishingly fast and yet socially and geographically uneven for citizens and
communities. Rapid social and political transformation causes significant inequality
because dramatic restructuring so often goes hand in hand with an uneven distribution
of income and consumption.
9.2 Conceptual and Empirical Contributions
Development should not be observed solely in terms of economic change, and the
impact of cultural, political and ideological change should be equally considered. In
particular, it is clear that the economic dimension has been prioritised in academic
discussions about development and that, as a result, social and political inequality has
received less scholarly attention (Stigilitz, 2006；Sen, 1999; Simon, 1997; Unwin,
1994; Saches, 1992; Smith, 1984). In addition, current literature concerning China’s
regional development and inequality mainly focuses on the provincial level, with
limited studies at the county level (Knight, 2008; Fan and Sun, 2008; Wan and Zhang,
2006; Xu and Li, 2006; ye and Wei, 2005; Wei and Ye, 2004; Huang and Leung,
2002; Willams, 2002; GU et al., 2001). The scalar nature of regional inequality can be
studied further at a finer sale. This thesis, therefore, fills these gaps in the literature
and is the first systematic attempt to investigate, at the county level, the spatial
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differences to be found in social and political, as well as economic, development
across China. The thesis covers the following four innovative aspects:
First, unlike most previous studies, which have all been based on provincial data
(such as Fan and Sun, 2008; Ho and Li, 2008; Knight, 2008; Wan and Zhang, 2006),
this thesis investigates at the county scale, providing significantly more detailed and
accurate analysis. A county-scale perspective enables a study of the relationships
between inequalities at larger and smaller scales, even taking into account everyday
life experiences (Wei, 1999).
Second, much of the previous research (conducted mainly by economists) has
paid attention to economic indices and seldom mentions the social and political
factors which have had an enormous influence on China ’ s economic development.
Social inequality in particular remains less well studied (Kanbur, Qian and Zhang,
2008; Zhang and Wan, 2006; Hertel and Zhai, 2006). This thesis extends the indices
to the social and political factors contributing to developmental inequality. It draws
comparisons between social and economic inequality at a range of scales and analyses
how certain geopolitical factors influence China ’ s regional social and economic
strategies. One of the key innovative features of this research is the fact that it seeks to
draw comparisons between social and economic differences at a range of scales and it
demonstrates a willingness to consider how certain political factors have influenced
China’s regional social and economic strategies.
Third, in China there are only 31 provinces but at least 2000 counties. In China,
the county rather than the province is the fundamental economic, social and political
unit. Therefore, it follows that China’s spatial inequalities can be better explained at
the county level. However, the huge amount of data collection, organisation and
analysis presents a real challenge for the researcher, which has resulted in county-
level research lagging far behind that at the provincial scale. The methodology of this
thesis includes using GIS so that the data could be scientifically interpreted and a set
of distinctive images could be produced to display the research findings. This research
therefore adopts an innovative approach in its use of GIS techniques to analyse the
economic data from over 2000 counties and reveal in depth the spatial distribution of
economic, social and political development in China. This method provides an
alternative perspective to those suggested in current regional development studies.
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Fourth, excluding the data collected from the official statistical yearbook and
documents, the research project aimed to examine data relating to individual
experiences of development and inequality by investigating a series of case studies.
These case studies were located across five counties, with three from Gansu province
in west China, one from Hubei province in central China and a final one from
Guangdong province in south China. This thesis analyses empirical data from five
counties, collected from focus groups, questionnaires and interviews, in order to
explain the ways in which people from different contextual backgrounds (according to
age, gender, place, location, social status and ethnicity) respond to disparities in
development. The empirical data places a special emphasis on certain factors which
might impact upon the study participants, such as personal income, expenditure and
savings; access to education, health care and social welfare; the impact of central
government preferential policies and local government; and, finally, people’s values
and beliefs. The thesis also investigates the causes of these disparities and suggests
practical means for alleviating such inequalities through the findings of the case
studies.
9.3 Main Findings and Policy Implications
Regional development and spatial inequality in China is an area of research that
has caught the interest of a considerable number of scholars. Resulting research has
mainly focused on the implications of development theory and development strategies
in this transitional and developing country.
Overall, based on a database of all the counties in China from 1999 to 2006 and
field surveys conducted in five counties, the main findings of this study are
summarised below:
In general, China ’ s progress in terms of its economic development has been
impressive and significant. Between 1996 and 2006, all five counties investigated
experienced rapid economic growth. In addition, this thesis’ analysis of economic
growth and income diversity over the last twenty years has demonstrated that the
inequality of income has increased with economic growth. This inequality is still
widening and has not reached its maximum conversional point yet (Lu, 2008).
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Preferential policies such as regional development strategies (Démurger et al., 2002a;
2002b), urban-biased policies (Fang et al., 2002), the inter-governmental transfer
system and national security planning are the main causes for such inequality (Tsui,
2005). Economic factors impacting on inequality include regional public
infrastructure (Démurger, 2001), FDI and exports (Ng and Tuae, 2003), fiscal
decentralisation (Qiao et al., 2008), the reform of SOEs and inter-regional trade
protection. In addition, a diverse range of geographical factors also play an important
role (Wei and Fang, 2006).
Although individual incomes have significantly increased, overall, the results of
the decomposition framework show that the income gap between the western, central
and coastal areas widened as income growth accelerated in the coastal areas. The
rural-urban income gap was not as severe as statistical data suggested. In addition, the
rural-urban income gap in coastal regions is found to be narrower than the rural-urban
income gap inland. Inequalities in income between genders and between different
ethnic groups are widening. Income inequality between different social classes leads
to social and economic tensions. Consumption patterns vary between urban and rural
areas, between coastal and inland counties, and between different social classes. At
present, the poorest populations are concentrated in the western provinces and the
remote and mountainous areas, where economic development is obstructed by the
lack of basic infrastructure and limited human resources. Even in the regions with a
more developed economic environment, poor people have increasingly struggled. In
the meantime, compared to rural poverty, rising urban poverty may cause greater
social and political instability because the urban residents are comparatively more
powerful and more politically organised.
In contemporary China, the transition from a planned to a market economy is
likely to extend the social inequality between locations, urban and rural regions and
different groups of people (Chen and Lu, 2008; Wong and Lu, 2002; Sorensen, 1996).
China’s birth control policy has reduced population fertility but it has also generated
an ageing society and gender imbalance. Social class stratification is still forming
within this transitional society, and education has lost its importance within social
mobility processes. Political decision making and policies have played an important
role in uneven regional development and are still decisive factors in economic and
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other development inequalities. Corruption is persistent and may influence political
instability and cause a legitimacy crisis for the regime. Although the current Chinese
government has made an effort to organise anti-corruption campaigns, the central
government’s anti-corruption efforts are inadequate because of the character of the
current political system. Corruption has increased dramatically since 1978 and has
become even worse since the 1990s. As a result, political reform towards democracy
is essential and could allow China to control corruption more effectively.
Given that economic, social and political inequality is still increasing and has not
yet reached its maximum conversional point, it is essential that the Chinese
government introduces policies to relieve spatial disparity and build a harmonious
society. First, agriculture plays an essential role for the poor as a source of
employment and income. Some areas do not have strong agricultural resources and
endowments where off-farm employment or migration may help them to escape
poverty (Tabuchi, 1988). Therefore, the local government needs to pay more attention
to labour mobility. As some areas have strong agricultural resources, the government
may help to overcome obstacles for individuals by offering small loans, constructing
physical infrastructure, fostering links within the community and expanding markets
to boost the local economy. Second, constructing physical infrastructure in rural areas,
particularly roads, should be a high priority for the government when investing in
rural development because it may create opportunities for the poor population to help
themselves. Third, the central government ought to deliver and finance core public
services such as education, health care and social security; responsibility for these
services is frequently pushed down to lower-level governments without the central
provision of sufficient financial support, producing huge fiscal disparities across
regions. If the central government provides poor regions with more and better quality
services, it will alleviate costs to the local government and local people. Fourth, the
current political system needs political reform. In particular, attempts to encourage a
more democratic system and anti-corruption efforts are inadequate.
9.4 Challenges and Constraints
Denscombe (2007:146) assert that researchers should ‘try to learn as much from our
shortcomings as from our successes’. Therefore, awareness of challenges and
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constraints is essential for researchers. I summarise some of the key challenges and
constraints of this thesis in this sections.
One of the main difficulties in conducting my research was the collection and
processing of the huge amount of data required for analysis, which comprised around
500,000 statistical data sets. The county-level data set is over 67 times larger than the
provincial data set in terms of any single index. There are over 2000 counties
(including county-level cities) and, from 1992 to 2006, over 20 indices were collected
per county per year. The construction of this database was a very time-consuming task
as some of the data provided by NBS was not in digital format. Such data had to be
manually inputted or adjusted into a digital format and further processed by analysis
tools such as Stata and GIS. Although this study has a limited data set, it has proved
very useful to the thesis’ aim of further analysing and understanding different aspects
of regional development at the county level in China.
Due to the limited levels of funding and a lack of institutional support, carrying
out research on China is challenging (Scoggins, 2014). It is very important of
knowing people and social networks although gender and place of birth may matter as
well. This has resulted in some constraints during the field survey. For example, I
encountered difficulties in judging the total amount of grey income and its distribution
pattern. Further research is required into methods for judging the income inequality in
different social classes, and the relationship between gender and income inequality
during the Reform. Therefore, a future empirical field survey might wish to examine
grey income inequality in more depth.
9.5 Possible Research Directions in Future
During the ongoing processes of the Reform period, continuous reforms, rapid
change and extraordinary growth have stimulated many debates about China.
Regional development theory has identified a number of issues emerging from China’
s transition process, which may provide possible directions for future research.
First, future research needs to pay more attention to areas in central and western
China. At present, most papers and projects focus on globalising cities such as Beijing
and Shanghai; coastal regions such as the Yangtze Estuary and the Pearl River
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Estuary; or other core cities in the coastal area such as Wenzhou (Yeung and Lin,
2003). Such a regional bias may partly be due to the fact that data can be more
accessible for scholars working in local areas. For example, scholars in Hong Kong,
many trained in the West, are particularly interested in studying the cities in, and the
development of, the Pearl River Estuary.
Second, the role of the local government in China ’ s regional development and
transformation needs to be further studied. There are complexities not only in
relations between the global, national and local scales, but also between the economic,
social and political dimensions of development, raising many research issues for
future investigations.
Third, the theoretical framework through which development and inequality is
discussed is deeply sited in Western theory, meaning that the theoretical contexts of
China and other developing countries have been ignored (Dawkins, 2003; Yeung and
Lin, 2003). However, with the Reform and its transitional processes still ongoing, it is
difficult to use existing Western--based theoretical models to accommodate its
dynamics and complications (Pannell, 2007). Indeed, it is challenging to construct
theoretical models and launch an empirical field survey at a moment of ongoing
Chinese transition and transformation. Therefore, more research is required to
facilitate the creation of new theoretical models through which county and provincial
level data can be better analysed and Chinese development and transition can be
better understood through multi-scalar modelling and data collection.
Since the initiation of Reform in 1978 and particularly since China opened to
the West in the mid-1980s, quantitative research methods, development models and
spatial geographical models have been a focus for researchers in China. Scholars
turned to the West to find alternative development models and strategies in academic
inquiry such as Kuznets Curve model to explain China ’ s reform policy and
development strategy (Fan, Kanbur and Zhang, 2011; Aandahl, 2005). Furthermore,
theoretical frameworks of transition, transformation, globalisation, can also contribute
to understanding China’s current development and inequality. For example, Rose and
Viju (2014) display that income inequality has become a significant problem in
Central and Eastern European countries during their transition process because of its
economic, demographic, political, and cultural and environmental factors. Fedorov
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(2002:443) state ‘Increasing regional inequality and regional polarization are
becoming a serious policy concern in modern day Russia’ because of export shares of
regions. Rapid social and political transformation causes significant inequality
because dramatic restructuring so often goes hand in hand with an uneven distribution
of income (Curwin and Mahutga, 2014; Aghion and Commander, 1999). Kornai
(2006) examines the changes of the Central Eastern European region and finds that
the scale and pace of transformation is astonishingly fast and yet socially and
geographically uneven for citizens and communities.
In sum, development and inequality can be assessed at a number of scales: the
individual, the local community, the regional, the national and the global (among
others) (Liu and Wu, 2008；Deng and Moore, 2004; Akita, 2001). Although my
researching at the county level can present a detailed understanding of development
and economic, social, political and ideological inequality in comparison to the
provincial level, both the provincial-level data and county-level data should be used in
order to maximise overall value because complementary insights can be obtained
from multi-scalar vision. According to current county data and provincial data,
uneven regional development was inevitable in China ’ s development because the
Chinese government introduced preferential socio-spatial policies both historically as
well as during the process of economic reform beginning in 1978. In addition, the
inequality conversional point has not reached yet because government’s policies are
inadequate for the purposes of reducing regional inequality (Zhang et al., 2008; Wei,
2007 and Fleisher, 2006).
Development involves changes in economic structures and growth, and
contributes to inequality in a wide range of spheres, such as education, healthcare and
life expectancy. Economic factors are not alone in contributing to such inequalities
resulting from development, and historical, socio-political, demographic, cultural,
institutional and ecological factors are all demonstrated to be equally relevant to the
study (Bramall, 2008; Chang, 2006; Fan, 1997). Therefore, multi-scalar analysis
reveals significant results not only at regional scale, but also at a number of different
local scales. County-level analysis can achieve complementary insights to current
provincial-level research rather than replacing provincial-level research per se.
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Appendix 1: Focus Groups Guide
I. Introduction – as the moderator, I will present an overview of the goals of the
discussion and introduce the participants to one another (Approximately 10 minutes)
This discussion is about economic growth and social development. In particular,
it covers: how local people react to, and understand, the rapid economic development
and widening disparities between urban and rural regions and rich and poor people;
and how the development and disparities affect their well-being and relationships with
other ethnic groups, neighbours, family members, relatives, friends and communities.
My intention is to explain the inequality phenomena, discover the reasons behind the
disparities between ethnic groups and communities, and seek practical means of
alleviating such inequalities at the county level in China.
Introduction: My name is Man Xu and I am a PhD student at the Department of
Geography, Royal Holloway University of London. Today’s discussion will be used
as a case study for my PhD thesis. All information will be used for the research
purpose only and all personal information will be kept confidential.
Then, introduce each participant, including their names and professions.
II. Discussion Building Stage (Approximately 10 minutes)
Easily answered questions are used to encourage participants to begin talking and
sharing. Undoubtedly, China’s economic reform has so far been very successful and
in the past 20 years China has experienced dramatic economic growth. All
participants will be asked how their personal life has changed as a result and how they
value the changes, i.e. positively or negatively.
Question: How has your life changed in economic, social, political and cultural
ways in the last 30 years? Could you give some examples? (Approximately 10
minutes)
(Prompt: Thirty years ago what were the three most valuable household assets
you had, and what are they now? E.g. watch, bicycle, sewing machine, TV,
refrigerator, washing machine, computer, mobile phone, air conditioner, house, car)
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(Prompt: Have your living conditions changed significantly in the last 30 years?
E.g. house size, quality of building material and surrounding environment)
(Prompt: What are your most significant current expenditures? What were they
30 years ago? E.g. house, education, health care, food and clothes, entertainment)
III. In-depth Discussion Stage (Approximately 70 minutes)
Focus on the main questions in line of the topic guide, encouraging conversation
to reveal participants’ feelings and thoughts. All questions may be asked.
Understanding of “development” - The term “development” has been debated
continuously since the establishment of development studies in the 1940s, as views
about the definition change over time in association with world economic
development stages and events (Potter, 2004).There is no single widely accepted
definition of “development”. All participants will be asked about their own
understanding of the word “development”.
Question: How do you understand development? (Approximately 5 minutes).
Types of activities - Western scholars suggest that all groups of people have four
main types of activities: economic, social, political and ideological (e.g. Unwin 1994).
Does this criterion fit with Chinese people? All participants will be asked about their
activities. This question can then be extended further, asking if these activities have
changed from before the establishment of People’s Republic of China in 1949,
through Mao’s era (1949-1976), to the present.
Question: Do you think all groups of people have different types of activities?
(Approximately 5 minutes).
Understanding the disparity and inequality in China - So far China’ s economic
reform has been very successful and, in the past 20 years, China has experienced
dramatic economic growth. However, the Chinese government has admitted that
immense disparities now exist in China between regions, between urban and rural
residents, and between rich and poor people. These disparities pose a vital threat to
China’s future national economy, which will inevitably influence its social stability.
296
Thus the ideology of the latest Five-Year Plan (11th) has changed from “get rich first”
to “common prosperity” (Fan, 2006). All participants will be shown a map of the
GDP in different parts of China and different parts of Gansu province.
Question: This is a map of GDP in different parts of China. Why do you think
that these differences exist? (Approximately 5 minutes).
Question: This is a map of GDP in different parts of Gansu? Why do you think
that these differences exist? (Approximately 5 minutes).
Reasons for disparity - All participants will be asked if they consider disparity to
be the most important issue for social stability, what causes disparity and inequality,
and why. They will also be asked for suggestions for alleviating disparity and
inequality and encouraging sustainable development. They will also be asked about
the key obstacles preventing China from achieving sustainable and harmonious
development.
Question: Why do you think that disparities exist and have worsened in present-
day China? (Approximately 15 minutes).
(Prompt: Economic factors: income, grey income, expenditure, consumption,
saving, etc.; social factors: gender, social welfare, social injustice, education, health
care, etc.; political/policy factors: preferential policies, government efficiency, etc.;
cultural and religious factors: different development expectations according to
cultures, religions and ethnic groups, etc.; natural resources/conditions; personal
factors: laziness, lack of willpower or poor luck).
Question: Do you think disparity is an inevitable part of modern life? How do
you think the government or other organizations could alleviate disparity?
(Approximately 10 minutes).
(Prompt: Economic development strategy; social development strategy;
preferential policies)
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Question: How have disparities changed in China in the last 30 years? Do you
prefer Mao’s China or present-day China, and why? (Approximately 15 minutes).
China’s future and prospects for ordinary people’s lives - Two different opinions
are currently expressed about China’s future. Fan (1997) states that those who have
become rich first will consequently bring prosperity to other ordinary people; while
Jun (2006) warns that the great inequalities will eventually affect China’s economic
and social stability, and that China ’ s economy will soon collapse. In line with this
debate, all participants will be asked about their personal views of China’s future and
its impact on their own life, as well as the key obstacles preventing China from
achieving sustainable and harmonious development.
Question: What do you think will happen in the future in China with respect to
disparity? (Approximately 10 minutes).
IV. Close (Approximately 10 minutes)
I will summarise the impressions and make conclusions about the information
gathered, which gives participants the opportunity to clarify, confirm or even
elaborate.
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Appendix 2: Questionnaire
To participant:
This questionnaire is for PhD research on the social and economic situation of your county,
with the main aim of exploring the reasons for disparities between rich and poor people. I would
appreciate it if you could complete this questionnaire. All responses will remain anonymous and
confidential. Please try to answer all the questions that are relevant to you. Thank you for taking
part.
Section One: Basic Understanding
1. In your view, what is the meaning of development? (Please tick one answer)
 National enhancement
 Economic growth
 Social, economic and technological change
 Increases in economic wealth of a group of people
 Other (specify) ________
2. Thinking about the period of old China (before liberation, i.e. 1949), Mao’s era and the
present, could you describe these three periods of time in four words? (Please write down
one answer in each box)
First Word Second Word Third Word Forth Word
Old China
Mao’s era
Present
Section Two: Economy
3. Please tick the three most valuable items in your household.
 Watch
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 Bicycle
 Sewing machine
 TV
 Refrigerator
 Washing machine
 Computer
 Mobile phone
 Air conditioning
 House
 Car
 Other (please specify)____________
4. What kind of property do you inhabit? Size? : (Please tick one answer)
 Provided by work unit/government/enterprise as welfare
 Purchased without mortgage/loan  , and how much did you pay for your
accommodation? _________
 Purchased with mortgage/loan  , and how much did/do you pay monthly for the
mortgage? ______
 Rented from private landlord  , and how much do you pay monthly in rent?
____________
 Other(specify) ____________
5. Please rank the following expenditures made by your family from high to low. (Please put
highest in first box and lowest in sixth box)
1 2 3 4 5 6
a. House
b. Education
c. Health care
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d. Food
e. Entertainment
f. Other (please specify)_____
6. Do you or your family members have health insurance?(Please tick one answer):
 Yes
 No
Please specify approximately how much you or your family members have spent for the
health care in the last year, including hospital bed, medicine and all other fees? (If you have
health insurance, please let me know the fees you paid for the insurance and other fees that
insurance does not cover) ____________
Do you think if health care cost is affordable? (Please tick one answer)
 Yes
 No
7. Please specify how many years do you in school? ____________
8. Please specify how much you or your family members have spent in total on education in
the last year____________
What was this expenditure for? (Please tick one or more answers):
 Nursery
 Primary school
 Secondary school
 Higher education
 Professional training
 Other (please specify)__________________________
9. In your opinion, which of following employment situations is the best to work in? (Please
put the best one in first box and the worst in seventh box)
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
a. Private firm/company
b. State-owned-enterprise
c. Central or local government
d. Hospitals or other health services
e. Education
f. Own a private firm/company or small business
g. Farmer
10. Except salary and bonus, do you have other income resources? (Please tick one answer):
 Yes
 No
 If Yes, please specify______________
11. Thinking about annual income, what is your annual income scale at the moment?
(Please tick one answer)
Below
2000
Yuan
2000 to
5000
Yuan
5000
to
15000
Yuan
15000
to
30000
Yuan
30000
to
50000
Yuan
50000
to
100000
Yuan
Above
100000
Yuan
Your
annual
income
12. Thinking about saving, what is your percentage rate approximately?(Please tick one answer)
0% 0% to
10%
10%
to
30%
30% to
50%
50% to
70%
Above
70%
Your
saving
rate
13. How do you judge the economic growth of your county? (Please tick one answer)
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 Very fast 
 Fast 
 Average 
 Slow 
 Very slow 
How many of your family members reside outside of your household (HuKou registration)
for more than six months? (Please tick one answer)
 None 
 1
 2
 3
 More than 3 
Section Three: Social Features
14. Which of the following social problems do you think will affect social stability the most?
(Please tick one answer)
 Drugs
 Gambling
 Mafia
 Prurient
 Crime, including fraud
15. Please rank the following social classes according to which is the most admirable. (Put the
most admirable in first box and the least admirable in tenth box)
a. Peasants
b. Peasant labourers
c. Working class
d. Urban cadres
e. Rural cadres
f. Private entrepreneurs
g. Managers
h. Household business owners, individual Manufacturers and traders
i. Professionals
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j. Intellectuals
16. Please tick which government benefits you receive:
 Complete free compulsory education
 Free health care for children under 18 and above 65
 Health insurance for people between 18 and 65
 Retirement national pension for people over 65
17. How many children do you have?(Please tick one answer)
 None 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 More than 3 
18. Do you live with your parents/grandparents/children/grandchildren? (Please tick one answer)
 Yes
 No 
If no, how often do you contact your parents/grandparents/children/grandchildren?
Here, contact means calling, visiting or providing financial/practical support.
How often do you contact your relatives and neighbours? Here, relatives include siblings,
cousins, uncles, aunties, etc. (Please tick one answer for each item)
Never Less
often
than once
a month
At least
once a
month
At least
once a
week
At least
once a
day
Parents/grandparents/
children/grandchildre
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n
Relatives
Neighbours
Section Four: Politics
19. Do you agree with the following statements? (Please circle one that meets your agreement)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree No
opinion
Agree Strongly
Agree
Compared with the pre-
open-door period, you are
more satisfied with the
current central
government’s policies
Compared with the pre-
open-door period, you are
more satisfied with
current county-level
government polices
Compared with the pre-
open-door period,
disparity is getting more
serious
It is the government’s
responsibility to solve the
disparity problem
20. Which of the following local government units you are most satisfied with? (Please put the
one you are most satisfied with in first box and the one you are least satisfied with in the
ninth box):
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
a. County Government
305
b. Local Tax Bureau
c. County Hygiene Bureau
d. County Cultural and Education Bureau
e. County Public Security Bureau
f. County Court and Procuratorate Bureau
g. County Finance Bureau
h. Township Government
i. Village Committee
21. Which of the following do you think is the biggest threat to China ’ s political stability?
(Please tick one answer)
 Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan independence
 Natural disaster
 Corruption
 Disparity
 Others (please specify)_____________
Section Five: Ideology, religion and culture
22. Do you think that culture is an important influence on economic and social development?
(Please tick one answer)
 Yes
 No 
If yes, which culture do you think most influences economic and social development in
China? (Please tick one answer)
 Traditional Confucianism
 Traditional Chinese culture (other than Confucianism)
 Christian culture
 Other Western culture (other than Christian)
 Other (please specify)_____________________
23. Please choose your three favourite types of entertainment. (Please tick three answers)
 Traditional operas
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 Mahjong
 Traditional calligraphy and painting
 Classical poetry and novels
 Hong Kong and Taiwanese popular music
 Disco and karaoke
 Oil painting
 Other (please specify)_____________________
24. Do you have any religious beliefs? (Please tick one answer)
 Yes
 No 
If yes, please tick one answer
o Communism
o Christian
o Muslin
o Buddhist
o Daoism
o Confucianism
o Other (please specify) ________
Section Six: Personal Information
This is the last section. It would be very helpful for my research if you could tell me about
yourself, so that I can analyse the results by interpreting how people from different backgrounds
respond to the issues raised.
25. Do you live in a town or in a village? (Please tick one answer)
 Town
 Village
26. Legal marital status: (Please tick one answer)
 Married
 Single (includes divorced, widow and widower)
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27. Gender (Please tick one answer):
 Male
 Female
28. Age:(Please tick one answer)
 21-40
 41-60
 61 and over
29. Ethnic group: (Please tick one answer)
 Han
 Muslim
 Tibetan
 Other (Please specify)____
30. Education: your highest education level: (Please tick one answer)
 No education
 Primary school
 Secondary school and professional training
 University/college degree
 Postgraduate/PhD
31. Occupation: (Please tick one answer)
 Peasant
 Peasant labourer
 Working class
 Urban cadre
 Rural cadre
 Private entrepreneur
 Manager
 Household business owner, individual manufacturers and traders
 Professional
 Intellectual
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Appendix 3: Interview Guide
To interviewee:
China ’ s economy is currently growing at a rate faster than that of any other
country, with annual GDP increasing by approximately 10% per year in the past two
decades. However, the inequality between rich and poor has been growing
continuously and rapidly for some time. Local people in different parts of China have
different reactions and understandings of rapid economic development and widening
disparities. I would like you to talk about the development and disparities based on
your own experience. Please tell me your own story, your understanding of
development and disparity and the reasons behind the disparity, and possible ways to
alleviate the disparity. I would like to talk about the following issues:
1. Understanding of development.
2. Economic, social, political and ideological development in China and your life
over the past 30 years.
3. Understanding of disparity, causes of disparity and suggestions for sustainable
development.
4. Imperative challenges for the government.
5. China’s future and impacts on ordinary people’s lives.
I would greatly appreciate your kind assistance. All these conversations will be
used only for the purpose of my PhD research.
Section 1 Understandings of “development” and “disparity”.
The first section starts with basic understandings.
1. We hear about “development” everywhere in China. What is your understanding
of it, and why? In your view, what are the key dimensions of development, and
why?
- Definition (Prompt: national enhancement; economic growth; social,
economic and technological change; increased economic wealth of a group of
people)
- Dimensions (Prompt: economic, social, political, ideological, etc.)
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2. According to the Oxford Dictionary, “disparity” means inequality related to
economic, social or political differences in a country, province, state, continent or
people. It is often considered as a consequence of development. What is your
understanding of disparity, and why?
- Definitions (Prompt: inequality, unfair)
Section 2 Economic, social, political and ideological development in China
and its impact on your life over the last 30 years.
Data from the Statistical Yearbook and findings from my pilot survey show that
there have been huge changes since economic reform began. In this section, all
interviewees will be asked for their point of view as to how China as a whole has
changed, if they feel that their own life has changed as a result, and how they value
the changes.
3. Could you describe the improvement in China’s economic development and your
own economic condition?
- What are the major changes you have witnessed in China ’ s economic
development? Could you give some examples?
- What are the major economic improvements you have witnessed in your
town/village? Could you give some examples?
- How has your individual and household income changed? What are they?
- Do you own your apartment/house? How big is it? How much did you pay for
it?
- Thirty years ago what were the three most valuable household assets you had,
and what are they now? (Prompts: Watch, bicycle, sewing machine, TV,
refrigerator, washing machine, computer, mobile phone, air conditioner, house,
car)
- Has the condition of your house changed significantly in the last 30 years?
(Prompts: house size, quality of building material and surrounding
environment)
- What are your most significant current expenditures? What were they 30 years
ago? (Prompts: house, education, health care, food and clothes, entertainment)
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4. Social Development:
- What are today’s most severe social problems? What were they 30 years ago?
(Prompts: drugs, gambling, mafia, prurient, criminality and crime-related
fraud)
- In your opinion, how many social classes exist in present-day China? What are
they? What were they 30 years ago? (Prompts: peasants, peasant labourers,
working class, urban cadres, rural cadres, private entrepreneurs, managers,
household business owners and individual manufacturers and traders,
professionals, intellectuals)
- Have you heard of the minimum livelihood guarantee? Do you know about
any other social welfare offers?
- What are the major differences in your health care conditions now compared
to the period before economic reform? What about the cost in particular? Are
you able to afford it?
- How do you value the education? What are the major differences in education
conditions between the present and the period before economic reform? What
about the cost in particular? Are you able to afford it?
- Has the relationship between family members changed from 30 years ago to
the present? (Prompts: Becoming closer? No change? Drifting apart?)
5. Political Development:
- What are your understandings of the government’s policy changes?
- Local government governance
- What is the most serious threat to political stability in China? (Prompts:
Tibetan independence, Xingjiang independence, Taiwanese independence,
corruption , disparity)
6. Culture and Religion
- How has culture changed from 30 years ago in China? (Prompts: traditional
Confucianism or Western culture affecting China more than before, less than
before or no change).
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- How has religion changed from 30 years ago in China?
- How important is religion or religious belief to your life?
- How important are religion and religious beliefs to socio-economic
development?
7. Changes of Environment
- Improvements. (Prompts: beautiful cities and towns with plants and clean,
wide streets)
- Pollution. (Prompts: water, atmosphere, etc.)
8. I would like you to describe your typical daily activities
- Your working time
- Your transportation
- Your job tasks
- Your social life
- Your family
- Your entertainment
Section 3 Imperative challenges for the government.
What are the key obstacles preventing China from achieving sustainable and
harmonious development? Why?
9. Economic challenges
- Economic growth
- Economic structure balance
- Regional development balance
- Income disparity
10. Social challenges
- Social welfare reform
- Education reform
- Health care system reform
- Social inequality
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11. Political challenges
- Political stability
- Corruption
- Disparity
- Good governance
- Political reform
12. Ideological challenges
13. Environmental and resource challenges
- Environmental deterioration
- Diminishing natural resources
Section 4 Causes of disparity and suggestions for sustainable development.
The Chinese government has admitted that immense disparities now exist in
China between regions, between urban and rural residents, and between rich and poor
people. These disparities pose a vital threat to China’s future national economy, which
will inevitably influence its social stability. Thus the ideology of the latest Five-Year
Plan (11th) has changed from “get rich first” to “common prosperity” (Fan, 2006). All
interviewees will be asked what challenges they think China is facing. In this section,
I would like to know about interviewees’ understandings of current disparity in China,
opinions on the causes of disparity and suggestions to alleviate disparity.
14. Thinking about Mao’s China and present-day China, which society has less
disparity? Which society do you prefer? Why?
15. What factors cause disparity and how?
- Economic factors (Prompt: income, grey income, expenditure, consumption,
savings, etc.)
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- Social factors (Prompt: gender, social welfare, social injustice, education,
health care, etc.)
- Political/policy factors (Prompt: preferential policies, government efficiency,
etc.)
- Cultural and religious factors (Prompt: different development expectations
according to cultures, religions and ethnic groups, etc.)
- Natural resources/conditions (Prompt: oil fields resources, tourism resources)
- Personal factors (Prompt: laziness, lack of willpower or poor luck).
16. Do you think disparity is an inevitable part of modern life? How do you think the
government or other organizations could alleviate disparity?
- Economic development strategy
- Social development strategy
- Preferential policies
Section 5 China’s future prospects and impacts on ordinary people’s lives
Two different opinions are currently expressed about China’s future. Fan (1997)
states that those who have become rich first will consequently bring prosperity to
other ordinary people; while Jun (2006) warns that the great inequalities will
eventually affect China ’ s economic and social stability, and that China ’ s economy
will soon collapse. In line with this debate, all interviewees will be asked about their
personal views of China ’ s future and its impact on their own life, and the reasons
behind their judgement.
17. What do you think China’s future will be? Why?
18. Do you think China will achieve sustainable and harmonious development?
(Prompt: positive, negative). How will China’s future relate to your own life?
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